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Abstract 
The Logic of (dis)Order 
How the Discourse on Peace, Conflict and Development Serves to Reproduce 
Inequity, Injustice, Violence and War: The Case of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, 
the Oslo Peace Accords and the Interim Period of 1993-2000 
By Elizabeth A. McCormack 
Abstract: This thesis is primarily concerned with the thinking, writing and 
speaking on problems of peace, conflict and development. It explores how the 
historicity of development thinking, guided by the assumption that economic 
prosperity yields peace and social security, functions primarily as a deployment of 
power: a regime of knowledge. It argues the discourse (concepts, ideas, 
assumptions) on, or ways of thinking about, peace, conflict and development 
obfuscates the root causes of conflict, and reproduces inequity, injustice, violence 
and war. It seeks to illustrate the gap between how development thinkers and 
practitioners come to know a problem, and how that problem is experienced on 
the ground. The case of the Oslo Peace Accords and Interim Period will show the 
dependency of contexts of "complex emergency" on external agents and agendas 
of development, and their assumptions, concepts, and ideas, necessarily 
rearticulates a local, historical, institutionally embedded dependency, and deep 
social divisions. 
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My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is 
not the same thing as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have 
something to do [...] I think the ethico-political choice we have to make every day 
is to determine which is the main danger —Michel Foucault 
Posing the Problem 
According to the United Nations, two-thirds of countries in the world suffer from 
latent tension and violent conflict. The greatest threat to the prevention, 
management, and reconciliation of conflict and war is no longer posed by inter 
state actors. Rather, multiple social, political, economic, ideological, and cultural 
dynamics draw a wide assortment of people into various forms of collective 
violence (Reychler and Paffenholz (eds) 2001; UN 2005b). Today, intra-state war 
and conflict, humanitarian crises, and the crimes of genocide and terrorism are 
considered the greatest threats to global peace. Regional conflict, religious 
militancy, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, human rights violations, 
preventative diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, unipolarity, and the role of 
non-state actors, are just some of the pressing issues currently on the international 
peace agenda (Holtz 2002; Rotham 2002; Carment and Schnabel (eds) 2003; 
Siram and Wermester 2003). 
1 Quoted in The Foucault Reader (1984), 343 
2 See <<www.un.org » 
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The field of international development interacts with the field of Conflict 
Management in the area of the effects and outcomes of war and conflict. The 
literature on development in the 1990s is dominated by the theme of the spread of 
war and conflict and its devastating impacts and effects on development and 
peace. Indeed, international development agencies and their donors are 
increasingly caught up in contexts of complex emergencies, characterized by 
protracted crisis and the collapse of the state (Uvin 1998, 1999, 2001; Gervais 
2003; Baare and Uvin 1999; Barakat and Chard 2003; Bryant and Kappaz (eds) 
2005; Debiel (ed) 2002). The processes of international development interact with 
the international peace agenda through three main areas: conflict prevention, 
humanitarian intervention and response, and peacebuilding (Bryant and Kappaz 
2005, 1-31). 
The role of donor agencies, agendas, and strategies is to contribute to 
conflict resolution (conflict prevention) with the aim of expanding/creating a 
political space, or an effective capacity, for peace (peacebuilding) (Doyle and 
Sambis 1999; Lederach 2001). The focus of development efforts in the area of 
peacebuilding is to encourage an effective capacity for peace through the 
advancement of political and civil rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; 
and the right to development (Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 1992, 1994; United Nations 
2005b). It is effective when it addresses the root causes of violence and conflict. 
Full reconstruction of states and societies, resettlement of displaced persons, 
rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators, implementing justice, are just a few 
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examples of emerging pertinent development problems (Bryant and Kappaz 2005, 
1-31; world Bank 1997, 1998; UN 2005b). 
There is a growing consensus among multilateral and bilateral donor 
agencies that intra-state conflict is often the result of structural inequality, inequity 
and injustice (World Bank 1997; OECD 1997). As stated by the OECD, 
"humanitarian assistance cannot substitute for sustained political commitment and 
action to avert crisis and support peace" (OECD 1997, 1). Turning attention to 
the structural factors that create conditions of (sustained) conflict and violence has 
taken the form of "conflict prevention" - eliminating sources of conflict that 
prevent the creation of peaceful societies precondition to development. Indeed, 
international organizations, donors, and international financial institutions have 
intensified, diversified, and broadened their intervention and response to situations 
of conflict in the post-Cold War (Baare and Uvin 1999; Uvin 1999). 
The early 1990s seemed to provide a solid basis for a 'peace optimism': 
positive peaceful developments in international relations within and among 
nations, notably the achievement of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords; the United 
Nations invited new members to join and the European Union expanded; Nelson 
Mandela was elected as President of South Africa in 1994, formally ending a 
century of apartheid rule. Yet the perception of success was soon to be interrupted 
by a resounding reality of widespread, unparalleled violence and conflict, that 
literally decimated millions of civilians, thousands of communities, entire 
countries, and whole regions: the war in the now former Yugoslavia blindsided 
the international community; anarchy, conflict, violence, genocide, state failure, 
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HIV/AIDs ravaged the African continent; the Asian markets collapsed and peace 
agreements, namely Oslo, fail. 
The Israel/Palestine Conflict and the Oslo Peace Accords (1993) 
The signing of the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords between Yassir Arafat and the PLO 
team, and the State of Israel, represented by Yitzak Rabin, was celebrated by the 
international community as an historic reconciliation to one of the twentietfi 
century's most enduring conflicts: The Israel/Palestine conflict, rooted in the 
protracted Arab/Israeli Conflict and the 'Palestine Question'. Rabin and Arafat's 
famed, albeit forced, handshake in front of the White House, symbolized not only 
the potential, but the ability for third party intervention, through mediation, 
preventative diplomacy, and negotiation, to yield comprehensive peace 
settlements. At the time, Oslo was widely regarded by the international 
community as an archetype of conflict resolution, and represented the zenith of a 
peace optimism that spans from 1989 until the mid-90s. Two years later, Rabin is 
himself assassinated by an extreme nationalist, and by 2000, violent conflict is 
fully restored between Israel and Palestinians with the outbreak of the October 
2000 El-Aqsa Intifada. 
Critics of the Accords, namely the Palestinian people themselves and their 
partners, were quick to point out in as early as 1993 that Oslo did not represent a 
just peace, and therefore could not represent a sustainable peace. Instrumental 
issues, such as the right of return for Palestinian refugees, the status of Jerusalem, 
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and the settlement of Israeli communities in the West Bank and Gaza had not been 
resolved but were instead postponed for future negotiations through the 
nomenclature of 'Final Status Issues'. The absence of these core issues from the 
final peace agreement ensured the failure of the peace accords, which when all 
told, took seven years to completely unfurl. 
The outbreak of the second intifada effectively destroyed any prospects for 
the implementation of the Oslo Accords and resolution on "final status" issues 
such as the right of return for refugees and the settlement of the Israeli 
communities in the West Bank and Gaza. Moreover, the more than three years of 
Israeli "reprisals" for and "security measures" against the intifada inter alia 
military incursions, air strikes, and extra-judicial killings, combined with the 
destruction of thousands of homes, institutions, agricultural lands and other means 
for livelihood - have resulted in the radicalization of political attitudes and the 
"de-development" of the Palestinian Territories (Ajluni 2003,64). 
The Research Problematic 
There is much debate on the ability for international development as a theory 
and/or practice(s) to help prevent conflict and war and promote peace (Lederach 
1999, 2003; Lagerquist 2003; Yapa 2002; Kippers-Black 1999; Rahema and 
Bawtree (eds) 1997). Development theory, how it is conceptualized and how it 
materializes, is the engine to all matters, manners, and practices of international 
development. It embodies not only the logic and motive behind the policies and 
prescriptions of international donors, international financial institutions, multi and 
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bilateral organizations, and states, but it also defines and engenders the 
relationships between these bodies, and they to their beneficiaries. This research 
will show how donor preference for explicitly attempting to "influence core social 
and political dynamics of governance, reconciliation and justice," with the aim of 
preventing conflict and building cultures of peace, is widely debated as having 
negative unintended consequences on beneficiaries (Uvin 2001, 177). Donor 
assistance and its aid monies are constitutive to development in post-conflict and 
peacebuilding processes, and as the case of Palestine will show, die increased 
scope of donor involvement in such contexts raise critical questions, as decision-
making power over resource allocation, priorities, and project design rests largely 
in the hands of donors and their related apparatuses. As such, the dependency of 
contexts of "complex emergency" such as Palestine on external agents and 
agendas of development, and their financial institutions, often rearticulates a local, 
historical, institutionally embedded dependency, and deep social divisions 
(Lagerquist 2003; Said 2001; Samara 2001). 
The thinking and practice of peace breaks down into four sets of issues that 
relate to development theory: philosophical, political, economic, development. 
For over fifty years, global peace has been conditioned upon the economic 
prosperity of state actors in the international system. This assumption has defined 
the parameters for action, in thinking and in practice, for both international 
development and international relations. Through this paradigm, peace is 
understood as both the absence of violence and social stability and is considered a 
precondition to economic development. In turn, economic development is 
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considered precondition to human or social development. Alternately, 
development theory is concerned with conflict that makes conditions for 
economic development difficult if not impossible. Conflict is understood as an 
obstacle to any kind of development, or in other words, a negative condition of 
peace. Translated into practice, this means development mechanisms -
aid/assistance, technology and knowledge transfers, and the all-important 
'development project' - do not typically take hold until after conflict cease.3 
Thus, broadly speaking, the aim of international development is to encourage 
peace and dissuade conflict through economic opportunity. 
The hegemony of economic prosperity-as-peace as the preferred 
understanding of and solution to crisis and conflict now takes the form of 
'globalization' ~ the filter through which all current development thinking and 
practice must pass. Adopted by almost every field of inquiry, its meaning varies 
between professional points of view and motivation. Broadly speaking 
globalization describes a process of increasing global political, economic, cultural, 
ideological, and technological integration, intensifying capitalist expansion, 
dissolving borders with trade, and the political and economic rise of transnational 
corporations (TNCs) (Bhagwati 2004; Sklair 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001). 
Throughout the 90s, international organizations and national governments, namely 
the United States, pursue broadly a common strategy for dealing with widespread 
chaos, crisis, and violence based on the assumption that liberalizing states through 
legal, political, economic and social reforms would foster and promote peace and 
3 In another view, in times of conflict, any and all existing development expertise is evacuated 
from the conflict zone. 
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security within and between states. In the political realm it meant democratization, 
and in the economic realm, privatization and deregulation. 
Widespread criticism has drawn attention to the differential effects of 
globalization on Northern and especially Southern economies, labour, 
productivity, culture, and social welfare. In short, these literatures attempt to 
prove the gap between policy and prescription, one the one hand, and their effect, 
on the other; or in other words, the living gap between theory and practice. They 
show how the forces, processes, and practices of globalization contribute to an 
overall decrease in human security, human rights and welfare, and increasing 
conflict and war (Gai 2000, Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Logan 2002; Yapa 2002; 
UNCTAD 2006). 
When policies and processes of globalization are grafted onto contexts of 
conflict and deep division the differential effects are further intensified. 
Throughout the interim period (1994-2000), neoliberal economic policies and the 
structural adjustment and democratization programs they require, having recently 
been packaged through the social reality of 'globalization', form the basis of the 
World Bank/IMF peacebuilding agenda in the Territories. Indeed, the economy of 
the Palestinian Authority (1993-2000) is unique because it is alone in having been 
designed, from its very onset, by the policies and prescriptions of external actors 
and globalizing institutions: namely, the World Bank and IMF (Samara 2001). 
Under Oslo, these institutions consider the PA economy the engine to peace and 
prosperity in the semi-autonomous Palestinian territories, and they take authority 
over its control and design. This peacebuilding agenda is articulated as the 
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integration of the PA economy into global markets through increasing foreign 
investment and financing in the territories, and creating labour-intensive export 
production (World Bank 1999; Samara 2001). 
The purpose of this research is begin to create a language to articulate the 
'gap' between the knowledge about a given 'development problem' and the reality 
of the problem as it is itself experienced on the ground. The guiding development 
issue this research addresses is the relationship of conflict to development: if 
peaceable conditions and elimination of structural violence are precondition to 
development, how can economic development, let alone sustainable development 
occur in contexts marked by deep divisions, asymmetry, and animosity? This 
research is indeed part of a massive literature (development, conflict, and peace), 
but one that is distorted, paying disproportional attention to certain aspects, with 
virtual silence on others. It is also surprisingly uniform, given the scope and 
multidisciplinary nature of the literature. 
The purpose of this inquiry is to assess and evaluate the conceptual 
divisions and distinctions related to terms 'conflict', 'development' and 'peace', 
the relationship of these three concepts, each to the other, and the how the 
operational aspects of theses terms define the conflict and development agenda 
and establish the parameters for action. Defining the conceptual parameters of this 
research will be critical to its practical operation to policy and decision-making. 
The scrutiny of policy is critical to this research because policy guides and reflects 
a deeper understanding of the problem at hand. In development practice, policy 
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aims to reform social and political institutions and development markets (World 
Bank and Brynen 2000). 
The gap between the perception of peace and the reality of conflict can be 
measured by ideas and concepts missing from dominant theory and thinking, as it 
can be measured by ineffective policies and prescriptions. For example, absent 
from development literature in general and the development literature on conflict 
and peace in particular is a critical study of theories of power and relations of 
power, and a critical study of the concepts 'justice', 'peace', 'conflict, and 
'peacebuilding' as concepts, themes, or issues. 'Justice', 'peace', 'conflict, and 
'peacebuilding' are interpreted in the literature largely in their 
technical/operational form (political elections and good governance, law and 
order, peace agreements). There is a virtual silence around these concepts in 
dominant development thinking vis-a-vis their philosophical, moral, ethical, and 
psychological meanings: fairness, equality, equity, harmony. 
Indeed, development theory and, therefore, development practice are often 
isolated from the political processes of conflict prevention that mitigate 
peacebuilding efforts. It is not surprising then that the critical development 
literature on conflict and peace is rather scant relative to other areas of 
development interest (gender, globalization, the environment, micro enterprise). 
Conflict and peace are borrowed concepts - considered under the authority of 
international relations, political scientists, and political institutions - onto which 
development theory grafts its explanations, concepts, and solutions. Thus, 
development literature vis-a-vis global conflict, despite its intentions to promote 
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and facilitate peace, tends to be descriptive and reactionary to conflict dynamics, 
and not critical and responsive. It is largely characterized by identifying and 
exploring the multitude of ills accompanied by conflict and war (famine, forced 
migration, human rights abuses, environmental degradation, etc) and identifying 
obstacles to implementing policies and strategies (failure of the state, corruption, 
spoilers). Consequently, the literature reads at times voyeuristic, at other times, 
opportunistic. 
These qualities of the development literature on conflict and peace raise 
critical questions, as decision-making power over resource allocation, priorities, 
and project design rests largely in the hands of donors and their related 
apparatuses (Uvin 2001; Gervais 2003; World Bank and Brynen 2000): If 
development theory is selective when it comes to its conceptual parameters, to 
what degree can its knowledge base (paradigms, strategies, and schools of 
thought) serve to understand development problems? If development theory (or 
ways of thinking) avoids issues of power, how can processes and practices or 
development positively interact with the on the ground realities posed by deeply 
divided societies? These questions begin to articulate the gap between theory and 
practice, "between rhetoric and reality, between declarations and deeds", in 
international development (UN 2005b, 36 para. 34). 
Thesis Statement 
This thesis is about the choices we make. To tiiis end, it is primarily concerned 
with the question, how do we as development thinkers and practitioners come to 
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know a 'development problem'? What is it we know and how do we know it? 
Whom does this knowledge benefit? For this reason, this thesis is primarily 
concerned with the speaking, thinking, and writing about problems of peace, 
conflict and development. This thesis argues the knowledge base provided by the 
conventional thinking on conflict and war is insufficient for providing authentic 
meaning about a given conflict, and in turn, results in knowledge deficiencies in 
the conventional thinking on development and peace. It will argue the biggest 
threat to international peace and security, or the root cause of conflict and war, is 
how those empowered the make decisions on matters relating to conflict and war 
think about conflict and war. 
The guiding principle of this research is mat for sustainable peace and 
development to succeed in any conflict sensitive context, but in particular 
Israel/Palestine, these processes will require a deeper understanding of the 
relationship between ideas and power and knowledge to the production of 
development thinking and practice, vis-a-vis issues of peace and conflict and the 
reproduction of violence and conflict. The aim of this research is to reveal how 
power, privilege and influence operate dirough the deployment of knowledge and 
strategies in international development and international peacebuilding strategies, 
and to show how ways of thinking about peace, conflict and development are the 
domains and mechanisms for the reproduction of dependency and conflict. The 
objective is to analyze development as a form of knowledge in terms of power. It 
will scrutinize how development theory creates knowledge and how this 
knowledge interacts with other forms of knowledge (in continuity or 
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discontinuity) on peace and conflict. It asks, given a specific organizational 
structure, how and why do authorities of 'development' establish 'a knowledge' 
of development in deeply divided societies? It will argue mainstream development 
discourse obfuscates rather that illuminates root causes of conflict because it is 
predicated on certain assumptions which in turn reproduce conflict. 
This research establishes a link between knowledge and social injustice 
(structural violence). It will involve inquiry into literatures that are preoccupied 
with development, conflict and power. Thus, a clear link can be made to social 
effects on the ground: how does the idea of development work? What is its 
relationship to conflict? Of central concern, exploring the different knowledge on 
peace, conflict and development and how they shape and inform strategies for 
conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and sustainable development. This research 
will be applied to the case of the conflict between Israel/Palestine and the Oslo 
Accords/interim period. The role of knowledge as regimes of power in the 
Israel/Palestine relationship, sources of and influences for these regimes, and how 
they operationalize power relations will be explored. The central role of 
'narratives' is crucial when concerned with knowledge production. As such, 
respective national narratives political narratives, narratives of representation, and 
cultural belonging will be explored. 
This thesis is primarily interested in power relations and their exercise and 
effect. To this end it borrows from post-modern theory and asks, in a specific type 
of knowledge, in a specific truth, rooted historically, what are the most immediate 
and local power relations at work? How do they make possible the kinds of 
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knowleges at play and conversely how were these knowledges used to support 
power relations? How do these power relations change by their very exercise? 
How do these relations link together to one another according to the logic of one 
great strategy? (Foucault 1978, 97). I argue the connection is as follows: 
knowledge is not only the means to understanding a particular 'development 
problem', it is the problem itself. For tiiis research, knowledge is not about what is 
being said, (it is not useful as syntax), but how all that is said is articulated; 
meaning, how it is organized, selected, prioritized, arranged selected into a 
coherent way of saying something about a problem (it is useful as 
comprehension). 
Thus knowledge is understood to denote both a process (such as 
peacebuilding, or economic liberalism) and a project (such as a peace agreement 
or development project) for understanding. Knowledge is both the problem and 
the solution; the obfuscation and the optic for seeing our way out. It is both the 
subject of this thesis and the method; the object of analysis and the means for 
analysis. Knowledge is explored in a fourfold manner: first, why ideas are 
implemented (relates to how conflict is understood); second, how these ideas are 
conceptualized (relates to the relations of power and their functions); third the 
character of relationship between actors, positions of authority, those empowered 
to act and how they act; and fourth, knowledge is explored as a process of 
selection - what is said and not said, what is known and what is left in the dark. 
The thesis of this research is twofold (i) development knowledge in 
peacebuilding contexts reproduces and makes legitimate a logic of social 
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inequality which in turn reproduces unresolved contradictions and negative 
attitudes between conflict parties, and relationships of dependency; and (ii) 
development knowledge can be a means to resolve conflict nonviolently and 
redress social inequality and injustice because it has the potential to reconstitute a 
language for enunciating the historical, material, and emotional dimensions of 
conflict, activating norms such as responsiveness and enduring relations of 
mutuality and respect. 
In the case study this thesis will explore the link between the globalizing 
agendas of the international donors in post-Oslo Israel/Palestine and the 
reproduction of structural dominance considered endemic to cultures of violence 
and conflict. To this end, Palestinian development under Oslo will be explored as 
an "encounter" between donor agendas and their discourses of globalization and 
peacebuilding, PA elite interests and their discourses, and Israeli security interests 
and their discourses of control (Lagerquist 2003). This research illustrates how 
throughout the duration of 'the peace process', the jurisdiction of the Palestinian 
Authority was "dominated by Israeli economic policies" and "subordinated to the 
prescriptions of international financial institutions" (Samara 2001, 1). Thus the 
peacebuilding agenda of the post- Oslo period is understood as rearticulating the 
asymmetrical relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. 
The thesis prescribes that problems of development, peace, and conflict 
should be approached in the following manner. First, assume that the conflict is 
evolving, morphing, dynamic, sensitive, turbulent, and emotional. Second, apply 
multiple mixed strategies sensitive to various stages of a conflict. Third, account 
21 
for and understand the ideological issues at stake (on the ground realities). Four, 
the development community needs to take a more activist approach to conflict 
resolution, action that is responsive not reactive, strategic not technical, deployed 
as a process and project of justice. This approach assumes everything is political 
and therefore stresses the importance of being able to show the conflict 
constituents tangible gains from cooperation and conflict management. It also 
stresses the importance of strengthening groups more prone to nonviolence and 
cooperation. Jentleson (2003) calls these actors "cooperation constituents" (35). In 
turn, the paradigm for thinking and writing, and therefore knowing, about conflict 
is refocused on relationships; development is relationships, peace is relationships, 
conflict is relationships - between individuals, states, and systems. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework constructed by the author identifies the ideas used for 
this research. These ideas contain the guiding assumptions of this research and are 
defined by concepts. The working ideas of this thesis are as follows: 
Ideas Matter 
This research is guiding by the assumption that ideas matter. Social constructivists 
argue ideas matter because they have material effects (Miller and Holstein 1993; 
Mbembe 2001; Mamdani 1998). For this thesis, concepts reflect relations of 
power: what a concept means rests largely on its interpretation (Talentino 2003). 
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Where concepts come from, who authors them, the contexts from which they 
emerge, and the knowledge they disseminate is instrumental to their 
understanding and meaning. Thus, concepts provide key frameworks for political 
decisions (Carment and Schnabel (eds) 2003). This thesis will show the 
international system is guided by norms; these norms fashion concepts; concepts 
define relationships (distribution of wealth, allies, power). People are represented 
by concepts and where one is aligned conceptually determine one's power to 
influence one's fate. 
Knowledge creation is by nature the object of apolitical struggle because it poses 
the question of power 
A guiding assumption for this thesis is that to concern oneself with knowledge 
creation is intrinsically political (Adams (ed) 1992; Foucault 1977, 1978). It is to 
begin a course of study at a place of radical skepticism about truth and facts and 
how they correspondence to knowledge: to approach a development problem from 
this perspective is to reject the 'intrinsic good' or 'value' of facts (Kippers-Black 
1999; Said 1977, 1978; Brigg 2002; White 2002). It calls for an interest not only 
in 'what' is known but 'why' and 'how' and to what effect. It shows academic 
knowledge, established as objective, scientific, impartial is instrumental in the 
reproduction of colonial forms of subjugation and administration (Bove 1992, 6). 
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Development is a form of knowledge linked to material entitlements 
Development theory is a social science discipline and therefore favours categories, 
selectivity, and principles of order and reason. Complex human experience 
(conflict, war, peace) is measured and analyzed through scientific discovery. This 
research is guided by the idea that development theory is a deployment of power 
because power is exercised through the process of selecting or choosing. This 
research endeavours to identify what is selected/chosen and why, and who 
benefits or loses (Barakat and Chard 2003; Jones 2004; White 2002). 
There can be no development without peace and there can be no peace without 
justice. Therefore there can be no development without justice 
In the context of this research, justice is a development focus, understood as a 
social issue, encompassing both socioeconomic and sociopolitical justice. In this 
way, sociopolitical and socioeconomic justice is considered two sides of the same 
coin, herein referred to as "social justice". It presumes the origins of conflicts are 
rooted in socioeconomic and socio-political injustice. Therefore peace is 
concomitant to a just and an equitable society and instrumental to freedom. The 
underlying assumption of this thesis is that peace is constitutive to social justice 
and social justice is constitutive to peace. A guiding assumption of this research is 
that peace and its processes and projects tend to treat the symptoms (manifest 
violence) and not the disease of conflict (structural violence). In other words, 
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peacebuilding and conflict prevention focus on the form, not the content of a 
given conflict. 
Economic liberalization—the dominant model for peace and prosperity— 
engenders conflict rather than encourages peace because it reproduces 
asymmetrical power relations 
Donor involvement in peacebuilding contexts is an exercise in deploying relations 
of power onto a preexisting matrix of power relations (Lagerquist 2003). This idea 
guides the research, challenging the very assumptions and core values of the 
development enterprise. It shows the economic liberalization as peacebuilding 
model is predicated on a paradox: economic liberalization requires and fosters 
competition which contradicts the need for social cohesion and reconciliation in 
contexts of conflict and deep division (Paris 2003). As such, processes of 
liberalization and their accoutrements (human rights, gender quality, free 
elections, peace education) exacerbate and inflame structural inequalities and 
social asymmetries endemic to cultures of conflict. This research draws out the 
role of power relations between donors and agents of peacebuilding (third party 
intervention) and the recipients of assistance and intervention: how and why and 
to what end relations of power are articulated and received is brought Centrally to 
the research endeavor. 
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Structural violence (sociopolitical and socioeconomic injustice) represent the 
origins of conflict as well as sources for its resolution 
Peace scholars emphasize that structural violence is embedded in our very 
language structures: the way we think and communicate (Boulding 1996; 
Gorsevski 1999; Galtung 1969, 1975). Structural violence is 'indirect' and less 
visible in that it refers to violence built into the social fabric through institutions, 
policies, attitudes, norms, values, assumptions (Reychler and Paffenholz (eds) 
2001; Galtung 1975; Boulding 1996; Uvin 1998). Structural violence can be 
understood as the absence of access to means of production, to health and 
nutrition, to empowerment through participation, justice, to information and 
education, to dignified social relationships, cooperation and equity. Examples of 
structural violence include, but are not limited to, endemic poverty, gender 
discrimination, centralized state authority and power, and ethnic stratification 
(apartheid, ethnic democracies). For this thesis, violence means more than 
physical harm (armed violence) and includes psychological violence, intended to 
produce mental suffering or to spread fear and hate, and cultural violence, 
intended to legitimize abuse and oppression - violence is approved in the name of 
a legitimizing discourse (religion, nationalism, political ideology) (Reychler and 
Paffenholz (eds) 2001; Galtung 1975; Lira 2001). 
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Sustainable peace cannot be reconciled with the perpetuation of social injustice; 
Just (symmetrical) power relations are the basis for the capacity for a society to 
manage conflicts nonviolently (the foundation for sustainable development) 
This research is guided by the normative idea that peacebuilding must redress the 
structural inequalities in political, economic, and social systems in deeply divided 
societies (Uvin 1998; Lederach 2003; Talentino 2003). The aim of conflict 
resolution strategies such as peacebuilding and conflict prevention is the creation 
of a just and equitable society whereby social relations are more or less 
symmetrical in terms of political, economic, social, and cultural power. It assumes 
only deep and locally owned social and political dynamics can render the kind of 
justice required to address structural dominance and exclusion (Boulding 1996, 
2001; Cousens 2001). 
Methodology 
This research is concerned with accounting for the guiding assumptions, the 
norms and values, the principles and logics, and the core concepts of theories of 
peace, conflict and development since 1950. Therefore, for this research, the 
source of data is various forms of discourse. Discourse, for this research, refers to 
that which is spoken, written, known, and understood and its sum effect. With 
Macdonell (1986), this thesis takes the position that all human action is discursive 
in nature. Discourse refers not only to utterances, but to understanding: 
"Discourse is not about objects: radier discourse constitutes them" (Sheridan 
27 
1980, 98). In this way, discourse is understood not as a referent, a sign of 
something else, but is itself intrinsically the meaning, the message spoken (Adams 
1992). The kinds of discourse used in this research are institutional, ideological 
(aim to promote change for the interest for a group), theoretical (aim is to 
convince people of 'the truth', describe and explain), and programmatic (action-
oriented, policy prescription). They were accessed from intergovernmental 
organizations, governmental and non-governmental organizations, scholarly 
research, United Nations related bodies, international financial institutions, and 
civil society organizations. 
The methodology for this research is a form of comparative discourse 
analysis. The gap between development theory and practice (the politics of 
development) in relation to the lived reality of 'peace' and 'conflict' is the locale 
or domain of analysis. This link is worked out by analyzing the speaking and 
writing of the actors involved, how this is 'enunciated' and deployed, and the 
motive for each respective position: who is speaking, why, under what authority, 
to what aim, and to what effect. Through juxtaposing the thinking on peace, 
conflict, and development, with the material benefits, or 'lived reality', of these 
discourses, in this case, the Oslo Peace Accords and interim period, 'the gap' 
between how peace/conflict prevention is spoken and deployed and how it is 
experienced 'on the ground' is revealed. What will be shown is peacebuilding-as-
development constitutes a 'negative space' for peace that in turn, reproduces 
asymmetrical relationships of power and dependency, and ultimately the root 
causes of the conflict at hand. 
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The method of this research is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is an 
analytical interpretation of discourse — a "carefully argued interpretation" rather 
than an "exhaustive characterization" (Martinussen 1997, 318). Discourse analysis 
is useful to unravel the relations between power and powerlessness and in identity 
formation processes: "it can capture the linguistic articulation of ethnic and other 
identities which is a central pre-condition for their politicization" (319). Discourse 
analysis is also useful as an analytical tool to grapple with contemporary society 
and its problems because it provides entry into an analysis of the "linkages 
between power, knowledge, institutions, the state, intellectuals, and the control of 
populations" (Bove 1992, 6). 
This research adopts a Foucauldian discourse analysis (1978). For 
Foucault, language is an event not an activity. He shifts attention away from the 
'statement', the words spoken or written, to the 'enunciation', the context in 
which they are uttered and the status or position of their author. His critical 
interest is in the laws operating behind the formation of words, or in other words, 
how 'discourse' is operationalized. For Foucault, discourse has a tactical function: 
power and knowledge are joined together in discourse (100) and further, discourse 
transmits and produces power (101). Of central analytical focus: the variation and 
effects of the distribution of discursive elements, according to who is speaking, 
their position of power (the right to make them), and the institutional context in 
which s/he happens to be situated and the position of subjects in the discourse. In 
doing so, Foucault shows discourse is an asset in that it poses, fundamentally, the 
question of power. (Bove 1992; Sheridan 1980) 
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Indeed, a central analytical tool for this research is Foucault's theory of 
power (1978). His theory of power begins with a paradoxical assumption: power 
is simultaneously interpersonal or relational, subjective, and intimate, as well as 
structural, abstract, objective, and impersonal. Foucault offers a way of thinking 
about power that enjoins two distinct properties: "subjects acting upon themselves 
and others" and a "complex strategic situation in a particular society" with which 
individuals are engaged (Foucault 1978, 93). In doing so, Foucault expands the 
conceptual borders of 'power' to include its productive, reproductive, and 
'polymorphic' qualities. First, he abandons the assumption power as a simple 
denotation of binary brute force: "cease to conceive of [power] in terms of law, 
prohibition, liberty and sovereignty" and with it a "[...] negative representation" 
(90). To understand power solely as an imposition obscures more than reveals 
how power operates, as it tends to exclude or obfuscate the incorporative, 
inclusive, and productive qualities of power. Rather, Foucault re-conceptualizes 
power as "polymorphic" in its exercise, constituting multitudes of discourses, 
manifesting many different forms, through which mechanisms of power act 
simultaneously (9). 
For Foucault, power is better understood as a "process", a "multiplicity of 
force relations", that "support" each other and form a "chain" or "system" (92-
93). Power is "omnipresent" because it is produced from one moment to the next, 
in every relation from one point to another: "power is everywhere because it 
comes from everywhere (93)." In this way, power is not considered an aberration, 
but ubiquitous to social life. The law, political, social, economic institutions and 
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their policies, and social hegemonies like customary norms (social, religious, and 
gender roles) and mainstream attitudes, are a few examples of different strategies 
through which these force relations take effect. For example, as Foucault points 
out, notions of 'common sense' and 'normal' have privilege of unnoticed power 
and this power produces instruments of control which can both include and 
exclude social members. 
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault advances five central propositions 
from his definition of power which serves as the basis for the analysis of this 
research. First, power is not fixed but fluid, "exercised from innumerable points in 
die interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations" (94). Second, relations of 
power are concomitant to other types of relationships, such as economic processes 
and knowledge relationships. Their intersection reveal, what Foucault calls, the 
"divisions, disequilibriums" inherent to these relationships, and have a "directly 
productive role" in re/creating their internal conditions. Third, because there is no 
binary of ruler and ruled, power comes from below as well as above. Families, 
small groups, and institutions are an important basis for "wide ranging effects of 
cleavage that run through the social body as a whole" (94). Fourth, power 
relations are both "intentional" and "nonsubjective" both internally derived and 
externally imposed. While Foucault acknowledges the exercise of power does not 
necessarily imply choice of an individual subject, "there is no power exercised 
without a series of aims and objectives (95)". 
This leads to Foucault's last supposition, which is the exercise of power 
necessitates the exercise of resistance. The relational character of power relations 
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allows for a plurality of forms of resistance. In Foucauldian analysis, there is no 
binary of relations where there is a dominant discourse and an excluded discourse; 
only a "multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in various 
strategies" (101). What is of concern is their distribution and their reconstruction: 
with what is said and not said, what is permitted and what is forbidden, what is 
silenced and concealed and what is revealed and known. "Silence is a shelter for 
power", says Foucault, because it "anchors prohibitions" and "provide for obscure 
areas of tolerance" (101). 
Discourse analysis is messy business: it is an intrinsically unstable and 
complex process that is neither a "uniform" nor "stable". It can be both and 
instrument and effect of power; it can also be a locus of resistance: "a starting 
point for an opposing strategy" (101). In this way, discourse and its analysis is 
intrinsically dissident to calcified hierarchies and asymmetries in social relations 
and their institutions, policies, norms, values, and ideas. It is this characteristic 
that proves most useful to thinking about problems of development, peace, and 
conflict, and ultimately, theories of development vis-a-vis peace and conflict. 
Structure of the Thesis Argument 
Chapter Two presents a review of the literature on the thinking and writing on 
peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development as practice and thought. As 
such, this chapter presents a broad discussion on how peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention are discussed, spoken, and thought about. This discourse is juxtaposed 
with development theory and donor involvement in the promotion of peace and 
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prevention of conflict. This chapter begins with an overview of contemporary 
peacebuilding from 1989 to 2000 It then provides a broad discussion on the issues 
of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and peacebuildng. It discusses how 
peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development strategies are implemented. 
It provides a literature review of theories of peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
and how they relate to development, exploring the logic of their associated 
assumptions, beliefs, and ideas. The principal concern for this literature review is 
the degree to which it helps us better understand how and what we know about 
peace, conflict and development and therefore peacebuilding, conflict prevention, 
and development. It provides an historical exposition of the concepts 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention and development; the aim is to illustrate the 
meaning of knowledge and its functions, its properties, and characteristics 
Chapter Three presents a review of the literature on the thinking and writing 
on peace, conflict, and development as concepts, in an effort to present and 
interpret the literature, to show the different schools and positions on peace, 
conflict and development. It will unmask the major theoretical influences that 
shape these concepts over the last sixty years in an effort to present and interpret 
the literature on conflict, peace, and development as concepts and ideas, showing 
their different schools and positions, unmasking the privileged ideas, assumptions 
and beliefs relevant to the understanding of a given conflict. Through this 
analysis, working ideas on the nature of knowledge on peace, conflict and 
development is generated; these ideas relate specifically to the nature of 
development. This chapter concludes with findings to suggest that the tliinking 
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and writing on conflict, peace, and development is driven by the mechanics of 
their respective discourse and not the problem at hand. It identifies and organizes 
the functions and logics of their discursive articulation with the aim of 
establishing a further framework for understanding the discursive dimension to 
conflict and conflict prevention. Moreover, it shows how discourse is linked to 
material entitlements. 
Chapter Four presents an overview of the Israel-Palestine Conflict through a 
historical perspective. This chapter does not simply provide a litany of facts and 
data, but attempts to present the Israel/Palestine conflict through the lens of social 
relations: the basic building blocks of conflict. This chapter focuses on the 
character of Israel/Palestinian relations vis-a-vis power as the entry point for 
understanding the broader scope of Israel/Palestinian Conflict. Thus, it presents 
data on the historical, political, economic, social character and context of 
Israeli/Palestinian relations. It also presents the various narrative positions, 
influences and effects resulting in the Israel/Palestine. An analysis of the major 
narratives of the Israel/Palestine Conflict provides an application of the discussion 
presented in Chapters Two and Three. 
Chapter Five presents a discussion on the Oslo Accords and their framework 
for peacebuilding during the Interim Period. It provides historical approaches to 
building peace in Israel/Palestine. It shows how the Accords reproduced 
structured dominance in the territories and how they function to as a form of 
power in order to contain, control Palestinian claims to sovereignty, 
independence, autonomy. 
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Chapter Six presents both the function and effect of development initiatives 
and efforts in consolidating peace during the interim Period. It draws the link 
between the aims and objectives of development during the interim period and 
their material effects. 
Chapter Seven presents the study's findings and conclusions. It will suggest 
that a critical study of discourse and power and relations of power become central 
to the development research endeavour. 
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Chapter Two 
Peacebuilding, Conflict Prevention and International 
Development: 
An Overview of the Literature 
Introduction 
This research begins with a literature review that is primarily concerned with the 
thinking, speaking, and writing about peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and 
donor development in their operational and theoretical forms: in concept and in 
their relation to problems of development, peace, and conflict. As such, this 
chapter will present a broad discussion on how peacebuilding and conflict 
prevention are practiced, spoken, and thought about. This chapter will present an 
overview of peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and development as peacebuilding 
efforts between 1989 and 2000. It will then present the thinking on each concept 
as an evolving phenomenon through a review of the literature. This review will 
attempt to asses the conceptual merits of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and 
development. The principle concern for this literature review is the degree to 
which it helps us better understand how and what we know about peace, conflict 
and development as concepts, and therefore peacebuilding, conflict prevention, 
and development as policies, prescriptions, and practices. 
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What is Peacebuilding? 
Since 1989, the concept of peacebuilding has gained widespread acceptance in 
academic and political circles. While the notion of peacebuilding was originally 
conceived as an integral part of United Nations' (UN) efforts in the promotion of 
global peace and resolution of conflict, there is a clear consensus in the literature 
that the early 90s in many ways 'discovered' peace (Crocker et al (eds) 2001; 
Carment and Schnabel (eds) 2003). Indeed, there has been a long tradition of 
peace scholarship, peacemaking, and conflict management - the United Nations 
was created for the very purpose of preserving global peace - nonetheless, 'peace' 
and 'peacebuilding', in idea and practice, was marginalized in academic circles, 
political networks and institutions, and centres of power. The fall of communism 
and spread of democracy and capitalism, combined with emerging intrastate 
conflicts through the 90s brought peace and peacebuilding to the fore of the 
international agenda. 
Peacebuilding in the early 1990s referred to a series of activities intended 
to help countries recover from violent conflict. During the 1990s, the concept and 
practice of peacebuilding evolves to include the prevention and mitigating of 
violent conflicts within societies, as well as helping them to recover (Boutros-
Boutros Ghali 1992; Aksu 2003). Broadly, peacebuilding refers to sustained, 
long-term efforts to strengthen the prospects of internal peace, after conflict 
ceases, and decrease the likelihood of recurring violent conflict. It includes 
conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict strategies. It involves a 
range of activities from monitoring, humanitarian aid, development, conflict 
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resolution, and conflict transformation. The overarching goal is to enhance the 
indigenous 'capacity of a society to manage conflict nonviolently'. 
Peacebuilding focuses on the political and socio-economic context of 
conflict (not military and humanitarian) and it seeks to find the means to 
institutionalize the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The strategic aims of 
peacebuilding include building human security through democratic governance, 
promoting and advancing human rights, particularly the human rights of women, 
rule of law, sustainable development, equitable access to resources, and 
environmental security. By the mid-1990s, the notion of peacebuilding, and its 
oft-cited companion conflict prevention, is centrally placed on the international 
agenda. 
What is Conflict Prevention? 
The functioning of conflict prevention as an operational and structural response to 
emerging war, conflict, and crisis, begins first with understanding the character of 
the global context (1989-2000). The post Cold War international system 
undergoes a paradigm shift which transforms not only the system itself but the 
very concept of conflict and war: the international system shifts from a bipolar to 
a unipolar power structure, dominated by American hegemony, and its 
concomitant democracy and capitalism, and yielding increased global insecurity 
and instability. Traditional interstate conflict is replaced with intrastate conflict 
and war carried out by non-state actors; conflict within states, wars of or on 
citizens, often between social groups. There is also a rise in economic and 
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environmental conflicts. The determinant of conflict shifts likewise from ideology 
to identity, giving rise to such concepts as 'civil conflict', 'civil war', and 'ethnic 
conflict' to denote the emerging forms of violence and conflict. War is 
disproportionately experienced by the Developing South: 80 % of the world's 
poorest 20 countries have suffered intense conflict, political violence, and/or war 
in the last fifteen years.4 The primary sources of conflict in the Third World are 
"more likely to derive from internal rather than external variables" (Levy 2001, 
20). Resource shortages, threats to economic subsistence, as well as tenuous 
political legitimacy, are oft-cited sources for conflict in the Developing South. 
Unlike the cold war system, the post cold war system is unique for a 'lack 
of a clear enemy'. The level of brutality and destruction on civilians is another 
new, regular feature of the international system. To this day, the United Nations 
reports that currently roughly 25 million people are internally displaced 
worldwide, one third of which are" beyond the reach of aid systems"; 11-12 
million people are refugees; Over 40 million people infected with AIDs; More 
than 1 billion live below the 'extreme poverty line' ($l/day) while 20, 000 people 
die worldwide/day from the effects of poverty (UN 2005b, 4 para 9). 
Conflict resolution embraces the process of conflict management from 
conflict settlement to peacebuilding. The resolution of conflict includes the 
activities of enforcement, negotiation, mediation, settlement, implementation, and 
consolidation (Crocker et al 2001; Kriesberg 2001; Jentleson 2001). Cold war 
conflict prevention strategies take the shape of preventative action. Strategies are 
shaped by the 'sovereignty principle' and focus on cycles of prevention: prewar, 
4 See « www.worlbank.org » 
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pre-escalation, and post war prevention. Through the 1990s, conflict prevention 
comes becomes largely synonymous with preventative diplomacy, the resolution 
of conflict through peace agreements, as well as the processes of implementation 
and consolidation of agreements. Peacekeeping emerges as a central operational 
tool for preventing the escalation of conflict and for consolidating peace 
agreements. Three main principles guide the logic of peacekeeping: mutual 
consent, no force/self defense, and impartiality. By 2000, preventative diplomacy 
has come to mean response to address the rapid escalation of horizontal and 
vertical spread of conflicts, the role of private sector activity, and inclusion (to 
some degree) of track two diplomacy. 
Overall, strategies for preventing conflict can be organized into two broad 
categories: operational and structural approaches to conflict prevention. 
Operational approaches tend to be geared for the short term and emphasize 
strategies that seek to end or reduce violence. For example, preventative 
diplomacy is an operational response to conflict prevention, premised - on 
incentives provided by outside actors to change the behaviour of the conflict 
parties. Operational approaches cannot change the initial conditions that lead to 
conflict (Levy 2001; Jentleson 2003, 2001; Vayrynen 2003; Talentino 2003). 
Structural approaches to conflict prevention emphasize long term strategies 
that aim to address the root causes of a conflict. The focus is on capacity building 
in conflict prone societies; capacity building is central to the strengthening of 
conflict prevention (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 19). Structural conflict 
prevention strategies focus on human security, development and conflict 
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transformation, and are generally applied over a range of actors and issues. The 
end goal is to transform the conflict over time. It is through structural conflict 
prevention strategies that theories of conflict and development and peace form to 
make peacebuilding (Lederach2001; Ball 2001; Paris 2001). 
What is Development? 
In political peace processes and peacebuilding, the role of donor agencies, their 
agendas and strategies, is to contribute to the prevention and resolution of conflict, 
and the creation of critical peace-enhancing structures (UN, World Bank, OECD). 
The role of external support is to supplement not substitute local efforts to achieve 
a sustainable peace. Donors contribute to long term conflict prevention strategies 
(peacebuilding) in three key areas: knowledge base (e.g. World Bank's watching 
brief methodology); mandates and time; resources - creating funding windows. 
The overall objectives are twofold: to empower governments and civil society 
(World Bank 1999). The role of donors is to create sustained partnerships with 
and between conflict parties, local stakeholders, and civil society actors. To this 
end, creating durable peace and promoting sustainable poverty-reducing 
development require multiple actions and approaches on a variety of fronts. 
Technical assistance should also incorporate the experience of other countries that 
have gone from war to peace transitions. Ends donors seek include responsible, 
accountable, transparent, governments; strong civil society; accountable security 
forces; and poverty-reducing development. 
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The preferred means for persuading peace in peacebuilding and "conflict-
sensitive" approaches to development is through the advancement of political and 
civil rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and the right to development 
(Barakat and Chard 2003). In practice, the preferred means for creating an 
"effective capacity for peace" takes the form of social and economic development, 
namely through encouraging legal, political, and social reforms. Development 
assistance provides the opportunity for those reforms considered necessary to 
"change past systems and structures which may have contributed to social and 
economic inequalities and conflict" (OECD 1997, 3). Change is measured by 
improvements in indicators such as increased household incomes, health (caloric 
intake, increased mortality rates), literacy and access to education, political 
pluralism and free media (Boulding 1996; Boutros-Ghali 1992; Symonides and 
Singh 1996). 
Speaking Peacebuilding: The United Nations 
The United Nations (UN) is a key actor in creating knowledge about 
peacebuilding. Its concepts, ideas, theories, strategies form the basis of all 
peacebuilding activity. The UN is the sole collective security organization in the 
international system and its primary purpose and function is to maintain 
international peace and security. The Charter of the United Nations (1945) also 
identifies developing friendly relations, international cooperation on social, 
economic and humanitarian issues, and promoting human rights as crucial to 
maintaining global peace and security. The UN takes as its basis for articulating 
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peacebuilding the concept of peace. Peace in concept is understood as evolving, 
complex, multidimensional, and interrelational. To express the evolving idea of 
peace, the UN has assembled four key concepts that define the parameters for a 
four-phase strategy to resolving conflict: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding (Sitkowski 2006). Value is added when these 
strategies build consent and cooperation (Boutros-Ghali 1992). 
The UN considers peacebuilding a broad, interactive, multi layered concept, 
favouring such terms as "evolving", "interdependence", and "coordination". Long 
standing, traditional UN peacebuilding instruments include preventative 
diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping (Sitkowski 2006). UN peacebuilding 
missions (collective security operations) take three forms: peace enforcement 
(observer, buffer, force); peacekeeping (observer, buffer); and observer (passive 
observer). 
In theory and in practice, peacebuilding and conflict prevention are treated 
as two sides of the same coin: the task is to first seek a political peace through 
agreements (preventative diplomacy), and then, through peacebuilding efforts, 
identify and effect change in the "attitudes of conflict parties" (Moawad 1996, 
187). As Nazli Moawad (1996) points out, "agreements terminate conflicts, 
relationships implement agreements" (179). In this approach, the human being, 
rather than the state, is centrally placed as the subject and ultimate beneficiary of 
all efforts aimed at the creation of a common cooperative system of security. The 
conceptual apparatus known as 'Development and Peace' translates to creating the 
"necessary condition for effective government, social, and economic 
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advancement" (Mbaku et al 2001, 4). In practice it means, involving 'ordinary 
people' in the peace processes and empowering local communities through 
strengthening relationships. 
Boutos-Boutos Ghali's Agenda for Peace (1992) lays the groundwork for all 
post cold war preventative action. It provides a basis and the first broad 
framework for international peacebuilding and informs all UN peacebuilding and 
disarmament work. In it, Ghali reflects on preventative diplomacy within a range 
of conflict management techniques that include peacekeeping, peacemaking, 
peacebuilding and on confidence building, arms control and deployment. Post-
Cold War conflict resolution features two key phases. The first is the 'peace 
process;' a political process that seeks to stop patterns of violence through various 
forms of response, from sanctions, to diplomacy, to intervention, optimally 
culminating in a 'peace agreement'. The second is the creation of a 'space for 
peace' wherein social, economic, political, and cultural spaces are created for 
'being together' so as to strengthen, consolidate, and facilitate the peace 
agreement on the ground. This phase refers to the efforts to address the root 
causes of conflict with the aim of building a sustainable, durable peace. 
The peace agreement represents a sign of "mutual consent" for peace 
between the conflict parties (Stedman 2001). It is the presence of this consent that 
gives the peace agreement power to be implemented which in turn creates spaces 
for peace. This phase focuses on and favours short-term strategies and has an 
operational emphasis. The second phase refers to the implementation and 
consolidation of the peace agreement or peacebuilding. Peacebuilding focuses on 
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and favours long term conflict prevention strategies, the structural transformation 
of the conflict, involves third parties or external actors and international 
organizations, and promotes strategies that facilitate and consolidate peace. In 
sum, peace agreements represent short-term solutions to conflict resolution 
whereas peacebuilding represents long-term tasks that contribute to addressing the 
root causes of conflict. 
Agenda for Peace identifies the absence of democratic approaches to 
conflict resolution and lack of mutual respect as sources for conflict leading to 
violence and war. Of primary importance, action is called to "eliminate the 
sources of conflict" which develop in the context of deep social divisions and 
injustice. Through the 1990s, the United Nations focus on creating a normative 
framework for comprehensive, integrated peacebuilding, linking issues such as 
gender equality, human rights, health, education and the environment to 
cultivating sustainable and durable peace. The OECD Guidelines on Peace, 
Conflict and Development Cooperation (1997) and the UN Secretary General's 
report on Priorities for Post-Conflict Peace-Building (1998) put peacebuilding 
and conflict prevention at the forefront of the international agenda. The aim is the 
prevention of conflict at its root, thus preventing the great costs of upheaval 
(OECD 1997, 1). In Larger Freedom (2005) offers a new articulation, 
encapsulating the idea that development, security and human rights go hand and 
hand (para 12-17). 
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Epistemological shift 
Turning attention to the structural factors that create conditions of (sustained) 
conflict and violence represents an epistemological shift in the thinking on peace 
and conflict from conflict settlement (1960-1880s) toward conflict prevention 
(1990s) - eliminating those sources of conflict that prevent the creation of 
peaceful societies considered precondition to development. Acknowledging that 
conflict is the consequence of intra structural conditions, and not solely 
external/internal aggressors, reflects a shift in the very concept of peace - from 
'non-war' or an absence of violence - to 'positive peace', the elimination of 
structural violence, and the creation of patterns of cooperation and integration 
(Galtung 1975, 1996; Moawad 1996; Gorsevski 1999). 
Agenda for Peace (1992) heralds this epistemological shift. Of importance, 
it established guidelines on issues such as justice, security, reconciliation, and 
governance, issues hitherto considered beyond the development mandate (Baare; 
Shearer; Uvin; Scherrer: 1999, para 74). Peace organizations and related 
institutions such as UNESCO make the argument that a peace based solely on 
political and economic arrangements cannot affect a secure and lasting peace. 
Peace must therefore be founded, "upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of 
mankind [sic]" (Symonides and Singh 1996, 9). As noted by the OECD, violence 
engages 'basic values' and 'interests' of society's members (OECD 1997). The 
formation of "well-informed, democratically minded, and responsible citizens" is 
crucial for the construction of internal and international peace (Symonides and 
Singh 1996, 13). Thus, the prescribed aim for peacebuilding is the creation of "a 
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culture of peace." The creation of a culture of peace is understood as the creation 
of peaceful, nonviolent behavioural patterns and skills (Symonides and Singh 
1996). For Elise Boulding (2001), "building sustainable peace is not just a matter 
of direct intervention through mediation. It also requires direct intervention 
through development and relief aid, media coverage, and any other activity 
relating to existing or potential violent conflicts" (xii). 
For Moawad (1996), building a culture of peace involves changing attitudes, 
beliefs and behaviours (177). Analytical emphasis shifts to the cultural context of 
peaceful behavior in everyday life - partnerships, family life, values and rituals, 
relationships of trade and exchange, associations and manners of organizing. The 
right to express one's subjectivity is a freedom requisite to creating a culture of 
peace; to express one's subjectivity is to employ one's reasoned agency, to effect 
change and interact with one's environment. 
This epistemological shift marks a critical boundary, a fault line, in the 
thinking, writing, and speaking of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and 
development. All literature since 1990 is influenced by this shift either in small or 
significant degree. Of central concern in the literature is the degree to which 
external actors are involved in matters of inequity, injustice, and abuse and the 
form that intervention takes. It is a fluid boundary: the discourse on 
peacebuilding, conflict prevention, and donor development will show that the 
thinking and writing on peacebuilding ebbs and flows along this fault line, at 
times in continuity with and at other times, in discontinuity with the idea of 
positive peace. 
47 
Speaking Peacebuilding: The Scholarly Literature on Peacebuilding 
The scholarly literature on peacebuilding comprises two broad schools, literatures 
that focus on the operational/technical understanding of peacebuilding and 
literatures that focus on the structural understanding of peacebuilding. In the 
former, debates on peacebuilding focus on the requirements for successful 
peacebuilding (enabling conditions) and the construction of durable political 
settlements (peace agreements) in societies that have experienced prolonged civil 
strife as a result of deeply embedded divisions/cleavages (Hampson 2001, 387; 
Stedman 2001). There is no consensus on the successful requirements, or 
appropriate methods and means to end violent conflict and create peace. Nor is 
there consensus on what the political aims of such interventions should be. 
Different perspectives on these issues reflect different assumptions about the 
fundamental nature of conflict and the social, political, economic, military, 
humanitarian dynamics of conflict processes (Hampson 2001, 387-388). Other 
(realist) perspectives are based on competing assumptions about the appropriate 
timing for intervention and the overall effectiveness of third party intervention 
(Jentleson 2003; Vayrynen 2003). 
Consolidating peace debates centre on the process from moving to conflict 
settlement (peace agreements) to conflict resolution to conflict transformation 
(peacebuilding). These debates focus on the operational choices made to foster 
peace, for example prosecute of war criminals or establish Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions (TRCs). Of interest, there is a growing expansion of 
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this literature focusing on consolidating peace as a form of social engineering 
(Uvin 1998; Carment and Schnabel 2003). 
The literature that takes a structural understanding of peacebuilding is 
divided into debates on the conceptual merits of peacebuilding (the limitations of 
peacebuilding as technical response) and the enabling conditions, or requirements, 
for successful peacebuilding (Reychler and Paffenholtz (eds) 2001). John Paul 
Lederach (2001) describes peacebuilding as "an organic ecosystem" rather then 
"political event or agreement" (842). He observes a shift in peacebuilding from a 
narrow and hierarchically defined political event or agreement to an open, organic 
definition. He advocates for a systemic view of conflict systems and a multi lens 
approach to conflict analysis. 
Luc Reychler (2001) argues the aim of peacebuilding is "to transform 
conflicts constructively and to create a sustainable peace environment" (12). 
'Sustainable peace' refers to "a situation characterized by the absence of physical 
violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic, and cultural forms 
of discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self 
sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of 
conflicts" (12). Transforming a conflict addresses all the major components of the 
conflict including changing the 'opportunity structure' and the strategic thinking 
involved. Thus "effective communication", "peace-enhancing structures" and an 
"integrated moral-political climate" ('we-ness') are precondition to sustainable 
peace (13-14). Reychler highlights the need to pay closer analytical attention the 
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"political-psychological" variables at play in transforming conflict: "concepts, 
dogmas, habits, attitudes, emotions, and inclinations" (14). 
Rebecca Spence (2001) defines peacebuilding as "those activities and 
processes that focus on the root causes of conflict, rather than just the effects; 
[and] encourage and support the participation of indigenous resources in the 
design, implementation and sustainment of activities and processes" (137-8). 
Wendy Lambourne (2004) defines peacebuilding as "strategies designed to 
promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the 
population are met and violent conflicts do not recur (3)." This definition takes a 
"long-term focus and incorporates the goals of both negative peace (absence of 
physical violence) and positive peace (absence of structural violence)" (3). For 
Doyle & Sambanis (1999), the aim of peacebuilding is expanding the "space for 
peace". Peacebuilding strategies then ultimately aim to create a 'political space', 
or rather, an 'effective capacity' for building and sustaining peace (1). 
Additionally, strategies 'should' address local roots of hostility, the local 
capacities for change and the "net specific degree of the international commitment 
available to assist change" (1). 
This literature advocates for an approach to peacebuilding that activates the 
conflict context from the ground up, favouring long-term solutions that focus on 
social justice, redressing inequity and structural violence, and modes of 
reconciliation. This approach is people-based and requires active engagement with 
the values, norms, and ideologies that underlie a conflict. Indeed, the literature 
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that takes a structural understanding of peacebuilding brings notions and issues 
concerning justice to the fore. 
Wendy Lambourne (2004) argues justice and reconciliation have historically 
been considered as competing objectives in the process of making and building 
peace. Preference for using globalizing policies and concepts in the practice of 
peacebuilding and conflict prevention, and the increasing focus on international 
justice, has meant the goals of justice and reconciliation have been adapted 
without adequately analyzing the concepts and how they are best achieved in 
different conflict circumstances and cultural contexts (Lambourne 2004; Pankurst 
1999). Her work shows the international community increasingly refers to the 
need to promote national reconciliation and resolve tensions, but rarely defines 
what that means. Most writing on international law and transitional justice does 
not include any analysis of the various types of justice and their relationship to 
reconciliation or conflict resolution. For Lambourne, "both justice and 
reconciliation are fundamentally significant goals that need to be addressed in the 
design of successful post-conflict peacebuilding processes and mechanisms" (2). 
Donna Pankurst (1999) argues there is an overall confusion about the 
relationship between justice, reconciliation, conflict resolution and peace. Justice 
is a complex concept with substantive, symbolic, economic and social, legal and 
psychological meanings. Rama Mani (1998) advocates three categories of justice 
which are necessary for reconciliation and peacebuilding: legal justice, rectifying 
justice and social justice (5-8). For Mani, justice may be retributive, restitutive or 
restorative, and different people have different priorities in relation to justice. For 
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some, an apology is required, for others, an acknowledgement of the harm done is 
required before forgiveness is possible. 
John Paul Lederach (2001) identifies socioeconomic injustice as an 
instrumental obstacle to peacebuilding. For Lederach, at issue is broadening our 
understanding of peacebuilding to include conflict transformation, restorative 
justice and socio-economic development: we have not adequately developed a 
peace-building framework that reduces direct violence and produces social and 
economic justice. He turns attention to the social meaning of reconciliation; 
involves righting wrongs nonviolendy and understanding the "deeper 
psychological and subjective aspects of people's experiences" (842). Thus 
reconciliation is based on building relationships and requires a process of 
reconstructing identities (842). 
For Lederach, reconciliation is first about people and relationships - real 
people in real situations. It refers to a process of change: reconciliation goes 
beyond the resolution of a particular issue, and toward a framework that embeds 
the issue in the context of a broader system of understanding including the root 
cause(s) that underlie the expression of conflict. Reconciliation requires linking 
the content of a particular issue with the systemic patterns and structures mat have 
historically guided and defined the relationships; seeking change in root causes 
(847-848). In sum, reconciliation enables a deeper understanding of the conflict 
and possibility to change the deeper patterns and causes of conflict in the 
relationship. 
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Nonviolence theory assumes a long-range approach to problem solving 
and conflict resolution. Non-violent peace-minded attributes include tolerance, 
intellectual generosity and respect. Also, finding and expressing one=s voice is 
an important part of fostering a community based on the 'values of peace making' 
and 'harmony' (Lagerquist 2003; Boulding 2001; Gaining 1996). There is a 
growing literature by practitioners directly involved in protracted conflicts that 
argues that attitudinal change requires a change in procedures, roles, and 
structures of conflict parties, including the development of institutional capacity at 
the local level dealing with conflict (Hampson 2003, 395-396). For Elise 
Boulding (2001), peacebuilding NGOs must, "learn to collaborate in the field 
rather than compete for resources" (x). The task for peacebuilders is to seek out 
local peacemakers, faith groups, women's organizations/groups, teachers, health 
professionals, and elders. As per Boulding, "No peacebuilding can be effective if 
it is not based on the best insights and resources of local communities in conflict 
situations" (x). 
In summary, peacebuilding debates suffer from a hegemony of technical 
understanding, and lack of specificity about the relationships between the 
conditions that lead to conflict and the effect of third party intervention: there is 
little consensus about what constitutes success. It is rife with theoretical 
antagonisms, namely, reconciling short term needs for the cessation of conflict 
and recovery with long term needs of addressing the root causes of conflict. 
Overall, peacebuilding is a broad "concept in search of a policy" (Carment and 
Schnabel 2003, 1). As a policy concern, it lacks meaningful infrastructure for 
53 
implementation as compared to other policy concerns such as humanitarianism, 
democracy, development, and arms control. The prescription is theoretical: to 
broaden the conceptual parameters of peacebuilding by expanding the conceptual 
parameters of conflict prevention. 
Speaking Peacebuilding: Scholarly Literature on Conflict Prevention 
Traditional conflict prevention finds its roots in the notion of deterrence. Bernard 
Brodie et al first develop theories that form the dominant deterrence paradigm -
preserve the peace through fear of retaliation. In the 1950s, then United Nations 
Secretary General Daj Hammarskjold originates modern preventative diplomacy, 
refining the aims of preventative action in the 1950-60 annual report to the 
General Assembly, Preventive Action. Wanting to strengthen the world 
organization's preventative role, he contended that early engagement of the UN 
could replace external interventions, "forestalling the tlestructiveness of conflict 
created by external military intervention and arms transfers" (Vayrynen 2003, 47). 
This could be achieved by employing both uni- and multi-lateral channels to 
arbitrate, mediate and encourage dialogue between conflicting parties. The aim 
was "to fill the vacuum conflict creates and emphasize the importance of regional 
security" (47). The first UN peacekeeping operation was UNEF (1956), deployed 
in the Suez Canal to separate belligerents (Israel, Egypt). In 1982, UN SC Javier 
Perez de Cuellar called for more systemic use of the Security Council to prevent 
the escalation of conflicts and provides the basis for current UN-based approaches 
to risk assessment and early warning. 
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The pinnacle of conflict prevention work was the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict (1998). The Carnegie Commission advocates that 
conflict prevention connotes a way of thinking; a state of mind, perhaps even a 
culture that permeates the activities of all those engaged in the implementation of 
preventative policy, be they NGOs, states, regional and global organizations 
(Carment and Schnabel 2003, 12). 
The scholarly literature on conflict prevention is dominated by foreign 
policy and political science experts. It is differentiated by how conflict is defined, 
either as set categories or as context. The literature is marked by different 
understandings of the concept of conflict: rationalist, determinist, purposivist, 
liberal. Broadly, the literature focuses on the structural conditions for conflict, 
systemic conditions for conflict; structural and systemic sources of conflict. In 
turn, conflict prevention strategies are differentiated as technical/operational 
response and/or structural response to conflict (Cousens 2001; Doyle and 
Sambanis 1999; Sisk 2003; United Nations 2005b; Carment and Schnabel (eds) 
2003). 
In response literature, debates are political, practical, and ethical in nature. 
Much of the debate tends to focus on the use of force; intervention debates are 
concerned with coercive versus non-coercive forms of response. Ethical debates 
focus on coercive and non-coercive methods of intervention to affect a conflict 
(Yugoslavia) and bring advancement toward peaceful settlement. Less attention is 
paid to other strategies and instruments ranging from formal diplomacy to track-
two interventions (Crocker et al 2001, xxiii). The thinking on intervention and 
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response to conflict is best characterized by the divide (debate) between realist 
and liberal interpretations of the sources of conflict. 
The realist position is differentiated by 'soft' and 'hard' schools of thought. 
Hard realists employ a narrow range of intervention strategies (use of force) to 
restore order, whereas soft realists employ policy options including diplomacy 
and mediation. The liberal position employs different schools of thought guided 
by the idea that trade promotes peace. The liberal school favours governance-
based strategies and addresses the psycho social dimension to conflict: "The 
success of preventative action seems to depend critically on the political contexts, 
and the ability for policy makers to read it correctly (Vayrynen 2003,48). 
Much is written and said about the logic and merits of conflict prevention in 
both its operational and structural forms, little said about its implementation. 
Talentino observes, with the concept of conflict prevention, an interpretive tension 
exists with on the one hand, a meaning of conflict prevention that denotes short 
term, immediate, judgmental and a long term, structural, latent and patient 
interpretation on the other. In the later, attitudinal change is a protracted and 
indeterminate undertaking. Changing attitudes involves both strategic operational 
responses and long term strategies (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 15). In turn, 
'capacity building' emerges as a central theme: institutions need to obtain a better 
understanding of both long term structural and operational strategies. As such, 
individuals who work there need to understand how they can use the political 
tools available (19). 
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For Bruce Jentleson (2003), responses to the deficiencies in current conflict 
prevention thinking to ineffective strategies have tended to narrow the definition. 
What is required is to broaden the meaning, make it malleable as policy, and 
therefore applicable to a variety of conflict cases over different phases of conflict. 
He prescribes adopting a multi layered, multi discipline, multi-sectoral approach 
to conflict prevention (35). There is a growing body of literature and support for 
the expansion of the definition of conflict. In this view, conflict varies between 
contexts as do the issues at stake, and the phase of conflict, timing, is of particular 
attention. There is a growing consensus around the idea that our tools for 
understanding conflict are not useful: theories, concepts, ideas, strategies, models; 
definitions describe. In the literature on conflict prevention, there is a tendency to 
draw dichotomies between realism, idealism, interests and values (definition of 
world order is shaped by values) (30). 
In summary, conflict prevention is an evolving, morphing concept that 
refers to both long and short term strategies, strategic and responsive to conflict. 
The aim is a change in attitude among its end users. As a concept, conflict 
prevention is "in search of a policy" (Carment and Schnabel 2003, 1). As a policy 
concern, it lacks meaningful understanding for implementation. The field is rife 
with theoretical antagonisms, namely, theoretical and operational division 
between conflict prevention (short-term operational/technical response) and 
peacebuilding (long-term, structural response). At issue in the literature is a need 
for a greater understanding of the dynamics of conflict and how they interact with 
development intervention. At issue in the practice of peacebuilding is whether 
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policy tools address systematic or structural conditions of a given conflict. As 
concepts, conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and development exhibit a 
conceptual tension between a short term, immediate, judgmental understanding 
and a long-term, structural, latent and patient interpretation. The prescription is 
idealistic: broaden the conceptual parameters of theory. 
Speaking Peacebuilding: Third Parties and External Actors: Donors and 
International Development Community 
The literature on development and conflict is divided into two main debates: the 
Crucible Argument and the Instrumental Argument. In the former, conflict is 
considered instrumental to development insofar as "development," sin quo non, 
seeks change. This idea guides the position that political conflicts give rise to 
development; conflict is understood as a catalyst for political change leading to 
development. The change required and the best means to achieve said change will 
involve either structural or strategic change. The underlying assumption of this 
argument is that humans are innately prone to conflict. Nazli Moawad (1996), 
argues conflict has both positive and negative properties, and is the guiding forces 
of productive change (182). He goes on to argue that conflict does not always 
denote a battle of competing self interests or desires, but may be used to clarify, 
transform, or create a relationship (183). 
The Instrumental Argument considers political and social stability a 
requirement for any kind of development. The guiding idea is there can be no 
development in the presence of conflict. Peace, not conflict, is instrumental to 
58 
development and is therefore the key condition for development to occur (World 
Bank; UN; USAID; OECD). For Tim Unwin (2002), the idea of development 
implies progress, however defined. Thus warfare is the antithesis of progress and 
therefore cannot be readily incorporated into a development-oriented theoretical 
scheme. Consequently, development programs and strategies are grafted onto 
contexts of conflict with borrowed concepts: development theory relies on the 
conventional wisdom on peace and conflict to guide is thinking and practice. 
When speaking conflict in the context of the Developing South, for much of 
the literature, conflict is synonymous with 'civil war'. In the literature 'regional' 
and 'ethnic conflict' is the greatest cause for conflict and violence in the world. 
These conflicts challenge preventative action and peacebuilding, undermining the 
bipolar or dual model of conflict that privileges state borders and national 
interests. In so-called 'ethnic conflicts', borders are blurred and boundaries 
between enemy and ally are lost. Jay Rotham (2002) describes these as 
'existential' conflicts whereby recognition of the legitimacy of the one is a threat 
to well-being and existence of the other. 
The development literature on peacebuilding and conflict prevention 
identifies three main challenges facing countries seeking war to peace transition: 
strengthening political institutions, providing a safe environment, and promoting 
economic and social revitalization. To this end, the literature reveals two central 
themes. The first is strengthening political institutions and supporting and 
transforming the security sector. In a post-conflict country, security is widely seen 
as the crucial element for any reconciliation and long term development to occur it 
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requires both ending the insecurity resulting from war and new forms of 
(criminal) insecurity (OECD 2001, 22). This literature addresses the link between 
causes of war and inadequate political governance: it is guided by the assumption 
that there can be no such political development without security of individuals, 
social groups and society as a whole. The second theme addresses appropriate 
strategies to promote economic and social revitalization. It focuses on the 
challenges to creating sustainable, poverty-reducing economic development and 
social development. Indeed, there can be no sustainable, poverty-reducing 
economic and social development, without political development that has one of 
its objectives a reasonably equitable sharing of the fruits of development. In short, 
"sustainable, poverty reducing development requires due attention to both 
economic and political governance" (Ball 2000, 36). 
Critics of the development enterprise argue development theory follows its 
own priorities and logic, existing outside and beyond local social and political 
dynamics, and placing too much emphasis in its prescriptions on technical 
assistance. Otitiers explore how development theory and practices rely on universal 
narratives to manage and administer its multitudinous 'development problems'. In 
this literature, the failure of the 'Peace Process' and subsequent failure of 
development agency to 'consolidate' peace on the ground, through the 90s, is 
linked to the "tendency," as Peter Lagerquist (2003) illustrates, of development 
projects to obscure issues of power and control (5). This is illustrated in the 
tendency for aid assessments and measures of development to rely on 
macroeconomic indicators of growth such as GDP, changes in household 
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incomes, and rates of unemployment; the methodology of IMF growth indicators 
and projection data operate on the principled condition of assuming no crisis 
(Ajluni 2003, 68). For Laguerquist, this is due to the tendency of donor agencies 
to deal with issues of power and control as technical problems responsive to 
technical development solutions. 
Central to development debates today is the idea diat human rights underlie 
and motivate development efforts, in general, but particularly in war to peace 
transition (Bredel 2004). The notion of a human rights approach to development is 
prominent in the literature, especially in the work of international organizations. 
Criticism of this paradigm is that in this approach, development only serves to 
identify the recipients of development as "rights holders" (syntax). Yet, this 
rights-based approach to resolving deeply embedded conflict is easily and readily 
grafted onto the globalization agenda of aid conditionality, deregulation and 
privatization through the rubric of "democracy", "good governance", and 
"economic growth". 
Globalization is a nebulous, shifting term. Globalization is explained and 
described in its literature through its differing perspectives on its properties and 
processes, revealing four key themes. First is whether globalization is inevitable 
process or an entirely new epoch (Sklair 2002). The second theme in the literature 
explains globalizations as increasing global interconnectedness, matched with 
restrictions imposed on the nation state (deregulation), intended to curtail its 
intervention in the pursuit of unfettered economic growth and the freeing of 
capital (Desai 2000). Third, firms and mobile capital have new power as the 
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providers of success in the global economy. The fourth theme explains 
globalization in terms of technological advancement as its central defining feature. 
Despite its conceptual ambiguity, the hegemony of 'globalization' has lead to its 
wide acceptance as a "social reality" (World Bank; UN 2005b, 5), and 
consequently, the "tacit acceptance of its assumptions" (Petras and Veltmeyer 
2000). 
Despite the normalizing of globalization as a 'social reality', growing 
criticism has drawn attention to the differential impacts of globalization on 
Northern and Southern economies, labour, productivity and social welfare. 
Through this lens, critical literatures have emerged focusing on 'globalization as 
strategy': the political, social, economic, cultural and ideological dimension 
(Sklair 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer 2001; Choussudovsky, 1997). In these 
literatures, 'globalization' is often used in conjunction with the term 
'neoliberalism' as a description of the prevailing orthodoxy of socio-economic 
organization. Neoliberalism describes fiscal policies that aim to integrate national 
economies into global markets, with private sector development, and public sector 
reform, with the aim of providing a stable legal, regulatory policy framework 
conducive to private investment and 'productive activity' (World Bank 1999, 
2000). Neoliberalism prefers deregulation, privatization of services, and 
unrestricted flows of capital. 
The negative socioeconomic effects of globalization are often illustrated 
through the impact of widespread privatization of education, heath services, 
utilities, etc. Neoliberalism is oft linked to increased poverty, decreasing wages, 
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increasing unemployment, environmental degradation, imperialism and Western 
hegemony in these literatures. Indeed, by 1996, several leaders from developing 
countries describe how globalization and liberalization had forced their local 
companies out of business and marginalised their economies at the 9th session of 
UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 1996). Leaders such as 
Tanzania's President Benjamin Mkapa, who reported to UNCTAD that countries 
undergoing liberalization and privatization under World Bank/IMF policies have 
"suffered heavy social costs" including job losses, cuts in health care and 
education and increased social and political instability (Khor 1996). 
Other literatures show the attempt to meld democratic reform with economic 
reform has ambiguous implications. The encounter between Western capital and 
the Third World has not been a mutual exchange: "the process has always been 
orchestrated by strong hegemonic forces to solidify die interests of global capital" 
(Logan 2002, 2). In these literatures, 'globalization' is often aligned with 
'colonialism' and 'imperialism' (Petras and Veltmeyer 2000, 2001). For these 
critics, 'globalization' like its antecedent 'colonialism', perpetuates 
socioeconomic dysfunction. Logan argues, third world economies become 
fragmented, as select actors and classes are co-opted into the global system, and 
die majority of people become increasingly marginalized: "Third World 
economies are being systematically relegated to oceans of poverty which are 
attached to the capitalist mainstream largely through he activities of a few capital 
cities, export-processing zones and miscellaneous mining and agricultural 
projects" (3) 
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The source of the conflict lies in the neoliberalism position that the 
dissolution of the state-market bond is "an unproblematic requirement for the 
political and economic survival of the Third World" (Logan 2002, 2; Kapstein 
1998-99). This is problematic because the neoliberalism position contends the 
dissolution of the state-market bond is "an unproblematic requirement for the 
political and economic survival of the Third World" (Logan 2002, 2; Kapstein 
1998-99). In peacebuilding contexts, this is crucial, as state-strengthening and 
nation-building are part and parcel of post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding; 
international aid is condition to anti-corruption measures, reduction of state 
bureaucracy, human rights monitoring, and democratic elections (World Bank and 
Brynen 2000). Furthermore, the role of human rights in socio economic change in 
the Third World contradicts the neoliberal call for the state "to abdicate its welfare 
obligations" (2). As Logan points out, concepts such as 'human rights' and 
'democracy', are "selectively expendable" in the globalization project (2). Indeed, 
globalization discourse as peacebuilding disfigures the social body, deepening 
ethnic divisions and widening social cleavages. 
Roland Paris (2001) challenges the assumptions of liberalization as post-
conflict peacebuilding. He argues the assumption that liberalizing states 
necessarily fosters peace is rooted in a theoretical paradox: democracy and 
capitalism both encourage and require competition, thus in peacebuilding 
processes, competition is the privileged agency for curbing, limiting, ending inter-
communal tension and conflict. Paris argues for institutionalization before 
liberalization. 
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'Economic growth as peacebuilding/conflict prevention' will remain for 
some time to come as the preferred solution to crisis and conflict (Collier 2000; 
World Bank 1999; 2003). Yet, as the OECD points out, while prolonged 
economic decline is a source of conflict, economic growth does not prevent or 
resolve violent conflict, but can intensify it (OECD 1997). Peter Uvin (1999), for 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) argues, "Aid managers need to 
face up to the political nature of all aid;[...][Development discourse can be used 
for many political purposes;... this involves recognizing that perceptions matter as 
much as facts in aid impacts; [and] who gets which piece of the cake is as 
important as the total size of the cake" (4). 
In conclusion, with the concepts of conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and 
development, a conceptual tension exists between a short term, immediate, 
judgmental understanding and a long term, structural, latent and patient 
interpretation. External actors in processes of peacebuilding are engaged in highly 
political, highly privileged activities and therefore require an understanding of 
knowledge as power, in function and form. The next chapter explores the 




Conceptualizing Conflict, Peace, and Development: 
An historical overview 
Introduction 
The basic building blocks of understanding knowledge as power are concepts. 
Concepts provide key frameworks for political decisions. For Andrea Talentino 
(2003), the meaning of concepts rest largely on how they are interpreted. The 
international system is guided by norms and these norms fashion concepts 
(Jentleson 2003, 30). In turn concepts define relationships (distribution of wealth, 
allies, power). The guiding assumption of this research is that ideas matter 
because they represent the quality of our knowledge about a given problem. As 
such, this chapter will present a broad discussion on how the concepts 'peace', 
'conflict', and 'development' have historically been discussed, spoken, and 
thought about. In turn, it will present a review of the theories of conflict, peace, 
and development that constitute the foundations for knowledge that underscore 
the international agenda, guiding all thinking and action. 
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Understanding Conflict 
The conceptual logic of the interrelationship between peace, conflict, and 
development lies in the concepts and theories of conflict. Theories and concepts of 
conflict are spoken largely by authorities on politics and social science: political 
science, sociology, psychology. The discourse on and around the phenomenon 
and concept of conflict is massive, including scholarly work, institutional 
documents, empirical data from the field. The sources are wide-ranging: states, 
institutions, NGOs, academics, practitioners, and dissidents. The discourse of 
conflict incorporates a broad range of disciplines and inquires into all aspects of 
conflict: individual, social, political, economic, philosophical, and ethical. 
The study of international conflict takes as its subject violence, war, social 
conflict, genocide. Theoretical approaches to conflict can be divided into two 
broad themes: theories of war and theories of social inequality. Theories of social 
inequality are concerned with societal processes of conflict, competition, 
organization, disorganization and control. Theories of interstate and intrastate war 
are useful for understanding how conflict and its varying manifestations are 
understood and made known in an orderly international structure. They are 
primarily concerned with theories of strategic interaction and bargaining and seek 
to explain how states interact and respond to each other (Levy 2001, 5). 
Conflict as concept and study is bounded by two opposing assumptions 
about the origins of conflict: innate depravity and constructivist. The innate 
depravity assumption assumes that humans are innately (biological essentialism) 
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prone to violence within and among groups. In turn, innate depravity assumes that 
war is an inevitable if not logical or material function of human nature as it is the 
most elementary way of asserting power and controlling one's environment. This 
assumption is embodied in the work of Darwin - Social Darwinism accepts the 
assumption that struggle is inevitable as a function of progress-and later Freud, 
and guides realist thinking about conflict. 
The constructivist assumption assumes conflict is not innate to humans, but 
constructed by both external and internal forces. The Seville Statement on 
Violence (1986) positioned that warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon and 
posits language and culture, not biology, as reasons for war. Thus, conflict is both 
actual and apparition, artificial and organic. Karl Marx, Emile Durkeim, Adam 
Smith, Quincy Wright, Johan Galtung are seminal contributors to the study of 
conflict as structure. Stubbs, Maitland and Tout studied the interaction between 
power, consent, freedom and obligation (Howard 2001, 30). Emile Durkeim 
contributes to the debate with his studies on the division of labour resulting from 
European industrialization. His analytical concern is with social change processes 
in the long term, or, the social consequences of economic growth. For Durkheim, 
separation, specialization, and social change inevitably cause widespread anomie, 
a feeling of rootlessness and aimlessness, a lack of sense of place or belonging. 
Sources of Conflict Literature 
Until 1914, war was largely perceived as a matter of social fact: an acceptable and 
oftentimes necessary means to settle disputes. By the 18th Century, this attitude 
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shifts, due largely to the creation of state systems, and the use of war to 
consolidate or expand power within the international system: the function of war 
shifts from biology to rational strategy (Howard 2001). Underlying theories of 
inter and intra state war is the norm that sovereign states are the basic and 
indispensable building block of the international system. The main concern for 
states is whether there is clear and present danger to sovereignty. The main issues 
for the management and resolution of conflict are respect for sovereignty and the 
consent and cooperation of conflict parties (Levy 2001, 6). The logic of the 
international system is that imbalance of power in the international system leads 
to conflict and war. 
Quincy Wright's Study of War (1941) is the first seminal modern work on 
the causes of war. He claimed "civilized war is primarily a function of state 
politics" (144). In this view, war is a function of state monopoly on violence. War 
begins "with conscious and reasoned decisions based on calculation, made by 
both parties, that they can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at 
peace" (Howard 2001, 37). Rousseau held a similar view, identifying sovereign 
states as the source for wars while Hobbes pointed to their creation as a source for 
peace. In this view, states are able to moderate or eliminate conflicts because of 
the mechanism of legitimacy of authority and social control. 
Since 1914, explanations for war and its meaning have predominantly 
focused on the causes of war and conditions for peace. This literature bounded by 
opposing fundamental assumptions about conflict and its manifestations: the 
primordial view and the purposivist view. The primordial view operates on the 
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logic that since there has always been war there will always be war and therefore 
assumes an overwhelming inevitability to conflict. In this view, so-called 'ethnic 
conflicts' are understood primarily as violent manifestations of fixed, inherited, 
and deeply antagonistic, historical identities. In this analysis, the end of the cold 
War stripped away the "constraining effects" of bipolar geopolitics, releasing 
historical hatreds to their "natural" states of conflict (Jentleson 2003, 27). In this 
view, powers tend to take a hands-off approach; conflict is understood as fixed 
and its analysis tends to be event-driven. 
In the purposivist view, conflict is understood as the result of calculations 
and motives by conflict parties. The purposivist view operates on the logic that 
war is a construct, not a function of biology. In this view, conflict does not 
represent historical inevitability, but calculations and motives by the conflict 
parties. This view is concerned with how and why identity-rooted tensions 
become deadly. The purposivist view operates on the logic that the dominant 
dynamic in contemporary conflicts is not historical inevitability, but, decisions 
made by conflict parties. The literature on conflict tends to draw dichotomies 
between these two views, manifested in the realist and liberal paradigms. The 
literature on the causes of war is dominated by the realist paradigm. 
The Realist Paradigm 
The core realist hypothesis is that "international outcomes" are determined by, or 
at least, constrained by the distribution of power between two or more states. The 
general realist proposition is that states act "to advance their interests, defined 
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primarily in terms of security" (Levy 2001, 8). Thus, the distribution of power 
between states is the "primary determinant" for "regional and ethnonational 
conflict in the contemporary world" (8). 
This body of literature incorporates several distinct theories, all of which 
hold the same core assumption: sovereign states are key actors in the international 
system and they act as rational actors to advance their own interests, namely, 
security, power, and wealth (7). The leading realist explanation for conflict and 
war is the balance of power theory, which posits maintaining an 'equilibrium of 
power' in the international system is the instrumental goal in the pursuit of global 
peace. The primary aim is to avoid hegemony, the dominance of one or more 
actors, in the international system. This theory explains how states will act to 
accumulate arms and form alliances in response to threats, perceived or actual, to 
their interests (7-12). 
Howard (2001) identifies ideological, economic, and popular wars, balance 
of power wars, wars to assist allies, and wars in defense of rights. Geffery Blainey 
(1973), a reductionist, claims all aims of war are "simply varieties of power. The 
vanity of nationalism, the will to spread ideology, the protection of kinsmen in an 
adjacent land, the desire for more territory [...] all these represent power in 
different wrappings. The conflicting aims of rival nations are always conflicts of 
power (149)". In this view, conflicts arise from conflicting claims, interests or 
ideologies (Howard 2001, 32). 
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The Liberal Paradigm 
The liberal paradigm is shaped by liberal international theory. Liberal 
international theory constitutes "a set of broad theories" which "share a broad set 
of assumptions" that operate on the guiding principle that the conditions for 
conflict in the international system can be influenced to increase the likelihood of 
peace and decrease levels of warfare (Levy 2001, 9). Conflict, therefore, can be 
changed, contained, managed, or even resolved. The primary components of the 
liberal dieory of peace are free trade, democratic political systems, and 
international institutions. Liberal theory promotes the hypothesis that commercial 
liberalism and democratic political systems promote peace. Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo are early proponents of the idea that trade promotes peace arguing 
it generates economic advantage for both parties, while war leads to a loss of 
benefits of trade (Levy 2001; Kippers Black 1999). Liberal theorists further 
postulate that prosperity, the material benefits of trade, creates a culture that 
supports that trade and thus the peaceful conditions that sustain it. 'Society level' 
liberal theory draws from Kant's liberal theory of democratic peace which posits 
states that are democratic in dieir composition are less likely to go to war. This 
theory explains how creating democratic political structures enhance the 
conditions necessary for peace; it incorporates 'the democratic norms model' and 
the 'institutional constraints model' (Levy 2001, 9-11). 
Mercantilists and economic rationalists criticize the liberal economic theory 
of war. They argue the contrary, that peace creates the conditions necessary for 
trade and prosperity, not trade and prosperity create conditions for peace. Another 
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theme of criticism is that war expands wealth and power, and trade is not enough 
to stop that. Indeed, the question then becomes, whether international trade has a 
negative effect on international conflict. Lastly, this body of criticism points to the 
potential destabilizing effects of economic asymmetries; globalization and its 
imminent forces of free trade and privatization is an efficient strategy for wealth 
accumulation, not necessarily wealth distribution. A central issue in the literature 
is the need for scholarship to pay attention to the conditions under which trade 
promotes peace or exacerbates conflict (Levy 2001, 11). 
In conclusion, conceptualizations of conflict have been dominated by the 
realist paradigm which functions with a fixed understanding of conflict - there is 
an inevitability to conflict which restricts the degree to which an external actor or 
force can influence it. There tends to be a narrow scope to the understanding of 
conflict as illustrated in the preference for single variable analysis in the literature. 
The lenses for understanding conflict posit causal analysis only on the most 
visible, or in the case of social systems, those vested with higher or formal power 
(Lederach 2001, 842). As Bernard Brodie (1973) claims "any theory of war in 
general or any war in particular that is not inherently eclectic and comprehensive, 
[...] is inherently bound for that reason to be wrong".5 
Understanding Peace 
The conceptual logic of the interrelationship between peace, conflict, and 
development lay in the concepts and theories of peace. Theories and concepts of 
5 quoted in Howard (2001), 32 
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peace are spoken articulated by authorities on politics and social science: political 
science, sociology, psychology. The discourse on and around the phenomenon 
and concept of peace is smaller in scope and influence compared to conflict. It 
includes scholarly work, institutional documents, empirical data from the field, 
peace agreements, declarations, and resolutions. The sources are wide-ranging: 
states, institutions, NGOs, academics, practitioners, and dissidents. The 
understanding of peace incorporates a broad range of disciplines and inquires into 
all aspects of conflict: individual, social, political, economic, philosophical, and 
ethical. 
Peace as concept and study is bounded by two opposing assumptions about 
the origins of or conditions for peace: negative peace and positive peace. Negative 
peace means 'non-war' or an absence of violence. The dominant realist paradigm 
for thinking about conflict is guided by negative peace — the assumption that 
peace means an absence of violence. Critics like Johan Gaming have widely 
pointed out the absence of war does not necessarily equate an absence of conflict. 
As such, peace as non-war is ineffective as a conceptual foundation for 
understanding both peace and conflict because it does not take into account 
factors such as geographic location, operations of power (economics, military, 
political), nor does it necessarily reflect an absence of hostility, discrimination, 
and positive, constructive relations between actors. 
Positive peace refers the absence of violence and the creation of patterns of 
cooperation and integration (Galtung 1975 &1996; Moawad 1996; Gorsevski 
1999). Positive peace evaluates both the cognitive and evaluative components of 
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peace. For example, peace can be used to describe the internal conditions in a 
society between groups, organizations, and social structures, or between an 
individual and his or her natural environment. Positive peace expands them 
parameters of 'peace as non-war' to include the elimination of 'structural 
violence', and the creation of patterns of cooperation and integration (Gaining, 
1975 & 1996; Moawad, 1996; Gorsevski, 1999). Comprehensive peace, an 
emerging conceptualization, expands the notion of positive peace to include the 
absence of physical, organized violence, and the absence of structural violence: 
"Peace is absence of violence of all kinds, direct (physical and verbal), structural, 
cultural, directed at the body, mind or spirit of some other human being, human or 
not" (Galtung 1996, 77). These understandings of peace give rise to a fourfold 
classification of relations between two nations: war (organized group violence), 
negative peace (no violence, but no other form of interaction either, best described 
as peaceful coexistence), positive peace: some cooperation interspersed with 
occasional outbreaks of violence, unqualified peace: an absence of violence is 
combined with a pattern of cooperation (Galtung 1975, 29). To this end, a 'logic 
of peace' operates on emotional, moral and ethical levels of reasoning, often 
existing beyond the boundaries of 'civilized' order and logic which often involves 
arbitrary or superficial groupings and systematic thinking (Boulding 2001). 
Peace scholars focus their attention to the causes or war, the conditions for 
peace, analysis of conflict processes, and the roles of NGOs and civil society in 
working for disarmament. Nazli Moawad (1996) offers an historical overview of 
Peace Studies (180-181). The First Wave (50s and 60s) is influenced by the 
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geopolitics of Cold War and the arms race. Peace Studies was initiated as a 
scholarly pursuit primarily at research institutes and through a few graduate 
programs. Peace research at this time is dominated by the conception of negative 
peace; it focused on the issues of the bi polarity, the Cold War, armistice, and the 
arms race, and especially disarmament (Galtung 1975). The Second Wave (70s) is 
influenced by the counter- cultural currents of 1960s: American youth culture, the 
Civil Rights movement, the nuclear threat. Throughout the 1970s, universities 
begin to develop undergraduate programs in peace studies. The Second Wave of 
peace research is referred to as an awakening of sorts and marks an 
epistemological break with traditionally thinking about peace. Peace research of 
the second wave is shaped by the concept of positive peace and worked to 
critically uncover positive peace: it focused on global oneness (Galtung 1975; 
Moawad 1996,180-181). 
The third wave (1980s) of peace research is influenced by widespread 
poverty and deterioration of "Third World" and increasing war and conflict. Peace 
Studies during this time is a beneficiary of increased private and state funding and 
the rise of liberalism — rights-based approaches to social science, institutional 
arrangements, and effecting structural change (Moawad 1996). The third wave 
heralds a paradigm shift in Peace Studies whereby its underlying assumptions 
fundamentally change, moving beyond the dialectic of negative/positive peace. 
Scholars of a comprehensive peace identify the shift in the literature on peace as 
follows: from an emphasis on issues of conflicts to the emphasis on identifying 
and effecting change in the attitudes of the conflict parties; from attention to states 
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to the acknowledgement of the rights of individuals; from traditional processes of 
conflict resolution to cooperative processes (Moawad 1996, 187). It focused on 
issues of structural violence and positive peace. 
Johan Galtung (1975) is a seminal contributor to the thinking of peace and 
conflict. Galtung's work is influential for how he distinguishes between 'negative 
peace' - the outcome of efforts is to stop physical or personal violence (direct 
violence) - and 'positive peace' - the outcome of efforts is to end indirect 
structural and cultural violence (indirect violence) that threaten the economic, 
social and cultural well being and identity of individual human beings or groups. 
Galtung draws attention to concepts of asymmetrical and symmetrical conflict, 
personal and structural violence, and the latent and manifest aspects of conflict. 
UNSG Daj Hammarskjold's work on preventative action established the 
first benchmarch in international peace policy. The guiding logic of 
Hammarskjold's policy was to keep great powers out of regional conflicts. Indeed, 
preventative action stems from "a more general logic that external interventions 
could be avoided or tempered if a region was made more autonomous in terms of 
security"; neutralization of the conflict zone was the principle tool of preventative 
action (Vayrynen 2003 47-48). Hammarskjold's approach is limited because it 
covers only horizontal conflicts, whereby salient borders are crossed and excludes 
the vertical escalation of conflict. The distinction between the two types of 
conflict lay in their "relationship with the principle of sovereignty" (Carment and 
Schnabel 2003, 48). In the former, sovereignty is violated, setting into motion the 
offence-defense cycle. In the later, third parties are more reluctant to get involved 
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and there is more of a tendency to let parties fight it out (48). The policy aim of 
preventative action after violence has started is to forestall its horizontal and 
vertical escalation (48). Such policies may be required after the signing of a peace 
agreement to facilitate the consolidation of the peace agreement, the conditions 
for peace, and sustainable long-term peace. 
The key issue in conceptualizing peace is in its relationship to justice: 
"Sustainable peace cannot be reconciled with the perpetuation of social injustice. 
Justice though will not achieve reconciliation if it merely secures revenge" 
(Boulding 2001, xii). Lederach (2001) describes what he calls the "justice gap" 
whereby there is a reduction of violence yet access to resources, participation, and 
human rights are not met. In his view, justice needs to account for suffering 
(requires responsibility taken). At issue in theories of peace is expanding the 
frontiers of knowledge: "For peace is a problem of social organization, and the 
theory of peace and war will someday be subsumed under the general theory of 
social organization" (Galtung 1975, 30). Conceptualizing peace in mainstream 
practice has lacked a strategic dimension which challenges at core the very 
assumptions that guides the logic that reproduces conflict. 
Understanding Development 
'Development' refers to a discipline for academic study (international 
development studies), a field for employment (projects and programs of 
international donor agencies; NGOs), a global plan or enterprise (the development 
project; globalization), and a concept. As a concept, it is simultaneously opaque 
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and fluid; it functions like a shape-shifter, morphing, as it incorporates new ideas 
and lexicons, shedding others. According to Knippers Black (1999), development 
has no precise meaning, nor any generally accepted definitions (1). It has "as 
many potential meanings as potential users (15). Nonetheless, a common theme 
emerges despite the fluidity of its meaning: broadly speaking, development 
implies 'enhancement' which can translate into progress and/or change. What this 
change means, and how it is best achieved, provides the entry point for a 
conceptualization of development as a concept and an idea (or body of ideas); 
diverging interpretations of development as a concept begin with diverging 
interpretations of the development problem. 
While the idea development is a ubiquitous, social fact; any review of the 
literature on development will reveal a vast and diverse landscape of thinking and 
writing on the subject. Theories of development cover a wide range of fields of 
inquiry - economics, sociology, ethics and philosophy, political science - and its 
meaning varies between professional points of view and motivation. In this view, 
development as a concept then is understood to have multiple meanings as 
opposed to a fixed definition. What complicates the study of international 
development for Kippers-Black is, "the commonly adopted meanings and thus 
explanations and strategies do not simply differ from diagnosis to prescriptions, 
they are almost always diametric opposites" (15). 
For this reason, postmodern perspectives offer a utility to understanding 
the roots of development as a way of thinking. Indeed, postmodern scholars of 
development have focused attention on historicizing the idea of development 
79 
theory as a response to official development assistance is of critical concern. In 
this view, the study of development and underdevelopment is emphasized 
historically as a response to official development practice, following rather than 
leading development thinking (action precedes thinking). The following section 
offers an historical perspective to the concept of development in order to show 
that while the notion of development may be fluid, its assumptions are fixed: 
development as a concept is highly contested, representing a particular set of 
historical choices. 
Development as Universalism 
The notion of 'development' emerges after the Second World War as both a 
project to reconstruct war-ravaged Europe, and as a universal process to be 
applied to the former colonies and newly independent states. Indeed, development 
denotes not only concept but category, a method of organizing states and their 
peoples: to become developed, one must first be underdeveloped. The 
introduction of development heralds new global divisions: First World, Second 
and Third World (and now Fourth Worlds of migrants and refugees) nations and a 
new professional field, International Development. These newly created global 
distinctions are both political and economic in nature—marking the borders of 
Cold War politics and the boundaries of global economic status. In turn, the field 
of international development and its theories mirrors these political and economic 
distinctions. 
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Development theory relies on universal narratives to manage and administer 
its multitudinous development problems. Historically, development discourse has 
been preoccupied with processes of development, its strategies and outcomes, and 
how these processes can be better implemented. Thus, theories of development are 
forms of knowledge concerned with explaining problems (economic and political) 
of development and the developing (Third) world. They analyze facts and data 
related to process of development, and seek to provide answers and offer solutions 
to these problems. Models of development explain complex ideas yet they are 
simplified representations of a whole body of diverse ideas and facts. 
Development models are instrumental to understanding development; they 
represent general ideas about development and are the tools that make analysis 
possible. The utility of a development model is contingent upon its practical 
applicability and cost effectiveness. 
There is a widespread tendency to assume a widespread applicability to 
theories of development. The idea of conditioning global peace on economic 
prosperity has defined the parameters for the idea of development, for both 
international development and international relations. To this end, peace (the 
absence of violence) is considered a precondition for economic development, 
which is in turn precondition to advancing transformative human and social 
development. The nation-state is considered the logical political unit in which 
populations were mobilized toward processes of modernization and the European 
model was the preferred model for economic stimulation. World War II lays the 
ground work for a new economic global system; the post-War development 
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project tended to prefer policy prescriptions that introduced banking and national 
accounting systems, education, private property, stock markets, legal systems, and 
public infrastructure to newly-formed states. The architects of the development 
project operate on the assumption that industrialization and modernization are 
legitimate development goals for all peoples and all states, including and 
especially newly emerging (post-colonial) nation states. 
The hegemony of this thinking underscores all international development 
activity and has resulted in deep divisions within development thinking; counter 
strategies to development emerge emphasizing human development, social justice, 
and equity. The development schools of the 50s and 60s had a tendency to look at 
developing countries as "fundamentally similar", and considered logical to 
"generalize about them as one type of society" (Martinussen 1997, 11). Rarely 
was this form of 'development' concerned with political or social considerations 
that influence development processes. In sum, the development project (1950 to 
present) represents a particular set of historical choices based on assumptions, 
rather than an inevitable evolutionary path. The historical evolution of the concept 
of development becomes of critical importance in an inquiry into how 
development is known. 
The Crisis of Development from 1990 to the Present 
The development literature of the past decade and a half has focused on the 'crisis 
of development'. This literature associates the development project with words 
such 'impasse' and 'post-development'. The guiding assumption of this literature 
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is that the assumptions, ideas and concepts of development are highly contested 
and only serve to benefit those who have the power to exercise them. The overall 
theme of this literature is that our tools are not useful: theories, concepts, ideas, 
strategies, definitions that describe and explain development obfuscate the reality 
of their actual exercise. These literatures take as their analytical focus relations of 
power in the development project; how issues of power in development contexts 
are managed with a hand's-off approach of non-interference (Lagerquist 2003; 
Uvin 2001; Gervais 2003). This literature has a moral dimension the increased 
scope of donor involvement in such contexts raise critical questions as decision 
making power over resource allocation, priorities, and project design rests largely 
in the hands of donors and their related apparatuses (Uvin 2001; Gervais 2003; 
Lagerquist 2003). For others, the problem lies in the evaluative process: indicators 
for measuring peace and development omit crucial social, political and/or 'ethnic' 
forces in social contexts: expediency, efficiency define the evaluative measures 
for the effectiveness and success of development initiatives. 
Another critical stream indicates the issue is in the theory: donor preference 
for Western Enlightenment discourse to explain peace and conflict presumes 
individuals act as free rational actors, and ignores the multiplicity of forces, some 
competing, others in companion, which determine actors behave in particular 
ways. To this end, 'discourse' is a useful tool in because it addresses the 
rationalities that underscore donor response to 'development problems'. As Peris 
S. Jones (2004) points out, rationality is embedded in discourse; a function of 
logic, discourse establishes the 'optics' for understanding a given reality and sets 
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the parameters for action and intervention. The term 'optics' in this sense refers to 
the 'gaze' deployed to coherently organize the problem at hand and 'determine' 
the best course of action: 'developmentalism', 'economism', 'feminism' and 
'Orientalism' are common examples of 'optics'. For White (2002), 'discourse' is a 
useful analytical tool for development because it links 'meaning' to 'material 
entitlements' (407). In this view, 'development' as discourse denotes the 
conceptual apparatus deployed by development institutions and the programs and 
outcomes, either in terms of spurring positive structural transformation, or 
sustaining a long-term improvement in human welfare. Thus 'discourse' 
represents the relationship between logic (theory) and action. 
Development as Economism 
The authorities on development, namely international financial institutions, 
national governments and their development assistance agencies, and populist 
scholars favour economic discourse for its analysis and solutions to development 
problems. In this view, economic growth is precondition to development. Early 
theories of development were largely theories of economic development and 
tended to revolve around identifying and creating conditions which either 
promoted or dissuaded economic growth. Current mainstream conceptualizations 
characterize development as globalization: the process of increasing global 
political, economic, cultural, ideological, and technological integration (Lai, 
2000). This is in keeping with the dominance of economic theories of 
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development to speak the language of development. From early modernization 
theory, to dependency theory, to liberal economic theory, development is 
disproportionately spoken through the language of economics. 
Economic development as a strategy to include the former colonies into 
global economic and political arrangements emerges in the era of the 
decolonizatiom. The political and intellectual response to decolonization linked 
human development to national economic growth. The key 'ingredients' of the 
early development project include: modernity, technological advancement, 
telecommunications, western knowledge, economic growth and output 
(McMichael 2000). Hence 'the need to develop' is applied universally to describe 
the former colonies - where they have been, where they are going - from 
underdeveloped to developed, or in other words, from 'primitive' or 'traditional' 
to modern. In a post-colonial world, non-European cultures had to be destroyed or 
transformed. Within this model, social systems perceived to be 'backward' are 
inappropriate foundations for societal modernization. Indeed, 'tradition', 'culture', 
'poverty' markers of 'Third-Worldness' are considered obstacles to development 
(Rostow, Lerner). As Brigg (2002) argues, the historicity of development thinking 
and practice symbolizes efforts to reconfigure the globe and reconstitute the 
colonies in the form of "institutions, funding and resource flows, philosophical 
propositions about the possibilities and desirability of social change modeled on 
the West" (427). 
Initially, development policy aimed at reducing the living standard gap 
between 'First' and 'Third world nations'. To this end, 'development' was, and 
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still is for the most part, measured using national accounting (GNP) and a rising 
standard of living (per capita income, commodity consumption, health, literacy). 
Prescriptions for economic development have key normative assumptions: that 
'living standards' represent universal, common values and principles, with the 
industrial North serving as the growth standard for the economic South; that 
'economic development' can be quantified or measured with a monetary index; 
that the common destiny of a society is increase monetary flows and commodities, 
and that non-monetary, non-commodified social systems are considered backward 
and traditional. 
The debt crisis (1970s and 1980s) shifts the problems of development from 
national to global concerns, creating new assumptions about economic 
'development'. The invisible hand is replaced with a heavy-handed approach to 
manipulating developing economies through structural reform. The introduction 
of structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in the 80s and its emphasis on aid 
conditionalities and privatization heralds the era of globalization. In the language 
of globalization, 'development' is associated with the ability to compete in global 
markets. The main agencies for facilitating this kind development are market 
'experts': Bretton Woods officials and corporate elites. White (2002) argues 
'development' is increasingly identified as a project of Western capitalism: the 
central issues occupying dominant development discourse are the geopolitical 
interests of states, international capital, and regional power blocs (408). 
Indeed, scholars, specialists, case studies, national accounting reports 
illustrate, the development as globalization project has deepened further the 
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cleavages created by the global division of labour and asymmetries in North/South 
economic arrangements. Globalization represents a policy agenda that favours 
market-led rather than state-led development, the liberalization of trade, a 
comparative advantage axiom, and the consolidation of global governance (rise in 
power of TNCs and banks). Consequently, globalization has resulted in the 
bifurcation of global labour, the increase in informal markets, the legitimacy crisis 
of state organizations and financial instability (McMichael 2000; Ellwood 2001). 
As African scholar Mahmood Mamdani (1997) argues, the universal application 
of development models (i.e. Marshall Plan, SAPs, EPZs) tends to understand 
"experiences as a series of approximations, as replays, understudies, that fall short 
of the real performance," lacking an "original history and authentic future" (9). 
Development can be understood as seeking the "most appropriate translation, the 
most appropriate fit" (12). In this view, every act of imposing a 'model of 
development' is an act of translation. 
Development as power 
White (2002) turns attention to 'development' as a mode of knowing or a set 
of regimes for the production of knowledge, as it fundamentally rests on notions 
of difference: traditional/modern, primitive/civilized, subject/citizen (413). 
Moreover, the development gaze tends to re/create a fixed reality whereby the 
'Other' (developing world) is simultaneously 'known' and 'foreign', included and 
excluded. In this way, 'development' can be articulated in Foucauldian terms of 
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power, as a "complex strategic situation" simultaneously constituting forces of 
normalization/inclusion and forces of domination/exclusion. 
Indeed, to articulate the power of development only in terms of brute force 
and domination is to underestimate and obfuscate its powers of incorporation. For 
White, "the secret of development's power" rests in its capacity to "enlist others 
to its own agenda" (410). The basis for this power lies in the process of selectivity 
that serves as the engine of development discourse. Lagerquist (2003) argues 
development can be seen as discourse insofar as it "permits some things to be 
known, others to be elided", and as such, the gap between the 'language of 
development' and 'lived realities' is "fraught with problematic politics and 
tenuous assumptions" (18). It is a determining silence however; the absence of 
key concepts/issues such justice, race/racism, non-violence resonates. 
Many scholars have turned critical attention to how the language of 
development is itself rooted in the colonial encounter both literally and 
metaphorically (White 2002; Mbembe 2000; Fenton 1999; Uvin 1998). For some 
scholars, the development project is a reinterpretation of the project of 
colonialism. In these literatures, development's mission is to emancipate colonial 
subjects from their 'primitive' condition, and exploit their resources for the 
benefit of 'progress.' These authors pay critical attention to the perspective of the 
'Other': the experience of 'South', or the citizens of the former colonies. In this 
view, the concept of development is expanded to include the experience of the 
colonized and the global dysfunction of colonialism to which the development 
project is easily and readily grafted. 
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These literatures highlight important features of the global context of the 
newly emerging development project. First, colonialism socially, economically, 
and politically reorganized the colonies. Of primary importance, the dependency 
and asymmetry created through colonialism's economic model: specializing the 
extraction and production of raw materials and primary products from the 
colonies. In turn, European manufacturing expands output, as their products 
became industrial inputs and foodstuffs for the colonies. This system reorganized 
the world, as it actively disorganized the colonies (underdevelopment), through its 
preference for export monoculture (exchange of manufactured goods for primary 
crops). Furthermore, these literatures draw attention to the affect of colonialism on 
labour: indigenous populations were moved or sold to meet the growing demands 
of productivity. In sum, these literatures highlight the outcomes of colonialism to 
include: the exploitation of wealth and resources of the colonies; the 
marginalization and genocide of indigenous people; the extraction of labour and 
cultural resources (treasurers); response by colonial subjects (submission, 
resistance, suicide) and racism (McMichael 2002; Mamdani 1999) 
Despite the apparent disintegration of imperialism and colonialism, and the 
emergence of development, freedom, and human rights, global economic, 
political, and social arrangements continue to reflect unequal arrangements of 
power (Chambers 2005; Rahnema and Bawtree (eds) 1997; Uvin 2001). Indeed, 
after WWII, post-colonial states found themselves materially disorganized, 
economically stagnant, and without political legitimacy, while capitalist centers 
enjoyed the 'golden age' of growth and progress. Early critics of the development 
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project tend to blame this disparity on uneven global economic structures which 
favour power and wealth (ECLA, dependency theory). For example, early 
strategies of development aimed at the former colonies tended to favour 
specializing in exports, as determined by dominant forces (primary goods), but 
made these developing economies vulnerable to changing prices. For others, the 
development project designed for the newly-emerging colonies both implicitly 
and explicitly subordinates the 'developing world' as it guaranteed the continued 
intervention of the North to the South, favouring northern capital and interests. As 
Steve Fenton (1999) observes, "the politics of recognition will often be allied to 
the politics of redistribution" (90). 
Palestinian economist Adel Samara (2001), like many critics of 
globalization, accepts the 'social reality' of this economic phenomenon, while 
drawing attention to its differential effects in and on advanced capitalist countries 
and developing countries. He does so by employing a centre-periphery model to 
describe relations between global economic actors. In this view, Western capitalist 
countries and their satellites "benefit from the liberalization of trade, access to 
expanded markets and the free movement of capital and goods (though not labour 
power)" at the expense of the Third World (1). Samara argues that in post-Oslo 
Palestine, the Palestinian Authority is largely externally created and financed by 
the capitalist centre (United Sates) and its financial institutions (World Bank and 
IMF). Oslo was born when globalization dominated, as it still does, international 
relations. The United States, emerging as the sole global superpower, assumes its 
place as the main controller of globalizing financial institutions. As the lead 
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'sponsor' to the peace process, the US emerges as the central 'partner' and author 
of the post-Oslo peace process. 
In summary, the thinking, speaking, and writing about development, peace 
and conflict is dominated by 'one-size-fits-all' models and single-variable 
analysis. The thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and 
conflict avoids their normative, qualitative dimensions. Moreover, our ideas fail to 
properly explain problems of development, peace, and conflict because they rely 
on highly contested fixed assumptions. Indeed, the thinking, writing, and speaking 
about development peace and conflict avoids discussion and analysis of power 
relations: internal to the conflict dynamic and external. Asymmetrical 
relationships are a condition of injustice; therefore conditional to peace and justice 
is redistributing power toward symmetrical relationships of power in conflict 
contexts. Development functions as power to the degree in which it is in 
continuity with asymmetries of power. Development functions as justice to the 
degree in which it is in continuity with symmetries of power. As such, the 
dependency of contexts of "complex emergency" on external agents and agendas 
of development, and their financial institutions, rearticulates a local, historical, 
institutionally embedded dependency, and deep social divisions. 
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Chapter Four 
Understanding the roots of the Israel/Palestine 
Conflict (1880s to the present) 
Introduction 
This chapter will initiate the case study for this research, the Israel/Palestine 
Conflict and the Oslo Accords and the interim period. To begin this research and 
analysis first begins with an understanding of the conflict dynamics: the character 
of relations between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. Gershon Shafir and Yoav 
Peled (1998) argue any analysis or attempt to understand Palestinian and Israeli 
relations involves a broad-based theoretical framework that consists of historical 
and current socio-economic models. This chapter will present the relationship 
between the conflict parties in a historical perspective to present and effects. 
Analytical focus will placed on key actors, documents, ideas, strategies, and 
concepts that shaped this conflict from the outside, and how these forces influence 
conflict within and between populations. It will present the key sources for the 
creation and maintenance of this conflict and how this relationship was structured 
and spoken, in policy and theory. The conditions for this conflict are then 
identified through key voices. 
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Overview 
The protracted conflict between the Jews of Israel and the Arabs of Palestine has 
been considered a threat to global peace and security for nearly over a century. 
From the point of view of the United Nations, the 'Palestine Problem' is a major 
source of danger for world peace and international security; it is a centre piece of 
international politics, diplomacy, and peace, academic study and research, social 
movements, journalism, and general interest. This conflict has special features; it 
is asymmetrical meaning (political, economic, military, social) power, influence, 
resources are disproportionately shared. Like many modern conflicts, the 
Israel/Palestine conflict is existential in nature; the very existence of Israel and 
Palestine are contrary to the existence of the other. Indeed, the relationship 
between Israel and Palestine and their respective peoples is characterized by the 
principled refusal of each to recognize the other. In the literature, the importance 
of both parties of this conflict to recognize each other as legitimate, as an enemy 
and as a partner in peace negotiations, is considered the precondition to resolving 
conflict and building peace. 
Since the 19th Century, Western European encounters with the 'Other', 
local or abroad, have been framed in terms of 'Questions'— The Native Question, 
The Woman Question, the Jewish Question, The Eastern Question and the 
Palestine Question. The United Nations serves as a central information system for 
the Question of Palestine. It functions from the logic that the Palestinian people 
have the inalienable right to self determination and sovereignty. To this end, the 
United Nations has generated a critical volume of information which has 
93 
strategically functioned to bring the Palestinian perspective into the grand 
narrative of the conflict. The Origin and Evolution of the Palestine Problem 
(1990), published four years after the outbreak of the first intifada, is a first 
attempt by the United Nations to comprehensively chronicle and document the 
roots of the conflict from the perspective of Palestinians. It represents an initial 
attempt to include Palestine narrative into the grand narrative of the Israel-
Palestine conflict. It is an important document not only for its content but for its 
perspective (analytical focus). It tells the story of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine 
through the voices of the actors involved; memorandums, correspondences, 
letters; the documents that defined the policy for Palestine; the effects of these 
policies; and the tracing of patterns violence with attempts at peace. The Division 
of Palestinian Rights (1993) was established in 1993 to provide the public with 
full text documents and access to information. Indeed, much of the work of the 
United Nations has been to broaden the parameters of understanding the conflict 
between Israel and Palestine. Such work provides an entry point into a broader 
historical perspective which takes as its analytical focus the deployment of power, 
through the lens of relationships, in creating, manifesting, and reproducing 
conflict. 
Early Zionism 1880 -1917 
Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to 
satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation, the rest we shall manage for 
ourselves—Theodor Herzl, The Jewish State, 1896 
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The character of relations between contemporary Arabs and Jews, in what is 
considered historical Palestine6, finds its roots in the early Zionism - a movement 
to create a uniquely Jewish national identity. Indeed, the defining characteristic of 
the Israel/Palestine conflict is the encounter between Zionism and indigenous 
Arabs, considered unique to the region (UN 1990; Said 1978, 1979). Zionism 
represents an ideology, and a political and social movement. The Zionism 
movement emerged with the rise of the discourses of political liberalism and 
political Zionism in 19th century Europe and in response to centuries of anti-
Semitism and violence experienced by Jews in Western and Eastern Europe, 
Russia, etc. 
For centuries, the Jews of Europe represented minority populations who 
were subject to severe restrictions of belonging in their host societies. The 
emergence of European liberalism, and its promise of universal rights and 
equality, assured its Jewry that economic, social, and political assimilation would 
be the engine to end anti-Semitism (UN 1990, 5-6). The appeal of liberalism was 
well received among Western European Jews, who tended to self-identify with 
their host nations rather than as members of a distinctive ethnic group. Yet while 
Western European Jews experienced an increasing integration into national life, 
Eastern European Jews experienced a strengthening of their 'alien status': they 
endured virulent anti-Semitism and persecution by pogroms, resulting in their 
6 Historical Palestine refers to the land area which today constitutes Israel/Palestine. Its boundaries 
extended from the Mediterranean Sea to TransJordan (Jordan), from the Red Sea to Lebanon. 
These boundaries mark not only land, but time, denoting the period preceding the creation of Israel 
(1880 to 1948). 
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mass migration and displacement. It is this experience that brokers public and 
political appeal and acceptance for Zionism. 
The thesis of the early Zionist movement was that liberalism and 
legislation could not alone deliver justice to the Jewish people. For Zionists, 
'emancipation', in the model of liberal nationalism, by design, obfuscated anti-
Jewish sentiment, discrimination and exclusion (UN 1990, 5-7). Early Zionist 
writers (Herzl, Pinsker, Weizmann) based their theory on the assumption that 
European psychological bonds to racism are stronger man legal bonds to equality: 
"anti-Semitism is so deeply rooted a prejudice that it can never be eliminated by 
legislation" (Cleveland 2000, 235). The objective of Zionism was thus: Jews must 
seize and settle an independent Jewish state in order to end their perpetual alien 
status. 
The existence of Jewish nationality and the absence of a Jewish state is the 
ideological basis for political Zionism. Indeed, political Zionists like Theodor 
Herzl, argued that Jews constitute a nation — sharing a common history, religion, 
and psychological bond - but lack a political state wherein they can freely express 
their national culture (235-236). For them, the solution lies in achieving state 
sovereignty. The First Zionist Conference in Basle (1889) established the World 
Zionist Organization and declared the goal of Zionism: to create for the Jewish 
people a home in Palestine secured by public law. 
To this end, there existed within the Zionist movement a. clear 
understanding for the need to shape a legitimizing discourse to rationalize and 
materialize their objective: the development of Palestine as a 'national homeland 
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for the Jews'. A concerted effort to reconfigure the demographic makeup of 
Palestine in favour of a substantial Jewish presence was considered critical to the 
success of the movement. The aim was to create a viable Jewish presence and a 
viable claim to the land. Thus evolved the primary strategies of the Zionist 
movement: land transfers and mass migration - the pillars of the Zionist project in 
Palestine. Early Zionists were able to draw on the deep psychological link Jews in 
the diaspora held for the Holy Land in order to build a political movement. For 
example, 50 thousand diasporic Jews immigrate to the Holy Land during the 
nineteenth century and their presence came to personify and symbolize the ancient 
spiritual Jewish link to Palestine (UN 1990, 7). 
Since the 1880s, grassroots Zionist organizations, whose common 
objective was to assist Jewish setdement in Palestine, helped facilitate early 
Jewish immigration. The Lovers of Zion served as a central organizing agency 
and helped fund small agricultural settlements. Notably, it popularized the Zionist 
campaign: a land without a people for a people without land. The Jewish National 
Fund (JNF), was "chiefly responsible for negotiating land purchases" to 
accommodate the newly arrived immigrants (Cleveland 2000, 248). It did so 
largely from absentee Arab land owners; for example, the Sursock Family of 
Beirut is infamously known in the literature for having sold some 50, 000 acres to 
the JNF in 1920 (248). The purchased land was leased "exclusively" to newly-
arrived Jewish immigrants for a "nominal rate" (248; UN 1990, 29-33). As well, 
The JNC provided start-up capital for immigrants so they could immediately 
initiate agricultural projects. In all, these early immigration strategies were highly 
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successful: from 1919 to 1923, Jewish immigration totaled 30,000; by 1929, it 
totaled 232, 000; and by 1939, the population of Palestine grew by more than 
400,000 Jewish residents (UN 1990, 33). 
In reality, Palestine, then under the control of the Ottoman Empire, was 
comprised of an indigenous Arab population of more than 500,000 residents 
whose ancestors had inhabited the Holy land for more than 1,500 years. This 
population comprised both Christians and Muslims, and constituted 90% of the 
region's population. Roughly two thirds of the Arab population was peasant-based 
and agrarian and farmed on lands owned by absentee landlords. Arab residents 
experience the negative effects of the Zionist project: dispossession, expulsion, 
and dispersal. Consequently, unemployment and poverty grew, as well as the 
displacement of Palestinians from rural areas to urban centers, and ultimately, to 
other countries. As observed by Zionist Ahad Ha'am early in the twentieth 
century (1910s): "I can't put up with the idea that our brethren are morally 
capable of behaving in such a way to humans of another people, and unwittingly 
the thought comes to mind: if it is so now, what will be our relation to the others if 
in truth we shall achieve at the end of times power in Eretz Yisrael" (UN 1990, 7). 
Politics of Privilege: British Influence and the Mandate Years (1922 to 1948) 
The four Great Powers are committed to zionism. And Zionism, be it right or 
wrong, good or had, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future 
98 
hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700, 000 
Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land—Lord Balfour, August 11, 1919 
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire was a catalyst for the creation of the 
'Palestine Problem'. By the early Twentieth Century, the 'Eastern Question' 
consumed European politics as the Great Powers scrambled "to establish control 
or spheres of influence over territories of the declining empire" (UN 1990, 2). 
Early Zionist leadership, particularly Chaim Weizmann, knew the importance of 
gaining international support for a Jewish state. This was important for several 
reasons: to consolidate divergent Jewish opinions about Zionism, to draw support 
from the European powers to harmonize die Allies' policy with the aims of 
Zionism, and to gain international approval and sanction for legitimacy (UN 
1990). 
World War I and the formation of the League of Nations consolidated the 
aims of the Zionist movement with geopolitical strategic interests of the Allies. In 
the British Government, David Lloyd George, Arthur Balfour, Herbert Samuel, 
and Mark Sykes have great sympathy toward the Zionist movement and its aims. 
These men serve as crucial links to authority and decision making power for the 
early Zionist leadership. Chaim Weizmann is an important advocate and activist 
for the Zionist movement who is instrumental in opening up official channels to 
the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine. Chief Secretary of me War Cabinet, Mark 
Sykes, in the words of Weizmann was "one of our greatest finds" (UN 1990, 8). 
7 A memorandum to Lord Cuzon from Lord Balfour (1919) The Origins and Evolution of the 
Palestine Problem 1917-1988(1990), 20. 
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He guided their work into "more official channels" and counseled them on 
"delicate diplomatic negotiations (8). Zionist leaders like Weizmann focused on 
stresseing the strategic (comparative) advantage of a Jewish State in Palestine: an 
effective guard of the Suez Canal and "a bridge between two civilizations" to 
interpret Western ideas in the Eastern countries (8). 
The Balfour Declaration (1917), authored by Lord Arthur James Balfour, 
is considered the cornerstone document to understanding the Israeli/Palestinian 
conflict. This document designs Arab/Jewish relations in Palestine. Indeed, it 
forms the juridical basis for Zionist claims, formalizing the intentions of political 
Zionism, and representing the policy position of the British government prior to 
and during the Mandate years (1920 - 1948). The Declaration has three key 
features. First, it contradicts promises made to the Arab Leadership in the 
McMahon Letters (1911) in which autonomy in Palestine was promised to Arab 
leaders in exchange for support during the WW I. Second, it expressed a 
commitment to a political organization (the Zionist Organization) and movement 
(Zionism) whose declared aim was to resettle Palestine with non-Palestinians. 
Third, its commitment is given at a time when Palestine is formally still part of the 
Ottoman Empire. Indeed, "the ambiguities and contradictions with the Declaration 
contributed heavily towards the conflict and goals and expectations that arose 
between Palestinian Arabs and the non-Palestinian Jews" (UN 1990, 13). 
The McMahon Letters (1911-14) between Sir Henry McMahon and Sherif 
Husain, Emir of Mecca, assured Arab control over Arab countries; "Great Britain 
is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the 
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regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca" (UN 1990, 3). Later 
the British position is that this promise never included Palestine. So far as 
Palestine is concerned, the British were determined "that no people shall be 
subject to another" and made claims for equal status between both peoples. Letters 
made public in 1939, shortly after, a committee of British and Arab 
representatives finds Britain had no right to dispose of Palestine (3). 
The Declaration, while not formerly considered a legal document, 
nonetheless fully legitimized the Zionist project for Palestine, as well as its aims 
and principles, and served as the philosophical and operational basis of the British 
Mandate. Of significance, it provided for the establishment of a Jewish National 
Colonising Corporation for the resettlement and economic development of 
Palestine (UN 1990, 9). The establishment of this organization formerly 
operationalized and legitimized early Zionist efforts to reconfigure the 
demographic makeup of the population of Palestine in favour of a substantial 
Jewish presence. 
The Declaration explicitly states that "nothing shall be done which may 
prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in 
Palestine", or "the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other 
country" (UN 1990, 5). Yet this aim is clearly incompatible with the Jewish 
settlement of Palestine. A central strategy of the Zionist movement was to 
purchase land directly from Arab elites, resulting in the eviction of Palestinian 
residents and their exclusion from economic life. For example, Article VTJ of the 
Constitution of the Jewish Agency: Land Holding and Employment Clauses, 
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expressly prohibited settlers from hiring 'non-Jewish' help (UN 1990, 29-33). 
Although denied means for earning a living, Palestinian Arabs were still required 
to pay British taxes. Moreover, this clause further prohibits non-Jews from 
holding land leases. To this day, 'Non-Jews' -including Arab citizens of Israel 
and Palestinian residents of the occupied Palestinian territory - are not entitled as 
a matter of social fact to buy, hold, own, or lease land (Golden 2002; Zureik 
2003). 
Dissent within the British Government represented a minority view. Sir 
Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and the only Jewish member of the 
British Cabinet was the foremost Jewish critic of the political aims of Zionism 
(UN 1990). Montagu argued Judaism was a universal faith, distinct from 
nationality. He wrote a secret memorandum later made public about his concerns 
that the political aims of Zionism will create division, discrimination, alienation: 
"[...] Mohammedans will be regarded as foreigners in their own land" (UN 1990, 
12). 
Indeed, the 700,000 strong indigenous people of Palestine, having 
inhabited the lands of Palestine for two preceding millennia, whose "desires and 
prejudices" were of no concern to Lord Balfour, were formally excluded from 
these negotiations. The Balfour Declaration was interpreted by local Arab 
communities, and by those abroad, as a violation of their inalienable right to exist. 
In a 1920 protest, citizens of Nazareth declared to the British Administrator in 
Jerusalem, "[...]we are the owners of this country and the land is our national 
home" (UN 1990, 2). The Arab community contended the Declaration represented 
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an infringement of the assurances of independence given by the Allied leaders in 
return for their support during the war (UN 1990). 
The British Mandate 
As part of the post-war redistribution of territory among the Allied victors, the 
League of Nations placed then Ottoman Palestine under British administration in 
the form of the Mandatory Power. Under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, the Mandates System is established. All Arab countries including 
Palestine were considered Class 'A' Mandates, meaning independence was 
provisionally recognized. This Article further states that, "the wishes of these 
communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory" 
(UN 1990, 20). The final disposition of Palestine was decided by the Allies at the 
San Remo Conference (1920) to be placed under British authority, "passed by 
mutual consent into British tutelage" (20). Only in Palestine does the Mandates 
system lead not to independence but conflict. 
The British Mandate (1920-1948) was intended in principle as a temporary 
arrangement until such time as Palestine attained full status as a fully independent 
nation. The character of this proposed nation of Palestine was made explicit by 
Lord Balfour in 1919 at the Paris Peace Conference, "Palestine shall be placed 
under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the 
establishment there of the Jewish national home and ultimately render possible the 
creation of an autonomous Commonwealth" (UN 1990, 6). Indeed, the principle 
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thrust of the Mandate was implementing the Balfour Declaration and establishing 
a Jewish national home. 
In sum, the principal authorities in shaping Palestine were the British 
Government and the Zionist Organization and its leadership. The central 
characteristic of the Mandate period was reconstituting Palestine through the 
processes of immigration and land purchasing. Jewish immigration to Palestine 
signifies the realization of inalienable and natural rights of the Jewish people and 
the interruption of the inalienable and natural rights of Palestinian people; and 
both a positive presence (a taking of place) and a negative presence (erasure from 
place, removal from place). In sum, the British government policy explicidy 
favored the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, characterized by 
the Balfour Declaration, and operationalized through the British Mandate. 
Early Conflicts 
The Arab people of Palestine pre-1948, be it Christian or Muslim, comprised over 
90 per cent of the population and inhabited 97 % of its land. The transformation of 
historic Palestine into a Jewish homeland represents the comparative advantage of 
the denial of the reality of Palestine in favour of modern principles of growth, 
development and modernization. In consequence, Arab peasants were pitted 
against an antagonist who is in a superior position. Arab resistance to the 
encroachment of Jewish immigration began in the late 1900s. The earliest report 
of abuses by Jewish immigrants on Palestinian inhabitants was in 1914 (UN 
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1990). Initial forms of Arab organized resistance takes the form of non-violence: 
November 2, 1918 nonviolent protests marked first anniversary of Balfour 
Declaration. The first formal declaration of Arab opposition to the plans being 
made for Palestine was in 1919, and accompanied reports of "intense anti-zionist 
feelings" in Palestine and Syria. The first anti-Jewish riot was in April 1920 in 
Nazareth in response to San Remo. The official response was to dispatch a local 
Commission of Inquiry which did not publish its findings. 
Riots and violent clashes culminated in the Jaffa riots (1921) which 
marked the one year anniversary of British Administration; Jewish settlers 
responded with Havlaga (restraint); the British authority responded with a 
Commission of Inquiry. The Western Wall riots (1929) resulted in over 200 dead 
and 600 injured. The British Authority responded with military intervention to 
restore control. A Commission under Sir Walter Shaw was dispatched and the 
Shaw Report is created. It reported a profound change in Arab Jewish relations 
and attitudes toward the other. This report also revealed the unrest of 1921 which 
was not reported a decade earlier. The Shaw Report: 
In less than ten years, three serious attacks have been made by Arabs 
on Jews. For 80 years before, there is no recorded instance of any 
similar incident. It is obvious then that the relations between the two 
races during the past decade must have differed in some material 
respect from those which previously obtained. Of this we found 
ample evidence. The local Commission which, in 1920 and 
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1921 respectively, enquired into the disturbances of those years drew 
attention to the change in attitude of the Arab population towards the 
Jews in Palestine. This was borne out of the evidence tendered during 
our inquiry when representatives of all parties told us that before the 
War the Jews and Arabs lived side by side if not in amity, at least 
with tolerance, a quality which to-day is almost unknown in Palestine 
(UN 1990, 35). 
For die Palestinians, violence and conflict represented "[...] among the 
Arabs of Palestine discontent with, and hostility to, the Jews, due to political and 
economic causes [...] connected with Jewish immigration, [...] and their 
conception of Zionist policy" (UN 1990, 35). From 1933 to 36 violence grows, 
yielding the birth of Jewish extremism and the role of terrorism in attacks against 
the British Government. Other forms of resistance included the Arab revolt of 
1936 - a general strike of Palestinian workers - as well as the emergence of 
associations and civil society groups: unions, women's organizations, political 
organizations. The leading authority in Arab resistance to first Zionist and then 
British authority are Muftis and Senior Arab officials. The 1936 general strike was 
called by the Arab High Commission, headed by Mufti of Jerusalem; resistance 
begins to take form as a national movement. As the strike prolongs, violence 
builds: attacks on British troops, police posts and Jewish settlements; sabotage of 
roads, railways, pipelines. The British authority responds with curfews, mass 
arrests, collective fines, and parts of the Arab Quarter of Jaffa are demolished for 
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the purposes of 'urban improvement' but revolt could not be suppressed. Jewish 
response shifts from Havlaga to reprisal. Ultimately, the Royal Commission 
sought third party intervention from Arab neighbours to mediate the conflict and 
they do. 
Early attempts at conflict resolution were enacted through the office of the 
British Royal Commission, who sends envoys and information missions regarding 
the nature of hostilities. Early commission findings included a belief among 
Arabs' that the Balfour Declaration implied a "denial of the right to self-
determination" and "their economic and political subjection to the Jews" (UN 
1990, 35). The King-Crane Commission (1919), consisting of Americans Henry 
King and Charles Crane (Britain and France nominate no members) was an 
important document in support of Palestinian concerns. King and Crane met with 
Arab nationalists, including representatives from Lebanon and Palestine who 
presented their resolution on the fate of Arab countries. This resolution included 
the first formal declaration of Arab opposition to the plans being made for 
Palestine (UN 1990, 19). The Commission recommends, "[...]serious 
modification of the extreme Zionist programme for Palestine of unlimited 
immigration of Jews" (19). It also noted reports of intense 'anti-Zionist' feelings 
in Syria and Palestine. Also of significance, the Commission notes that to realize 
the Zionist programme would require military force and rejects the 'historical real 
estate claim' to the land. 
The Shaw Report, as stated earlier, offered further insight to the dynamics 
and dimension to the growing conflict. The Peel Report, which investigated the 
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1936 violence, brought with it 58 death sentences for Arab dissidents and further 
rebellion. Further contributing to the problem, the British authority also vacillated 
in its Jewish immigration policy -introducing the White Paper, for example—in 
an attempt to placate Arab resentment and anger. This document only deepened 
the conflict by increasing tension and bitterness for the Jews. This became 
especially poignant during the 30s as German policies for Jewish extinction take 
root, and thousands of European Jews attempted to flee to Palestine, only to be 
turned away at Tel Aviv/Jaffa and sent to Cyprus. Ultimately, the British hand 
Palestine over to the United Nations in 1947 to seek a solution and resolve the 
conflict. 
Counterpoint attempts to yield peace between Jews and Palestinians began 
to emerge in the early 1920s. At the grassroots level of the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, Arab and Jewish women have historically been at the forefront of 
peacemaking. Simona Sharoni (1995) argues informal and formal networks 
created and supported by women of Israel/Palestine have, "historically supported 
inter-communal relations among Jews, Muslims, and Christians in the Arab 
world" (132). They have, for example, historically mobilized on the basis of the 
ethic of nonviolence as a means for resistance and community building. They 
have also established underground schools, and now, teach democracy, conflict 
resolution and peace strategies to youth and children (Plyler 2003; Giacaman and 
Johnson 2001; Svirsky 2003). 
In short, sources for the Palestine Problem (1880 to 1948) include: the 
disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, Anglo Arab understandings on Arab 
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independence (the Hussain-McMahon Letters), geopolitical influence and 
advantage of the European powers, the Balfour Declaration, Zionism and its 
immigration and land policies, early abuses and impunity; the Mandates system; 
institutionalized, racialized discrimination and enmity (internal social divisions), 
and the responses to the conflict by the British authority. 
The Making of a Nation: Eretz Y'Israel 1948 to 1967 
Your name will no longer be Jacob. You have struggled with God and with men, 
and you have won; so your name will be Israel. —Genesis 32:28 
World War II and the Holocaust crystallized the aim of Zionism into actual form: 
a home land for the Jews in historical Palestine. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-
Gurion declares Israel a democratic Jewish state. On May 15, 1948, Egypt, Syria, 
Lebanon, TransJordan, and Iraq invade Israel (Cleveland 2000; UN 1990). The 
war lasts until December and results in the expansion of Israel's territory, the total 
defeat of Palestinian Arabs, and the collapse of die UN proposal for peace. 
At the time of Israel's Independence, the Palestinian population comprised 
67% of the population of Palestine. The War of Independence (1948), or what 
Palestinians call al-Nakba - the great disaster - caused 780, 000 members of me 
pre-1948 Palestinian population to flee their villages and towns to neighbouring 
Arab states: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria. Those who could emigrate fled to 
Europe, the Persian Gulf States, or North America. At the time, the United 
8 In Hebrew, Israel literally means 'fights with God': 'Isra' - 'fights' and 'el' - 'God'. 
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Nations envisioned a solution of repatriating Arabs back to the areas from which 
they fled. However, The Government of Israel's immigration program during the 
years 1948 to 1951, under Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, rendered that plan moot: 
The Israel Government brought over 600,000 Jews of the diaspora back home to 
Israel (Cleveland 2000, 338). To accommodate the rapid waves of immigration 
Israeli authorities 'absorbed' 'abandoned' Arab land and property, taking over 
villages, urban dwellings and businesses (339-41). 
The dispersed Palestinian Arabs were concentrated in temporary refugee 
camps located in southern Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, and Jordan; only Jordan granted 
former Arab residents of Palestine citizenship (3348). By 1950, 906, 000 refugees 
were registered with the United Nations Relief Worker's Agency (UNRWA), a 
United Nations body established to operationalize social assistance to Palestinian 
refugees. The original UNRWA budget represented US$ 27 per individual per 
annum for food, shelter, clothing and medical services (347). Palestinian refugees 
possess an absence of legal status or political membership; their identity 
understood in terms of an absence from formal membership and belonging to a 
community. Today, Palestinian refugees number three million. 
Furthermore, 160,000 Palestinian Arab residents remained after the war. 
According to Adalah; the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights, 25% of those 
remaining Arabs became internally displaced persons.9 These Israeli-Arabs now 
constitute 20% of the total population of Israel, or roughly 1.2 million citizens. 
They live predominantly in Arab villages and towns, in mixed Arab-Jewish cities 
(Tiberius, Tel-Aviv/Jaffa), the Triangle Area (East/West Jerusalem and suburbs), 
9 See: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel <<www.adalah.org/backgroundhtml>> 
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and in the Negev (Beduin). Arab-Israelis have formal citizenship to the State of 
Israel under the Nationality Law, but are refused full belonging on the basis of 
ethnicity. From the state's inception, the Jewish majority viewed the remaining 
Arab minority with suspicion and hostility; certainly as the 'Other', as opposed to 
legitimate players in the newly formed Israeli polity (Weiner 1992; Yiftachel 
2000a, 2000b; Davis 1995; Kelman 1999; Ghanen 2000). 
For Shafir and Peled (1998), citizenship discourses are employed in 
competition over access to rights allocated by the state and para-state institutions. 
Therefore, citizenship, instead of levelling status difference, functions as a tool of 
stratification. Citizenship functions as power as a mechanism for domination: 
enforcing modes of inclusion and exclusion, differentiating legitimate from 
illegitimate. Citizenship is deployed as power through processes of incorporation 
and segregation. For example, Israeli identity cards, initiated to differentiate 
citizens on the basis of ethnicity and religion, identify the nationality of their 
holders as either "Jewish" or "Arab" for differentiation, as opposed to universally 
as "Israeli". Israeli nationality is equated with a specific religion for Jewish 
Israelis and with specific ethnicity for Israeli-Arabs. The result is the negative 
effect of 'Arabs' being singled out as 'non-Jewish' (Meir 2001; Manor 2001; 
Kelman 1999; Smooha 1997). 
I l l 
Naming as power and privilege: translating Palestine 
The War of Independence marks the transformation of historical Palestine from a 
colonial society to a civic society. 'Naming' became a critical catalyst for nation 
building and national identity-creation: it functioned to distinguish that which is 
legitimate from that which is not. First, Hebrew was established as the new 
national language, manifesting the new Israeli identity as distinctively Jewish and 
Israeli. The triumph of Hebrew is commonly considered a profound manifestation 
of the collective will of the Jewish people: the language became, "the most 
significant building block of the new Israeli identity" (Cleveland 2000, 341). 
Early identity shaping strategies included replacing Jewish Diaspora family names 
with distinctively Israeli Hebrew ones; Some such as Galil (of the Galilee), 
Shamir (rock) signified the landscape, while others such as Peled (steel) or Oz 
(might) signified strength and power (341). 
Other strategies include the product and process of rendering from one 
language, into another, the physical and psychological landscape of Arabic 
Palestine into Hebrew Israel. To this end, the Israel Defense Forces destroy 400 
Arab villages, towns, and regions, making way for distinctively Israeli 
communities, as part of renaming the landscape of the New Israel. This process of 
naming/renaming can be understood as a kind of geocultural translation (343). 
The epitome of this kind of geocultural translation is in the very name Israel. 
Indeed, for Zionists, the renaming of Palestine to Israel represented God's 
covenant to His people, chosen to live as a community, on their own land, to make 
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manifest the Law. According to Rabbi Reuven Lauffer of the Ohr Somayach/ 
Tannenbaum College in Jerusalem, renaming Jacob to Israel affects a dual 
identity: the physical man 'Jacob' and the spiritual man, "the G-d of Jacob". In 
turn, this dual-identity affects a dual spiritual landscape: the physical territorial 
space of 'the Promised Land', and an inner subjective space, a spiritual 
community to which each Jew is a member. In this sense any Jewish individual 
who upholds perfectly the Law manifests Eretz Y' Israel regardless of place.11 
This principle is embodied in the Law of Return (1950) which grants every 
Jew , wherever he or she may be, the right to come to Israel and become an 
Israeli citizen.13 The Law of Return formalized the immigration of all Jews to 
Israel as a central engine to nation building and serves as a legitimizing discourse, 
considering all Jews of the world citizens of Israel. In 1970, this law was amended 
to expand the definition of Jew "to ensure the unity of families where 
intermarriage has occurred.14 Thus Israel is understood to mean the spiritual, 
emotional, psychological community of the Hebrew people and that shared 
experience (Israeli citizenship), as well as a physical territorial space (landscape). 
The Law as embodied in the Ten Commandments and further teachings of Moses. 
11 This concept is similar in character the Islamic concept of 'umma' — signifying the community 
of Muslims worldwide and the spiritual bonds that link one Muslim to another. 
12 'Jew' here is defined as a person born of a Jewish mother or has converted to Judaism and is not 
a member of another religion. 
13 See Acquisition of Israeli Nationality « www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHokdpo » 
Accessed 31/03/2002, 3 
14 See: Acquisition of Israeli Nationality « www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp7MFAHokdpo » 
Accessed 31/03/2002, 3 
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The Other: accommodating difference, differentiating legitimacy 
The Zionist program had not planned for nor anticipated the existence of a large 
non-Jewish minority population in the future Jewish state. The question of "how 
to accommodate Israeli notions of social justice with the exclusivity of the Zionist 
ethos" was a vexing one for the Israeli leadership (Cleveland 2000, 340). Early 
state policy (1948 to 1967) ascribed Arab-Israelis the status "not capable of 
belonging". They held legal status as citizens, but held very little attachment to the 
collective identity of the state. These Arabs were granted formal membership but 
denied key rights essential to the practice of citizenship (Castles and Davidson 
2000, iii). To Israeli authority, these Arabs represented a manifestation of the 
animosity and contempt of the Arab world within state lines, and were thus 
subjected to a process of assimilation and control in order 'to belong' (Ghanen 
2000; Frisch 1997; Meir 2001). 
Under Ben Gurion's Labour Party, the entire Arab-Israeli population was 
placed under military rule. Fear and suspicion of Palestinian political activism and 
Israeli reprisal prohibited Palestinians from forming political organizations. Tight 
controls and restrictions on movement (permits were required to move from 
village to village), prohibitions on political membership or affiliations with 
political groups, limitations on employment, censorship of various media 
publications (Cleveland 2000, 340-341). Attempts by the Palestinian community 
to form political parties to run for the Knesset, such as the El Ard (Land) 
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Movement were forcibly stopped and their associations outlawed. Their status as 
secondary citizens was formalized in 1985 when the law governing elections to 
the Knesset was amendment to permit from participating in elections candidates 
deemed racist or contrary to the Jewish character of Israel (Shafir and Peled 
1998). Israeli Arabs are required by law to serve the interests of the Jewish State, 
and its Jewish citizens, first and foremost. 
Resistance to military law and other forms of state repression first take hold 
in 1956 with the killing of forty-nine Palestinian farmers in Kufr Kasem, returning 
from working their fields, by Israeli Defense Forces for violating a military 
curfew, unaware a curfew had been ordered on their village. The anniversary of 
the 1956 massacre marked the first large-scale protest of Arab Israeli citizens 
against Israeli state policies. Cross border raids and attacks escalated through the 
Sixties, as the newly formed Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) assumed 
the central leadership role in Palestinian resistance. Largely externally created, 
designed, and funded by Arab states, the PLO serves as the main mode of 
grassroots resistance to Israeli oppression and presence. By 1974, the PLO, lead 
by Yassir Arafat, is recognized as 'the sole legitimate representative' of the 
Palestinian people and held 'observation status' in the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
War between Israel and her Arab neighbours through the next three decades 
shifted the focus of the 'Palestine Problem' from the internal dynamics between 
Jewish and Palestinian neighbours, to external dynamics between neighbouring 
15 See The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel 
«www.adalah.orgb/ackground.shtml.» 
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states. The 'Palestine Problem' is translated to mean the 'Arab/Israeli Conflict', 
rendering mute Palestinian claims for independence, autonomy, and justice until 
the 1986 Intifada. The Suez Conflict of 1956 fully places the Israel/Arab conflict 
at the centre of the international peace agenda. It innovated the use of 
peacekeepers for the first time, deployed to the Sinai to serve as neutral guardians 
of peace. The October 1967 Israeli preemptive strike against Arab neighbours, 
known as the Six Day War, brought the focus of the conflict back inward to the 
internal dynamics of the conflict: it engendered the perpetual alien status of the 
Palestinian people. 
Palestine:16 The Legacy of Occupation (1967 to 1987) 
The asymmetrical character of Israeli/Palestinian relations today is rooted in 
Israel's territorial conquests during the Six Day War of June 1967: Jordan 
surrendered the West Bank and East Jerusalem (and a significant portion of its 
settled Palestinian population) and Egypt, the Gaza Strip. The Israeli state found 
itself in control of the then 1.5 million Arab Palestinian residents, home to these 
lands (Cleveland 2000, 331). These Palestinians where neither assimilated into the 
greater Israel, as this would compromise the Jewish character of Israel, nor 
permitted to leave (neighbouring countries soon refused refugees). They found 
themselves in political limbo and under administration of the IDF. 
16 Of note: Palestine is not an existing state, nor a recognized autonomous entity. Consequently, 
throughout the literature, the area is referred to by a number of names: the Occupied Territories, 
The Occupied Palestinian Territories, The West Bank and Gaza Strip, WBG, Palestine, etc. 
116 
Palestine today comprises three geographically fragmented political entities: 
West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Its population of roughly 2.9 million 
people is largely traditional and predominantly rural-based17. Both religion 
(Islam) and clan play critical roles in social structure and social dynamics: 
paternalistic values and patrimonial arrangements form most social and economic 
relationships. Customary law, exercised through Shar' ia courts, controls personal 
status law, matrimonial and divorce law, as well as property, inheritance and 
dowry matters (Welchman 2003, 34-69). Palestine constitutes a dependent 
economy, with a high poverty rate due largely to high inflation, and ranks among 
low income groups such as Ghana, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. (World Bank 2000, 
3-4). The political, social and economic dimensions of Palestinian society are 
marked by its submission to external authority. 
Indeed, the 1967 occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East 
Jerusalem, (and to some degree the Golan Heights) initiated a political conquest 
that enabled the Government of Israel to undertake, what some call, a "colossal" 
project of strategic, territorial, and architectural expansion into the territories 
(Weizman 2002, 1). This development occured literally; through territorial 
expansion, confiscating land, transferring Jewish populations into the territories, 
and displacing Arab residents; politically, through the building communities of 
Jewish settlers — Israeli citizens — in the territories, creating a human frontline; 
and economically, through the incorporation of the economic activities of the 
territories (Cleveland, 2000; Sharoni, 1995; Hiltermann, 1991). 
See: Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (2001) from www.pbsc.org 
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Furthermore, the 1967 occupation engendered a legitimizing ideology for a 
legitimate Jewish presence in the territories both internationally and at home. 
Indeed, the State of Israel formally considers the West Bank and East Jerusalem 
as lands constituting a legitimate part of the inalienable right for Jews to exist and 
belong in their promised homeland. Until the Oslo Accords (1993), the State of 
Israel had never formally recognized the presence of a 'preexisting' (i.e. 
legitimate) 'Palestinian' people (Meir 1976). Rather, the Israeli State had 
'officially' renamed the West Bank, Judea and Samaria, engendering Zionist 
ideology in and through the territories. The settler movement 1967-2003 re-
established the relationship between terrain and sacred text (Weizman 2002). The 
topography of the West Bank becomes sceneography, forming an exegetical 
landscape with scriptural significance (4). In turn, the state gains unfettered access 
to land, and a unique vantage of utter control over the territories (Weizman 2002; 
Golden, 2002; Samara, 2001). For example, prior to 1948, the Jewish community 
owned 6-7% of the land of historical Palestine; by 1988, 80% of the land is state 
owned; by 2002, 93% of all land in Israel is under direct state control and put at 
the exclusive disposal of Jewish citizens (Golden 2002). 
The Occupation and the Palestinian Economy 
Indeed, the political conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip enabled not only 
the process of Israeli expansion, but of Palestinian integration as well (Cashden 
1989; Samara 1989). The occupation was of great strategic economic value: a 
captive market for Israeli products and profit and a vast source of cheap labour 
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(Hiltermann 1991). As such, the political occupation of the West Bank and Gaza 
was coupled with a process of economic integration, whereby the economy of the 
territories is readjusted toward incorporation by the Israeli economy (Samara 
1989; Hiltermann 1991). Moshe Dayan, the chief architect of this process, 
prescribed policies that institutionalized mechanisms of full Israeli control over 
Palestinians: direct military presence and economic stranglehold were the primary 
means to, "facilitating Israeli dominance over the West Bank and their integration 
into the Israeli framework" (Hiltermann 1991, 18). 
First, the Civil Administration was established to coordinate every aspect of 
Palestinian life, denying residents basic rights and freedoms: political 
organizations were banned, trade unions outlawed, formal publications under 
strict censorship, and curfews imposed (Cleveland 2000, 356-357). Movement 
was severely restricted throughout the territories, requiring permit from military 
authorities, and the negotiation of check points. Second, Israeli occupation 
authorities broadly pursued a policy agenda of restricting Palestinian economic 
productivity overall: rejecting Palestinian licenses to start productive projects, 
placing bans on marketing and exporting Palestinian goods, and confiscating land. 
Israeli policies of land confiscation under occupation were hardest felt by 
independent and small producers, having by 1985, lost 54 percent of their most 
fertile and strategic lands to Israeli control (Samara 2001, 2). 
Additionally, Israeli policies of neglect and suppression of local enterprise -
for example, the banning of Palestinian agricultural exports - curtailed 
productivity throughout the territories. Producers from the territories, considered 
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potential competitors to Israeli industry, were ostensibly criminalized, while the 
production of crops by Israeli producers was actively encouraged through 
subsidies and incentives (Lagerquist 2003, 7; Samara 1989, 2001). As such, the 
loss of prime agricultural (productive) lands, combined with the inability for 
producers to compete with crops imported through, or produced by Israel, reduced 
the peasant class to surplus labour (Samara 2001, 2-4). In 1970, 38.7% of 
Palestinians are employed in Palestine; by 1986, the number drops to 25%. The 
aim of this process was to ensure the steady flow of cheap, unskilled, disorganized 
(non-union) labour from the territories to Israel; surplus labour was readily 
available in the refugee camps and villages (2-4). 
Dayan's project assumed the erasure of economic barriers would lead to a 
"subsequent erasure of the geographic borders" (1949 border or Green Line): 
Moshe Dayan seems to be aiming at an arrangement in which the issue 
of territorial sovereignty will be submerged in the welter of economic 
and personal ties that will have been created in the area. [...] in this fluid 
creation, in the process of integration, or what the Economist calls 
"osmosis", particular boundaries will assume secondary significance 
(Hiltermann 1991,17) 
Indeed, Israeli markets were largely reliant upon cheap labour, and the creation of 
a migratory labour force was to replace force as a means to achieve peace: "It was 
believed that the improvement of economic and social conditions would be a 
means to minimize grievances and to blanket resentments" (17). 
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For critics such as Adel Samara (2001), the principal aim of the occupation 
was not peace but sustained dominance, adjusting "the economy of the territories 
to fit the interests, needs and structure of [Israel's] own economy," resulting in 
planned, asymmetrical relations of dependency (2). In the exchange, Palestinians, 
cut off from the rest of the world, were forced to seek employment in Israel who 
in turn seeks cheap, unskilled, labour from Palestinians. As Samara points out, 
90% of imports came from or through Israel; any wages paid out by Israeli 
employers are returned as payment for consumer goods. Indeed, under occupation, 
"all Palestinian social classes are forced to interact directly with Israeli economy"; 
the peasant (working) class through its dependency on Israeli employers for 
wages, and the business class as commercial agents serving their own and Israeli 
business interests (2). Israel annexes to its own economy these two main classes 
of Palestinian society - workers and capitalists - resulting in what Samara calls, 
the alienation of Palestinian labour from Palestinian capital (2). 
The Occupation and Labour 
The International Labour Organizatin (ILO) once euphemistically described the 
Palestinian labour situation as "irregular", a meagre term to describe the unique 
political dynamic of the occupied territories. Under occupation, quotas and the 
need to obtain a work permit restricted the inflow of labour into Israel. Setting up 
labour exchanges was one way to control the flow of labour. According to official 
Israeli data, 5,000 Palestinians from the occupied territories were employed in 
Israel; in 1974, that number is 69,000; in 1986, 94,700. By 1989, the Israeli 
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government concedes as many as 116,000 Palestinians were regularly employed 
in Israel, only 45, 000 whom were regulated by labour exchanges (Hiltermann 
1991,18). 
Under occupation, Palestinian employees in Israel work with minimal to no 
provision for their well-being; disability payments, pensions, unemployment 
services are safety nets provided to Israeli citizens to the exclusion of Palestinians. 
For example, The Employment Service Law allows for Palestinians to be excluded 
from any job that would limit Israeli employment, thus shielding Israeli Jews from 
unemployment. While National Insurance Fees are deduced (20% of gross pay) 
from both Israeli and Palestinian workers, Israeli employees receive the full 20% 
benefit while Palestinians receive only 2%. The remaining 18 % are to be 
redistributed to the territories to promote 'investment and development'. In 
reality, these monies were transferred to the Israeli treasury for use in Israel until 
"security" can be achieved for Israel (Hiltermann 1991, 22). Further, Social 
Security is collected from Palestinian labourers, not to provide them with a 
pension, but to "create equality" between the cost of an Israeli worker and a 
worker from the occupied territories, so as not to "give the latter advantage". 
Indeed, "exclusive Israeli control over the economy has helped privilege the 
market position of the Jewish worker, and foster ethnically-defined labour market 
hierarchies and segmentations" (31). 
To sum up, the legacy of direct occupation has resulted in particular 
negative effects on the Palestinian economy: dependence on the Israeli economy 
for wages, a deformed relationship between labour and capital (working class and 
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capitalists are integrated separately into Israel, under occupation), and the 
weakening of the peasant class. Yitzhak Rabin states the intent clearly in 1985, 
"there will be no development in the Occupied Territories initiated by the Israeli 
government, and no permits given for expanding agriculture and industry which 
may compete with the State of Israel" (20). 
Settlements 
Today, the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem are geographically, 
politically, economically and socially separated by Israeli-held lands and dozens 
of enclaves of Israeli settlements (Weizman 2002; Giacaman 2002). Historically, 
Ariel Sharon was a key architect of Israeli settlement strategy. As Minister for 
Agriculture in the 1970s, he called for the settlement of two million Jews in the 
territories by the year 2000; In the 1980s, his settlement plan involved fractioning 
Palestinian communities into enclaves; in 1996, the Israeli government reinstated 
social and economic parity between the Jewish communities in 'Judea and 
Samaria' ascribing the same status as other 'developing' areas 'in Israel' such as 
the 'Negev desert' (Golden 2002). In 1998, as foreign minister, Sharon called on 
settlers to, "grab hilltops," before land was ceded to the Palestinians in peace 
negotiations. In March 2001, Sharon was elected Prime Minister on a platform 
that included his insistence that settlers be defended, the smallest and most 
isolated, to the last: "The fate of Netzarim is the fate of Tel Aviv". Indeed, 
Sharon's government has maintained the flow of incentives and subsidies 
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including, reduced bus fare, providing recreation for children, security, and even 
"pay setders the cost to bullet-proof their cars" (Weizman 2002, 2). 
While Jewish inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza enjoy the full status of 
Israeli citizenship, Palestinian residents are a marginalized majority without 
formal or legal political status. The Palestinian population in the territories is 
roughly ten times that of the Israeli settlers, roughly 2.9 million (PBSC 2000). By 
June 2001, the United Nations Relief Worker's Agency (UNRWA) cites 1.5 
million Palestinians were registered refugees, constituting 31% of the population 
of the West Bank and 81% of the Gaza Strip (UNRWA 2001). Palestinian 
refugees (about 5 million) represented 18% of the total number of refugees 
worldwide; meaning, roughly one in two Palestinians in the world received 
UNRWA services (UNRWA 2001). In this view, the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
can be understood as a landscape of two competing populations - one legitimate 
minority, and the other, an illegitimate majority. 
Israeli sociological architect Eyal Weizman (2002) argues the West Bank 
must be read as a narrative and not simply viewed as landscape. He describes 
Israeli settlements as state-sponsored islands of "territorial and personal 
democracy, manifestations of the Zionist pioneering ethos" (1-2). Israeli state 
Settlement policy post-1977 takes on three features: control, strategy, and self-
defense. For example, in 1984, the Ministry of Housing published guidelines for 
new construction in the West Bank, calling for a "geometry of vision" whereby 
settlements are used as urban "optical devices" for surveillance, and the exercise 
of power (3-5). 
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Weizman's work shows that settlements, in keeping with defense strategy, 
are typically built on hills, heavily guarded, while neighbouring Palestinian 
villages are on low ground; settlements are lit 24 hours a day, so brightly, in fact, 
that the artificial lights confuses diurnal rhythms; Palestinian villages, in 
opposition, lie in complete darkness (3-5). Architectural design tends to keep 'the 
gaze' at the horizon line, above and beyond the Palestinian villages below. The 
state thesis is thus: establish a vision as a means of control, and use the eyes of 
settlers as the mechanism for this control: "The Settlers celebrate the panorama as 
a sublime resource, but one that can be edited" (4). The functioning reality is the 
creation of parallel geographies - First and Third Worlds- that inhabit two distinct 
planes, two distinct realities. Indeed, settlers represent the perfection of the policy 
of separation, exclusion and control over the territories by Israeli state and 
military power. 
The First intifada (1986 to 1993) brought Palestinian resistance to Israeli 
occupation and settlement to the fore of the international agenda again. The 
intifada, —which in Arabic means shaking loose - was largely a non-violent 
resistance movement to Israeli control and dominance. It stressed widespread 
strikes, protests and demonstrations, and the symbolic throwing of stones at Israeli 
military personnel (Hiltermann 1991; Svirsky 2003). In response, the IDF strategy 
included mass arrests, collective curfews and penalties, and violence (notably, 
responding to stones with rubber bullets). Of greatest importance, the intifada 
represented a flourishing of Palestinian civic identity-making: creating schools, 
universities, counter-social and political systems, and resistance to hegemony and 
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control. Indeed, resistance began to take the character of justice: the need for 
Palestinian to achieve not only political autonomy but social justice - balancing 
uneven relations and symmetries of power. Palestinian nationalism and national 
claims developed and crystallized, or so was thought, into the Oslo Peace 
Accords: Palestinian sovereignty and self determination would be finally realized. 
Future Considerations: the El Aqsa Intifada, impasse, "Ebb and Flow " 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's visit to the Haram al-Sharif of the El-Aqsa Mosque 
compound on September 28, 2000 was the catalyst, and hence namesake, for 
Israel and Palestine's second intifada. His visit met with public demonstrations 
and stone throwing incidents. The next day, Israeli riot police and soldiers clash 
again with demonstrating Palestinians at this Islamic Holy Site, killing four 
protestors and injuring dozens more. Violent confrontations escalate: on October 
10, a French television crew broadcast the killing of 12-year old Mohammed 
Jamal al-Durah - caught in the crossfire between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian 
Security Forces after an afternoon of shopping with his father - and broadcast it 
around the world. Days later a raging Palestinian mob publically lynch four 
captured Israeli soldiers at a Palestinian security headquarters: hysterical 
Palestinian teenagers show the blood on their hands to the cheering crowd and 
awaiting television crews. 
Israel's reaction was efficient, brutal, and unrelenting: border closures, 24-
hour curfews, an increase in military checkpoints, barbed wire, road blockages, 
18 The Women's Affairs Technical Committee, A Chronology of Crisis (September 27, 2000-
October 22, 2000) Accessed 19/03/02 «http:// pal-watc.org/leaflet/crisis.html» 
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and the building of a security fence; the extrajudicial assassinations of political 
leaders, as well as the shelling of residential areas, bulldozing Palestinian crops 
and land, and demolishing homes (Esposito 2002, xxxi). Palestinian resistance 
returned in kind with gun and mortar fire, roadside bombs, and unprecedented 
attacks on Israeli settlements, culminating in an intensive suicide bombing 
campaign against Israeli civilians inside the Green Line. By 2003, over one 
hundred suicide bombs were detonated in Israeli cities and highways, settlements 
and towns and 431 people were killed (Enav 2003). Yet according to the Peace 
Monitor, despite the incessant violence and demanding costs of the conflict, the 
Israel Defense Force (IDF)., the IDF privately assessed that it is prepared to 
continue its presence "for another five years" (Espsoito 2002, 121). 
In theory, the Government of Israel's official position is that a "functioning" 
Palestinian civil society is central to engendering peaceful relations on the ground 
(UN 1993b). In practice, dismantling Palestinian civil society in order to disarm 
Palestinian resistance is a primary objective of Israel's military presence in the 
territories. The World Bank estimated that by April 2002, Israeli Defense Forces 
had inflicted at least some $650 million in damage to the infrastructure of the 
Palestinian territories: on agricultural land, public buildings, schools, private 
homes, hospitals, roads. The Palestinian Ministry of Housing reports some 1,600 
private homes were destroyed between 2000 and 2002, while another 1, 000 were 
damaged, affecting some 95,000 people (Ajluni 2003, 69). 
The El-Aqsa Intifada and resulting Israeli military response caused 
unprecedented levels of intimate physical violence, damage and destruction to 
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both sides. According to Israeli official data, by 2003, 525 Israeli civilians and 
232 members of the Israel Defense Forces were killed by violence, namely suicide 
bombs, while another 3,695 civilians and 1,528 security forces were injured 
and/or maimed.19 By the end of 2002, 1,970 Palestinians were killed by violence, 
of whom, 384 were minors under 18 years of age; another 21,500 were injured or 
maimed, half by shrapnel, ammunition and bomb fragments (70). 
Salem Ajluni (2003), former chief economist for the office of the United 
Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the impact of the violence on Palestinian civil 
society (2000-2003). First, he observed the main effect of security measures on 
Palestinian populations was unprecedented rates of unemployment and poverty 
and a matching radicalization of attitudes. In terms of households and incomes, 
for example, a 2002 World Bank press release reported it had assessed the poverty 
line in the Palestinian context at US$ 2.10 in per capita daily consumption.20 
Further, it estimated that prior to the current conflict, the Palestinian poverty rate 
was 21 % (1999); by the end of 2002, the poverty rate rose to 60 % with highest 
rates found in the Gaza Strip. 21 Indeed, income-earning opportunities lost during 
the first 27 months of the violence is estimated at 4.8$ billion, or 70 % of the 
Territories' anticipated gross national income, or equal to the entire Palestinian 
GDP of 1999. On a per person basis, this amounts to a national loss of US$ 1, 475 
19 From www.idf.il/daily_statistics/english/l.gif "Casualties During "Ebb" and "Flow" since 
29.09.00 Israeli Defense Force Publisher Accessed 07/04/03 
20 World Bank, World Bank Expands Support for Emergency Social Services to Palestinians 
(2002). 
World Bank, World Bank Expands Support for Emergency Social Services to Palestinians 
(2002). 
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per family of six persons, constituting an average daily loss of more than $US 7 
million (Ajluni 2003, 69.) 
Moreover, Ajluni reported on a USAID-funded study (2001) that found 
nearly 50% of Palestinians required external food assistance to help meet daily 
caloric requirements and more than 30 % were dependent on "food handouts" one 
year into the second intifada. Of those households surveyed, 53% had to borrow 
money to purchase basic foodstuffs while another 16.9% sold household assets. 
Chronic child malnutrition increased from 7.5 to 13.2% in the first year of conflict 
with 20% of children under five suffer from acute malnutrition. USAID found that 
"medical treatment in rural communities was severely interrupted due to 
roadblocks, affordability, or availability" (70). Ajluni adds further that education 
and nearly all public and private services have been either severely paralyzed or 
disrupted altogether. 
The level of disintegration experienced by Palestinian society has been 
described as amounting to nothing more than the "de-development" of the 
Palestinian territories. Ajluni refers to the phenomenon as 'irnmiseration', die 
mass impoverishment of an entire population, which he considers, "unprecedented 
in modern Palestinian history" (69). The irnmiseration of the Palestinian people 
has indeed galvanized extreme political rhetoric as the new popular culture on 
both sides of the Green Line. The median age of the Palestinian population will 
remain below 20 years until 2025; three generations of Palestinians have known 
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nothing other than occupation, violence, and control. Some 75% of Palestinians, 
mostly children, youth and women, suffer from acute psychological disorders: 
22 See Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (2000) <www.pbsc.org/english> 
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hypertension, depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder (Amayreh 2001, 3; 
Fecci 2001). Palestinian youth are undeniably traumatized, "some beyond repair" 
(Roy 1993, 130). For many on the ground, this characteristic of the conflict poses 
the greatest threat to long-term peace and stability: 
How will such children, an entire generation, be resocialized, 
particularly when their identity has been based on what they've been 
denied? How will such children be made ready to redress the problems 
of a waning civil society when they themselves have contributed to its 
demise? How can they rebuild their society when they have no real 
understanding of what it is that needs repair? This is the most critical 
problem facing Palestinian society into the future, and insofar as Gaza 
is concerned, the future is already knocking at the door (Roy 1993, 
130). 
The BDF described the relations between Palestinians and Israel post 2000 as 
the "Ebb and Flow" (2002), denoting the kind of characterization of relations 
Israelis and Palestinians have experienced since they encountered each other in 
the early days of the twentieth century. The effect of this characterization 
reproduces the historical determinism typically employed to understand this 
conflict. The implication is the natural relationship between Palestinians and 
Israelis is one of contempt and vengeance and violence: an existential dilemma.23 
23 This is typified in the evocation of the Genesis story of Isaac and Ismail to explain the root 
causes of this conflict. 
130 
It also denotes a binary intrinsic to Israel/Palestine relations. The discourse on the 
Arab/Israeli conflict (1949-2003) has typically described the conflict in such a 
way; a binary of opposing forces locked together - point/counterpoint, 
action/reaction. Consequently, dominant attitudes about the means to achieve 




Understanding Peacebuilding in the Israel-Palestinian 
Conflict and the Oslo Accords 
We, reserve combat officers and soldiers of the Israeli Defense Forces, who were 
raised upon the principles of Zionism [...]; We, who sensed how the commands 
issued to us in the Territories, destroy all the values We had absorbed while 
growing up in this country. We, who know that the Territories are not Israel, and 
that all settlements are bound to be evacuated in the end; We hereby declare that 
we shall not continue this War of the Settlements. We shall not continue to fight 
beyond the 1967 border to dominate, expel, starve humiliate a people— Refusenik 
Combatant's Letter, Courage to Refuse, 2002 
Introduction 
The United Nations was just two years old when it took over responsibility for the 
Palestine problem in 1947. In doing so, it accepted responsibility for a 'just' 
solution to the problem. The UN proposed solution was partition: divide Palestine 
into Palestinian and Jewish states with Jerusalem its internationalized capital. This 
solution failed, as stated in chapter two, because of Israel's state building project 
to return world Jewry 'home' through immigration and building Jewish 
communities. Also, increasing enmity between Israel and her Arab neighbours 
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rendered the idea of a housing a large population of 'enemies' within greater 
Israel impossible. Nonetheless, peace negotiations continue to press the two-state 
solution as the preferred relationship arrangement for Israelis and Palestinians and 
a just solution to the conflict. 
In the context of Arab-Israeli relations, peace negotiations have historically 
assumed a rights-based approach to conflict resolution whereby both groups are 
granted equal status. This is problematic when the character of relations between 
the conflict parties is asymmetrical in nature as in the case of Israel and Palestine. 
This approach serves as the basis of the 'two state solution': the preferred model 
for peace between these two peoples, endorsed by the UN. The two-state solution 
is based on the principle of the exchange of land for peace: two states for two 
peoples. This model gained popularity, through the legitimizing discourse of the 
United Nations (1947), as the sole practical means to broker peace at the local 
level between clashing Palestinian and Jewish residents in Palestine, and as a 
means to seek peaceful solutions to regional conflict between the new Israel polity 
and her hostile neighbours: Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. The basic 
operational principle of this model is the exchange of land for peaceful relations 
and political autonomy.24 The language of this model for peace- "land for peace", 
"concessions" - implies a negative mutual exchange of 'giving up' or 'loss' in 
exchange for peace 'gains'. The UN Partition Plan failed in its attempt to resolve 
civil tensions: violence and enmity spread across borders to the broader Middle 
East and beyond. 
See UN Partition Plan (1947), <www.un.org.> 
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Other relationship arrangements include coexistence and separation (Zureik 
2003; Smooha 1997). Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled (1998) offers a model for 
coexistence of peace based on a common political framework. They advocate for 
binationalism: they assume the separation of Israel and Palestine, or in other 
words, Israelis and Palestinians, is not possible, nor practical. Shafir and Peled 
identify the traditional Israeli position as die obstacle to peaceful relations 
(hegemony) and stress an essential change in the character of relations between 
the Israeli and Palestinian nations. They call for strategies that are community 
based focused on inter-community relations whereby the character of 
interrelations can be assessed and measured. 
Settlements 
Since 1967, relations between Israelis and Palestinians of the occupied territories 
have been defined by two key Security Council Resolutions: Resolutions 242 
(1967) and 338 (1973) (UN 2002). These resolutions serve as the foundational 
principles for a "just, lasting, comprehensive peace" in the region: calling for 
Israel's withdrawal from "territories occupied" to its pre-67 borders (the Green 
Line). Indeed, 
The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council have 
repeatedly characterized the Israeli settlement of the West Bank as "illegal" and 
an "obstacles to peace," and have affirmed the "inalienable right to self 
determination of the Palestinian People" (UN GA Res. 51/133, 1996). The central 
document to this position is the Fourth Geneva Convention on the Protection of 
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Civilians in Time of War (Article I), to which Israel is bound as a signatory. It 
calls for the preservation of the territorial and population integrity of lands 
captured during time of war. Moreover, in accordance with the Convention, land 
seized by Israel during the 1967 War is "inadmissible." Resolution 446 (1979), 
declared Israel's settlements had no legal validity and constituted, "a serious 
threat to a lasting peace in the Middle East." This position is affirmed in Security 
Council Resolution 265 (1980), in which the United Nations declares null and 
void Israel's attempt to reconfigure the territories in terms of territorial integrity 
and population, and called for the cessation of Israeli settlement activity. 
UN Security Council Resolutions are often criticized for their ambiguity and 
lack of clear censure concerning Israeli occupation. For example, in Res. 242, the 
absence of the word 'the' in the phrase "territories occupied" has resulted in much 
debate as to which territories are being referred. For Israel, it may include the 
Golan Heights and Gaza, but excludes Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). For 
Palestinians, it refers to all territories occupied in 1967 (including West Bank, 
Gaza Strip and Golan Heights). Such ambiguity serves as a continuation of the 
tendency of external actors to influence and reproduce the conflict when brokering 
peace. 
In December 2000, the General Assembly declared 2001-2010 the Second 
Decade for the Elimination of Colonialism which had as a central issue/concern 
Israeli Settlements and Israeli Practices.25 Resolution 446 (1979) declared Israel's 
settlements had no legal validity and constituted, "a serious threat to a lasting 
25 See <www.un.org > General Assembly declares 2001-2010 the Second Decade For the 
Elimination of Colonialism. 
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peace in the Middle East." Between 1991 and 2002, over 150 General Assembly 
and Security Council Resolutions were passed censuring Israeli expansionism. 
The Economic and Social Council has passed more than sixty-six resolutions have 
been passed regarding the illegality of the settlements of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip and resulting human rights abuses (UN 2002; UN 2006). 
The standard approach to peacebuilding in the Israel/Palestine conflict -the 
two state solution, a rights-based approach to peace, and the Security Council and 
General Assembly - as mechanisms and authorities for justice —has resulted in no 
peace for Palestinians or Israelis. It has not been successful in persuading Israeli 
compliance or bringing about a just solution to the conflict: Israel has never ceded 
illegal acquisition of territory; Palestinian resistance remains a form of terrorism. 
The impasse (2000-to present) demonstrates and represents the failure of the 
continuation current incarnation of this model, the Oslo Peace Accords (1993), to 
effect peace between these divided populations on the ground. In other words, to 
generate an intimate peace, a culture of peace, a peace between neighbours. 
Indeed, sole reliance on this model for peace represents a technical form of justice 
that perpetuates conflict and does not articulate peace. 
Authoring Peace: the Israel/Palestine Conflict and the Oslo Accords 
The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO Team [...] representing the 
Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation 
and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate rights, and strive to live in peaceful 
coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting, 
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comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through agreed upon 
political process (United Nations 1993a). 
The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles on the Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements (DOP) 'ended' 26 years of occupation, by transferring certain 
powers and responsibilities to the emerging Palestinian Authority (PA). The 
guiding principle of the Oslo Accords was "the recognition of mutual legitimate 
rights" as part of achieving "a just, lasting, comprehensive peace settlement" and 
an "historic reconciliation through agreed upon political process." (DOP, Annex). 
The central document of the peace Accords, the Declaration of Principles, was 
widely regarded by Palestinians at the time as "important cornerstone in the 
process of nation-building and achieving a just and lasting peace" (Kassis 2001, 
41). It transferred the role of civil control and security in the contested occupied 
territories, from the Israeli Government, to Yassir Arafat and his newly-
constructed Palestinian Authority (PA). The Oslo I Agreement, based "on mutual 
recognition" between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, and the subsequent 
Oslo II agreement (1995), provided a legal mechanism and timetable to resolve 
the conflict by 2000. 
The Taba Interim Arrangements set into place the operational principles of 
the Oslo Accords: the redistribution of power and responsibility to the PA with 
the aim of achieving Palestinian autonomy and Israeli security. Between 1993 and 
2000, the PA acquires administrative jurisdiction in the small areas under control 
for delivering public services, law enforcement, and legislative power. The Cairo 
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Agreement of May 1994 vested the PA autonomous control over 60% of the Gaza 
Strip, and control over Jericho and its surroundings. The Oslo II agreement of 
1995 extended this autonomy to include six towns and 450 villages of the West 
Bank. At the time of the September 2000 intifada, more than 60% of the former 
occupied territories are seemingly under Palestinian administration (World Bank 
2000, 2). 
In reality, the provisional Palestinian state engulfs Israeli settlement 
communities of the West Bank, itself constituting only 1.7% of the land in the 
West Bank with its population yet Israeli municipal boundaries and regional 
councils control 41.9% of the land of the West Bank. Thus the fact that die PA 
held audiority over 60% of territories obscured the reality that their authority was 
restricted to territorial islands rather than lands held, and that Israel retained 
control under Oslo of the air space above, the sub terrain beneath, as well as ports 
of entry and exit, borders, roads, and ports, severely truncating Palestinian 
sovereignty and PA autonomy (Said 2001; World Bank and Brynen 2000). As 
Weizman (2002) observes, to truly understand the failure of the Oslo Accords one 
must conceptualize the West Bank and Gaza in three dimensions, whereby the 
Palestinian territories are severed, disconnected by Israel, via strategic planning 
and policy into "different, discontinuous layers," enacting a matrix of control, 
discipline, order over the Palestinian residents (1-2). 
Under Oslo, Article V of the DOP called existing Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank and Gaza outstanding "issues of interests" along with the status of 
Jerusalem, the right of return for refugees, security arrangements, borders, and 
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relations and cooperation with other neighbours. Article VI clearly stipulated both 
sides "view the West Bank and Gaza as a single territorial unit, whose integrity 
will be preserved during the interim period" (A/48/48618). During the interim 
period, the number of recognized Israeli settlements remained constant in number, 
but their populations doubled, rising from 100, 500 in 1992 to 198, 000 in 2000 
(Said 2001, 32). Nonetheless, Israel maintains its settlement policy is consistent 
with the Oslo Peace Accord: "Neither the Declaration of Principles nor the 
Interim Agreement contains any provisions prohibiting or restricting the 
establishment or expansion of Jewish communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza" 
(Government of Israel 1996). Gilead Sher, former Israeli chief negotiator at Camp 
David names this maneuvering strategy, "Enlarging the cake before partitioning 
it" and says it is directly related to the authority of the Prime Minister's office 
(Weizman, 1-2). Indeed, the expansion of Judea and Samaria thrived during the 
interim period due largely to the influence of aggressive, right-wing ministers 
such as Sharon in the coalition government (Golden 2002). As Samiha Khalil says 
to Dr. Edward Said: "[...The interim agreements] do not provide a just solution to 
the Palestinian Question. The Israelis are still expropriating our lands [...] forcing 
us to live in isolated cantons. The so-called bypass roads are separating one 
Palestinian area to another." (Said 2001, 33). 
The Oslo Peace Accords and Economic Relationships 
The Protocol for Economic Arrangements (1994) was the first ever economic 
accord between the Palestinians and Israeli government. The basis of this 
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relationship, as outlined in the Protocol, was to forge an autonomous Palestinian 
economy within the greater Israeli economy as a means radically modify the 
nature of fiscal relationships between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. Indeed, 
the Protocol sought to end 27 years in which "trade relations were dictated 
exclusively by Israel, to the detriment of Palestinians (Malt 1997, 1). This 
comprehensive agreement covered import policy and taxes, monetary and fiscal 
policy, direct and indirect taxation, labour movements, agriculture, industry and 
tourism (Malt, 1997). This agreement, the first of its kind between a sovereign 
state and an autonomous political entity, would remain for an interim of five 
years, until, as per the Accords, permanent political status of the West Bank and 
Gaza was reached. 
The aim of the Protocol - to equalize the imbalance of power enjoyed by 
Israeli firms and business community, banks, and markets - obscured the reality 
of Israel's structured dominance over the West Bank and Gaza during the interim 
period (1994-2000). It allowed no provision for the Palestinian Authority to 
autonomously design its own fiscal and trade regime; the economies of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip remained driven by the Israeli shekel during the interim 
period. With no currency of its own, the Palestinian economy remained dependent 
upon the Israeli economy to determine prices. Consequently, Palestinians 
experienced no change in trade patterns, no change in employment possibilities, 
and increased inflation. Indeed, GNP dropped: in 1993 by 3.4%, in 1995 by 
10.1%, and in 1996 by 2.9%; similarly, unemployment increased to 30%, as 
compared to 5% in the pre-Oslo period (Samara 2001, 3). The Protocol ostensibly 
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consolidated Israeli control over the territories as a captive market: locked out of 
and dependent upon Israel's economy, Palestinians were in a perpetual state of 
vulnerability to economic instability and inflation. 
Under Oslo, Israeli control over Palestinian economic, political and social 
life was affected through the rubric of 'security concerns'. The PA administration 
was itself operationalized through a complex network of policing and security 
arrangements. Thousands of Palestinian agents were employed to perform 
surveillance duties on the Palestinian population, through the auspices of the IDF 
and American government (Said 2001, 33-34). The aim was to confine resistance 
to the peace process and Arafat/Israeli hegemony. Gaza Human Rights lawyer 
Raji Sourani, who was himself imprisoned by the PA in 1995, estimates that by 
1996, 20,000 security police patrol the Gaza population of one million (Said 2001, 
33). This amounts to a ratio of one police officer to every fifty residents, making 
Gaza the highest police per capita ratio in the world at a cost of $U.S. 500 million 
dollars per year during the interim period; by 1996, the Palestinian Authority is 
$U.S. 150 million in debt (34). 
The 1996 Palestinian election, heralded by the international community as a 
victory for democracy in the West Bank and Gaza, is another example of how 
Israel's right to security superseded the political and human rights of Palestinians. 
For example, the electoral process was primarily operationalized through a joint 
Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee, composed of representatives from the PA 
and Israel. The Israeli government ostensibly controlled the electoral process, 
through the agency of the Palestinian Authority, because it possessed sole veto 
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power over possible candidates and voters (Said 2001, 33). For example, 
prospective voters had to register with the Committee, according to his or her 
Israeli identification number, and "cleared" by Israeli authorities before given the 
right to vote. As well, each of the 700 candidates running for the Legislative 
Council had to be approved by Israel, so as to exclude "racists, terrorists, anti-
peace process proponents and other political undesirables" (34). For Said, 
democracy in this case means Israel and Yassir Arafat alone "unilaterally 
determine who is included and who is excluded from public life" (34). Thus Oslo 
enabled the Israeli authority to remain fully in control of the West Bank and Gaza 
despite these administrative concessions. Indeed, as Carolynn Baylies observes, 
"democracy cannot be retailed much less imposed on populations" where 
"political and economic conditions remain in dependency" (Baylies 1995, 336). 
From the onset, critics of the Oslo Peace Accords argued its essential failure 
to redress Israeli hegemony in the territories would result in its collapse. For Dr. 
Edward Said (2001), the Accords represented an attempt at "[...] forgetting the 
past, on trying to be pragmatic, trying to fit into the Israeli scheme of things". 
Under Oslo, peace for Palestinians can be understood as meaning a narrative of 
omission; the absence of sovereign authority over its resources; an absence of 
legitimate political, intellectual, religious, cultural, economic, and military 
sovereignty; an absence of resolution on key justice issues. Indeed, the 350, 000 
Israeli settlers living in the occupied territories enjoedy the full protective services 
of the DDF with privileges and rights denied to Palestinian residents. In sum, the 
Oslo Peace Accords effected a perpetuation of asymmetrical relations of power: 
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the dominant (Israeli) — disciplining in character and the subordinate (Palestinian) 
— submissive in character. 
The Post-Oslo Years and Shifting Attitudes 
Shortly after the signing of the Accords, and in response to General Assembly 
resolution 47/170 which recognized the need to promote the "independent 
development" of the territories, members of die international donor community, 
the PLO, as well as NGO representatives, presented the condition and character of 
Palestinian civil society at the United Nations. Their findings were contained in 
the document Report on the United Nations Seminar on Assistance to the 
Palestinian People: Papers and Statements (1993). In it, Sarah Roy reported: 
Old rules and traditional expectations no longer apply. New dynamics 
now characterize life inside the territory, dynamics which threaten not 
only to destroy the uprising in its most productive forms, but certain 
aspects of society itself. The most obvious change is the greater 
lawlessness and scale of violence committed by Arabs against Jews and 
by Jews against Arabs on both sides of the green line [...] Far less 
apparent but far more ominous, however, is the increasing disablement 
and approaching breakdown of civil society in Gaza, a product of 
widening societal divisions and internal fragmentation (Roy 1993, 
123). 
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The "internal fragmentation and societal divisions" of late 1993 evolve and 
intensify through the post-Oslo years, as documented in numerous opinion poles, 
sociological surveys, studies and national statistics accounting. Overall, they 
revealed increasing discord and tension both within and between Palestinian and 
Israeli residents of the territories. By 1997, the Palestinian Center for Public 
Opinion had found 40.8% of Palestinians surveyed favored suicide attacks against 
Israeli targets. 
A 1999 a Jerusalem Media and Communications Center opinion survey of 
Palestinian households in the West Bank found 41% of respondents claimed to 
"trust no one" and when asked which political leader they trusted most, 42% 
"stated that they trusted no political group" in the territories (World Bank and 
Brynen 2000, 70). The Palestinians as represented by this sample wanted greater 
transparency, efficiency, and accountability in public institutions, namely the 
Palestinian Authority (PA). Indeed, only 30% of Palestinians believed they could 
criticize the PA "without fear" which may explain the overall increase in support 
for popular movements that offer an alternative to PA hegemony (World Bank, 
61-84). 
The Department of Strategic Analysis, as part of a national project on "Final 
Status Negotiations", found in a survey on Israeli settler culture in the West Bank, 
an overall increase in the radicalization of Israeli settler attitudes vis-a-vis 
Palestinian neighbours. For example, the percentage of those willing to sell their 
property to a Palestinian buyer dropped from 15% in 1995 to 13% in 1997, while 
those refusing to consider such a transaction increased from 72 to 79%t (CPRS, 
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1997). Moreover, 41% of respondents expressed the attitude that the peace 
process would worsen their relations with Palestinians compared to 36 percent in 
1995. 
By 2000, Dr. Nader Said of Bir Zeit University in Ramallah had found an 
'ominous' and 'portending a state of unprecedented deterioration" in Palestinian 
society (Amayreh 2001, 2). According to Said, support for the PLO and 
Palestinian Authority dwindled to 36%, while support for Hamas on the ground 
increased (3). By all accounts, Hamas ran the best social service network in the 
Gaza Strip, and "some senior officials at UNRWA in Gaza acknowledged that 
Hamas is the only faction they trust to distribute UNRWA food donations to the 
people" (Roy 1993, 131). As Dr. Said observes, popular movements like Hamas 
have been vindicated by the second intifada: "Hamas made it clear that this 
[peace] process would not work and end up in a fiasco, which is exactly what has 
happened [...]" (Amayreh 2001, 2). 
In the case of Palestinian development, there existed a clear gap between the 
opinion of Palestinian elites and the mass public regarding aid effectiveness. 
PECDAR, like many donor organizations during the peace process, devoted 
considerable attention to short-term job creation - schemes with little 
'development effects'. International donors have "an indirect, often unintended, 
but still powerful influence in shaping Palestinian development and priorities" 
(World Bank and Brynen 2000, 15). One notorious example is the spending of 
millions of dollars to clean Gaza's streets (Byrne 1996). Throughout the interim 
period, numerous surveys and studies illustrate the views of the Palestinian public 
145 
reflects, "an excessively negative view of the impact of donor assistance in the 
OPT" (14). Indeed, a (1999) Japan-World Bank study found local development 
institutional structures were, "less successful at strategizing and were not always 
effectively linked to Palestinian policy-making" (35). The greatest failure, as 
identified in the literature, is an overall lack of continuity between development 
aims and practices and the day-to-day reality of Palestinians. 
The Interim Period (1993-2000), the seven years following the "handshake 
heard around the world," provides a context for understanding the 'relationship 
arrangements' between Israeli and Palestinian authority, and the relationship 
between those arrangements and the Palestinian population. It is during this period 
the principles for peaceful relations of the Oslo Accords are attempted to be 
formalized and operationalized through strategies of economic, political and 
social development. In reality, the interim period consolidated hierarchies, 





Peacebuilding and Development during the Interim 
Period (1993-2000) 
Introduction 
The West Bank and Gaza Strip is the largest recipient of non-military aid in the 
world, following Israel and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively.26 For the 1993 
Israeli-Palestinian peace accord, the international donor community "mobilized 
substantial economic resources in the search for peace" (World Bank 1999, 1). 
The World Bank estimates $U.S. 4 billion of donor aid was allocated to the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip under Oslo, in an effort to consolidate peace via economic 
development and good governance reforms (1). By 2000, roughly $U.S. 2.4 
billion of aid had been dispensed to assist in developing the political and 
economic infrastructure, considered by donors as prerequisite for developing a 
sustainable peace between the Israeli and Palestinian people (1). 
Development assistance in the West Bank and Gaza had an express political 
purpose: to consolidate and encourage peace as per the principles of the Oslo 
Accords. Of central priority was gaining popular support for the Oslo process on 
the ground (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 1). Indeed, "the strong commitment of 
26 See: « http://www.Inwebl8.worldbank.0rg/mna/mena.n...5 »Accessed March 22, 2002 
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the international community to support progress towards peace in the Middle 
East" constituted the aid priority "that Palestinians experience as part of the fruits 
of the peace process, tangible improvements in their everyday lives" (87). The 
preferred means to this support was financial aid and technical support to create 
conditions of sustained economic and social development. In practice, this broadly 
constituted technical assistance, increased trade, education, healthcare and 
democratization (World Bank (1999b, World Bank and Brynen 2000) 
The secondary means to facilitate support for peace the peace process is 
outlined in Article VIII in Annex VI on cooperation - The People-to-People 
Programme whose aim was "involving ordinary people" in the peace process 
(Endressen, Lena C. and Gilen, Signe 2000, 29-33). This was to be accomplished 
at two levels; at one level, state institutions would be activated for the purpose of 
increasing contact and understanding between people in both nations. In this 
approach, the media were to be mobilized to improve the images of the respective 
"other", and government ministries would be mobilized to initiate institutional 
changes (29-30). The second level of operation, the grassroots level, mobilized 
strategic actors in civil society - civil society organizations - as the tools of 
peacebuilding. In 2000, 22.9 million Euro was provided to this programme, 
including six large projects on civil society (university and media cooperation), 
and 13 People to People projects (Diamantopoulou 2002). To date, 76.3 million 
Euros have been allocated to peacebuilding programs fostering Israeli-Arab/Israeli 
Palestinian cooperation through joint projects and awareness campaigns 
promoting tolerance and peace (Endressen and Gilen 2000, 33). 
148 
In peacebuilding enterprises, the state and civil society actors, i.e. NGOs, 
are identified as the preferred recipients of aid dollars. Indeed, research on 
Palestinian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) became vital in the 1990s, in the 
view of the transition toward democratization, and the role these organizations 
play in the process of bringing about and fostering this transition. Mudar Kassis 
(2001) offers a definition of civil society organizations as a broad conceptual unit. 
In general, his term includes most non-governmental associations that tend to 
represent the interests of certain groups of the population and do not seek 
executive power, thus excluding political parties (35-47). In the Palestinian 
context, his definition excluded further any organization that is religious or family 
in nature, or that is not based on die voluntary participation of its members. This 
definition does include trade unions, clubs, associations, nonprofit development 
organizations, NGOs and research centres, and the media. 
According to a comprehensive survey conducted by die Center for Palestine 
Research and Studies (CPRS), 76% of civil society organizations in Palestine 
were created after 1967; the greatest growth occurring between 1987 and 1993 
during the first Intifada (1987 to 1993) (Kassis 2001, 38). During these years, 
CSOs were established at a rate of 11.8 per year as compared to 2.3 per year 1923 
to 1987 (40). The total number of CSOs in Palestine exceeds 1, 200. There are as 
well, 12 universities, four university colleges, 12 vocational centers and over 100 
magazines and newspapers (40). This translates into one CSO for every 2, 000 
people in West Bank and Gaza. As noted by Kassis, in comparison to the rest of 
149 
the Arab world, this number is close to what one would find in Egypt, considered 
comparatively better that any other Arab country. 
For the enterprise of developing peace, Palestinian CSOs had special 
importance, due largely to the advanced scope of their work, and the relatively 
high amount of international funding they receive toward the liberalization role 
they are expected to play (Kassis 2001). According to the CPRS study, annually, 
each Palestinian adult participated in at least one activity organized by a CSO. 
This role was considered vital to the process of peace for affecting the political 
system of the emerging Palestinian state, enabling a durable peace through 
institutional reform. Yet the majority of civil society organizations in Palestine do 
work that is described as "traditional" in nature, more than of which are cultural or 
sports clubs (38). Women's organizations constituted only 11% of CSOs and 
human rights organizations, 7% (38). Trade unions represented 2.7%, with child-
care, research, care of the elderly and disabled representing 1%. The majority of 
civil society organizations were located within the West Bank (79%), considered 
the most "liberal" area of Palestine outside of East Jerusalem, whereas 21% are in 
Gaza (38-39). 
The World Bank's policy approach to the territories clearly identified the 
central role of 'civil society' in its development strategies. For the World Bank, 
"civil society" as a conceptual and operational unit was linked to good governance 
and democracy as preconditions for peaceful societies. Of significance, is the 
distinction it draws between governance as an analytical framework and as an 
operational concept; it limited itself to the economic dimensions of governance: 
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the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's 
economic and social resources for development.27 In practice, this mandate was 
interpreted broadly to mean improving public sector management, increasing 
accountability (anti-corruption), and strengthening the legal framework of the 
state. 
Indeed, democracy/good governance reform was a critical feature of the 
Oslo Peace process, where democratization was causally linked to the political 
and economic processes required for sustained conditions of peace. Aid dollars 
were directed toward political reform, whereby targets associated with good 
governance or democracy became conditions for the release of monies (Baylies 
1995, 322). Targets included: functioning government machineries, a well-
functioning public sector, civil service, the imposition of "democratic" multi-party 
elections (1996), the liberalization of institutions, and increased pluralism in 
public life. Capacity building in civil society was causally linked to 
democratization processes, through the practice of participatory development, 
identified as "critical to the positive impact of development efforts" (World Bank 
and Brynen 2000, 3). Local ownership of the development process, "is key to 
good development programming," claimed the Bank, and achieved through "the 
active engagement of civil society" (3). Yet 'participation' was often a 
euphemism for 'local ownership', which more often than not translated into 
strengthening the capacities of existing power structures (Said 2001; Samara 
2001). As understated by the World Bank, the "Palestinian institutional 
framework for governance is unique among developing countries" [...] "given the 
27 See: The World Bank (1992) Governance and Democracy « www.worldbank.org>> 
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very limited Palestinian control of land, and lack of control over water, transport 
of goods and people, or access to external markets (World Bank and Brynen, 4)". 
The Oslo Peace Process and Development 
First on the list of priorities was to increase the standard of living for Palestinians, 
and to establish the foundations for economic development in the region. On the 
agenda: strengthening the PA and its institutions and producing the groundwork 
for future sustainable economic development. The importance of "getting policies 
and institutions right" was to be achieved through policy reform (fiscal stability) 
and institutional reform (democratization) (1-2). 
To this end, development assistance in the newly formed Palestinian 
territories is externally organized in a top-down manner. Local aid coordination 
structures were established by the international community in 1994-95 to increase 
cohesion and continuity of aid delivery. These aid coordination structures 
included: the Joint Liaison Committee, the Local Aid Coordination Committee 
and various sector working groups (World Bank 1999, 3). Prior to the second 
Intifada, the institutional architecture of development in the OPT (1993 to 2000) 
comprised a complex institutional framework of fifty or more donors, working 
with the Palestinian Authority and its ministries, the private sector, local 
governments, local committees and with local and international NGOs. At the 
international level, the United Nations agency UNESCO facilitates coordination 
among donors and sets the policy/project agenda, while the World Bank serves as 
secretariat and facilitates local aid coordination. Projects include workshops and 
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seminars on topics such as water, municipalities, public finance and legal reform 
(World Bank and Brynen 2000,3-4; 1999). 
The World Bank adopted a policy approach to the Palestinian territories that 
emphasized a desire for clear policy objectives, combined with "effective public 
institutions" and an "active engagement of civil society" as essential components 
of development to foster economic growth, reduce poverty, and improve social 
conditions (World Bank and Brynen 2000, 3). This rights-based approach to 
resolving deeply embedded conflict has been easily and readily grafted onto the 
neoliberal agenda of aid conditionality, deregulation, and privatization. 
Immediately after the signing of Oslo, the international community led by 
the World Bank, drew up the Emergency Assistance Program for Palestinian 
infrastructure, development, and institution building. The program's principal aim 
was to "stimulate private investment in sectors such as industry, tourism, 
telecommunications, and agriculture, by channelling long-term finance to local 
entrepreneurs" (World Bank 1993, 4). The World Bank further created the 
Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction (PECDAR), 
whose main function was to dispense donor funds (2.4 billion pledged) as per the 
Bank's directive. 
The principles governing the Palestinian Authority's fiscal operations were 
manifested in the Protocol on Economic Arrangements (1994). The provisions of 
the Protocol were as follows: the virtual free movement of goods, as well as the 
creation of a limited customs union, and access to Israeli markets historically 
excluded from entrepreneurs. The aim if this agreement was simple: the exchange 
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of economic freedom for peace. The Amman Economic Summit (Nov 1995) 
identified the role of Israel as a newly powerful entrepreneurial force in the Arab 
World. For the first time, Israeli business operators could seek Arab partners for 
industrial ventures, and purchase and manufacture consumer products and market 
services. The Amman Summit reflected a change in policy; the emerging role of 
the private sector, controlled by government policy, as a means to build peaceful 
relations between Palestinians and Israelis. 
Yet the Protocol was for many critics of the Peace Process worse than the 
Oslo Accords for Palestinian sovereignty. First, it explicitly ignored the issue of 
Palestinian sovereignty over land, thereby rendering impossible any real 
development strategy in the West Bank and Gaza, especially in agriculture, the 
main economic sector. Second, the Protocol explicitly restricted the PA to specific 
quantities of goods that could be imported and exported, undermining the 
principle of trade relations as a means to building peace; by 1997, Israel exports to 
the territories amounted to $US 1.2 billion and moved freely, while Palestinian 
exports to Israel amount to $US 210 million under heavy restrictions (Samara 
2001, 2). Third, the Protocol established institutional mechanisms for 
disseminating Israeli control over economic affairs in the occupied territories. 
This is illustrated in the creation of a joint economic committee which gave Israel 
veto power over PA requests. Moreover, the Paris Protocol further intensified the 
already deformed Palestinian labour situation in stating: 
[...]the two sides will work towards a normal work force movement 
between them taking into consideration the right of each side to decide at 
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one time or another the extent and conditions of workers' movements in 
their areas. If normal movement is cut to one side, it should immediately 
inform the other (DOP, 281). 
The result was de facto Israeli hegemony over the movement of 
Palestinians. For example, the World Bank has cited on numerous occasions the 
Israeli military policy of 'border closures' as a primary obstacle to development 
and peace in the territories. According to the World Bank and Brynen (2000), 120, 
000 Palestinians belong to the itinerant work force, seeking temporary 
employment in Israel as day laborers, for whom closures meant the cessation of 
any means for income. Border closures resulted in dramatic increases in 
unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza, reaching as high as 60 % in 1999 (1). 
Furthermore, 50-70 % of potential revenue from the Value Added Tax (VAT) is 
estimated to have been lost due to closures. By 2001, losses to the Gaza Economy 
reached $ 3 billion (US) a day because of Israeli strictures (Said 2001, 35). 
According to Sara Roy, 33% of the Palestine's poor were forced into 
poverty after the finalization of the Oslo Accords. As former Palestinian Minister 
of Trade Maher al-Masri states, "All economic agreements following the 
Declaration of Principles were dangerous and have had negative impact on the 
economy" (PECDAR 1997, 4). Alternately, by 1996, Israeli employment rates 
increased by 40% and per capita income of Israelis rose to US$ 16,690, enabling 
Israel to rank number 21 on the international income scale (Shafir and Gershon 
1998, 2). In April 1997, Israel was added to the IMF's list of developed countries 
(with Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong). 
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It is in this context, the 1999-2003 Palestinian Development Plan was put 
forth by the Palestinian Authority, calling for an estimated budget of $ 5 billion 
dollars (US): 141 million to come from development financing from the 
Palestinian Authority, 200 million from the United States, and the remaining 93% 
of its budget, 4.3 billion dollars, to come from the international donor community 
(World Bank and Brynen 2000, 15). Between 1993 and 1998, the cumulative total 
of international donations to the PA reached US$ 3.55 billion in pledges and US$ 
2.45 billion dispensed. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority put forth the Palestinian 
Development Plan (PDP), based on "the expectation that the political and 
economic agreements signed with Israel would be implemented in full."28 
The PDP was intended to be implemented throughout the course of the 
interim period, dependent upon the condition of Israeli withdrawal from the 
Occupied Territories, the safe mobility of Palestinians between the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, and the free access of Palestinian goods and services to regional and 
international markets (Sayigh 2000, 5). The first two years would focus on 
stabilizing the economy and the removal of obstacles restricting the development 
process. This rehabilitation period was to promote the economy's ability to absorb 
large investments without inflation of waste (21). The principal aims of the PDP 
were "the establishment of good governance via democracy, institutional 
transparency, pluralism and accountability vis-a-vis human rights interests" and 
"the establishment of a free and open market economy" (2). To this end, the PA's 
overall development strategy identifies the private sector as the principle engine of 
growth (Palestinian Public Investment Plan (PPIP) 1997, 2-3). The PDP relied 
28 The Palestinian Development Plan (1999) from <http://www.moe.gov.ps/fivyr.html> 
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heavily on outside investors in the private sector as machineries to facilitate 
economic development. As Samara (2001) observes, the PA approached economic 
development under Oslo in conventional terms: spending tax incomes, loans, and 
grants on infrastructure for the purpose of enticing foreign investors and expertise 
(tourists, businessmen, NGO managers, PA officials). For example, most 
investment in the West Bank and Gaza (one billion) was for housing, mainly in 
towns, whereas in villages, building licenses remained in the control of Israeli 
military authorities. Consequently, there was little improvement in housing 
infrastructure by either donors or the PA (4). 
Further, as per the globalizing agenda of the World Bank, the PA promoted 
monetary and fiscal policies that favoured external investors over local investment 
(Samara 2001; World Bank and Brynen 2000). Economic policies favoured 
stimulating private sector development and competition by encouraging the inflow 
of foreign capital. For example, they limited restrictions on foreign remittances 
and dealings in foreign currency, placed ceilings on local banks, not foreign, and 
the law of investment put no cap on the maximum percentage of foreign 
investment of joint projects, nor restricts transfers of net profits (Samara 2001, 5-
6). For Samara, the PA's unquestioning adoption of neoliberal economic policies 
that favour "foreign capital at the expense of local capital" further weakened the 
local private sector (6). 
Furthermore, the PA's adoption of global-oriented policies encouraged local 
and foreign banks to act freely regarding the transfer of public savings abroad: 
minimizing the size and amounts of loans, and imposing severe restrictions for 
157 
guaranteeing loans. The aim was to increase Palestine's desirability as an 
investment opportunity (5). However, over 70% of loans were short term and 
geared toward keeping clients financially solvent while real loans only account for 
6%. Banks tended to encourage their clients to save and then lend their savings 
abroad. For example, by March 1996, bank holdings amounted to US$ 1.35 
billion in individual and private sector deposits. Of this, US$ 310 million 
circulated in die forms of loans, while 938 million represents bank deposits 
abroad (7). As Samara argues, banks were not working as a vehicle for 
development under Oslo — about 90% of Palestinians savings were deposited in 
Jordanian banks (7) 
The resulting 'development' through subcontracting and privatization did 
not serve the population. For example, PA budgets were often used to convert the 
public or buy loyalty, namely through public sector employment (Said 2001; 
Samara 2001). Further, PA corruption extends to the private sector, where no 
more than five individuals in die PA's inner circle hold monopoly control over 
thirteen products: from petroleum to sugar to tobacco and soft drinks (Samara, 
2001). Samara shows the PA operates in direct competition with local Palestinian 
businesses and producers, while claiming to be non-interventionist. 
Moreover, PA fiscal policies favoured industry over agriculture and rural 
producers. They supported large and medium export-oriented industries and micro 
enterprise. The PA strategy offered two broad packages of assistance to encourage 
industry and investment in the territories: the first, border and local industrial 
zones which were open to capital from foreign and domestic sources; the second, 
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small enterprises to support these industrial zones. Samara argues, far from 
constituting 'economic development', these policies merely prepared the ground 
for a "casino economy" - corporate-led, unregulated capital investment having 
little to do with producing real goods and services for real people (3). 
Palestinian Estate Scheme for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
The Industrial Estate Development Program (DEDP) was sponsored by the 
European Investment Bank and World Bank as a template for the integration of 
the West Bank and Gaza into global markets (Lagerquist 2003, 5). It was initially 
designed to foster business "clusters" on the border between Israel and Palestine. 
Known as border estates, the aim of this scheme was to permit the employment of 
Palestinian workers by international and Israeli entrepreneurs, free from security-
related restrictions of the entry of Palestinians into Israel proper. The Palestinian 
Industrial Development Company (PADICO) served the role of administrator. 
The EEDP consisted of nine border estates and six local estates. According to the 
World Bank, nine industrial zones were planned along the Green Line for a cost of 
US$ 5 billion. Public investment for the program was estimated at $US 120 
million, excluding land costs (Samara 2001, 6). In support of the project, Military 
Order 105 (1991), "permitted for the first time free Palestinian investment in 
Gaza" (Lagerquist 2003, 7). 
The estate scheme, analogous to hundreds of similar export processing 
zones (EPZs) around the developing world, was adopted by the sponsors as a 'best 
practice' to promote the preferred model for economic development in the West 
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Bank and Gaza- "government by contract" - a process of transferring power from 
"estate management" to "private agents" (Lagerquist 2003, 6). The nature of 
Israeli control over the territories under Oslo yielded a "peculiar form to this 
arrangement": the estate scheme enabled former Israeli security officials to 
remarket themselves as private facilitators of Palestinian development (6). The 
role of these 'facilitators' was to mediate between Israeli security apparatus and 
the new PA supported Palestinian economic elite. The perceived benefits of this 
arrangement/program included the "secularization of the Gaza industrial estate on 
Israeli terms", and the creation of "closure proof areas, allowing for the free 
movement of goods and labour (an attempt to adapt to Israeli closures) (6). 
The central policy of the estate scheme was the creation of specially sealed 
industrial zones that would provide Palestinian investment with easy and secure 
access to Israeli markets (Samara 2001). The key determinants for investment in 
the Palestinian territories were considered the safety of investment, the availability 
of feasible projects, and readily available cheap labour. Industries expected to be 
labour intensive, export-oriented, marketing Israel to Palestinians. Palestinian 
identification cards, introduced during the first Intifada (1989), became 
instrumental for participation in post-Oslo development, and "emblematic of an 
integral to the systematized method of regulation and control to which it was 
linked": surveillance over the Palestinian population by Unking the individual to 
the central authority (Lagerquist 2003, 7). The governance package marketed by 
PIEDCO made it clear Israeli and international donors that they would have little 
to do with the Palestinian proto-state. Ahmad Hassasneh explains, "When I 
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advertise the estates I am not talking about investing in Palestine. I am talking 
about investing in the Industrial Estates" (11). The appeal of the estates program 
was that the creation of EPZs would allow development to occur as though no 
occupation existed at all, and in doing so, "rearticulated the Palestinians' 
iniquitous economic relationship with Israel" associated with the Oslo process (5). 
Summary Conclusions 
Reliance on peace agreements and policy rhetoric such as the Oslo Accords 
and Paris Protocol will surely obfuscate issues of control, power and dominance 
in peacebuilding contexts. Indeed, "for the World Bank, the economic delinking 
of the self rule areas from the Israeli economy is a contradiction of these 
protocols" (Inbari 1995). For Samara (2001), the aim of the Oslo peace process 
and subsequent interim period "was to usher in a new system reorienting the 
Palestinian people toward accommodation, thus limiting their goals of national 
liberation" (4). In the era of globalization of capital, especially Third World 
capital, increasingly 'ignores' nationality and national commitment. The more 
national capital is integrated with international financial capital, the weaker 
national attachment becomes. In turn, any resistance to the occupation is 
understood as 'against peace'. This is indicated by the conditions placed on local 
NGOs by donors to remove the political dimension of Palestinian development 
(resistance) from their policy agenda. Similarly, cooperation and coexistence with 
Israel, contingent for the receipt of funding, is viewed by Palestinians as co-opting 
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Palestinian sovereignty: "marketing Israel" through advocating normalization 
through joint 'cultural' and other seminars (6). The result as Peter Lagerquist 
illustrates, the tendency of development projects in the territories to reinvest, "a 
local, colonial, genealogy of development as control" (Lagerquist 2003, 5). 
In sum, development as peacebuilding during the interim years represents a 
genealogy of power that served to satisfy Israeli security needs for control over 
the territories and through Palestinians. Development policies for the territories 
reproduced Palestinian subordination to and dependency on Israel; peacebuilding 
through the interim period reproduced the structured dominance of Israel over the 
territories, deepening further the tension and fissures that divided these two 
peoples. In the territories, the interim period is understood as meaning, in the 
development sense, protracted endemic poverty, social disintegration and 




This research revealed the relationship between power and knowledge 
through the deployment of particular discursive positions and strategies in 
international and regional peacebuilding, illustrated through the Oslo Peace 
Accords and interim period (1993-2000). When studied through the perspective of 
relationships, the causes and consequences of conflict between Israeli Jews and 
Palestinian Arabs are largely externally influenced. The historical determinism 
and realist paradigm that typically articulate this conflict obfuscates the relations 
and deployments of power which define and reproduce social, political, cultural, 
and cultural asymmetries which in turn reproduces enmity, despair, and 
dispossession. Indeed, a relationship centered analysis enables an understanding 
of the Israel/Palestine conflict that is constructivist in nature; it is largely created 
and manufactured as opposed to inevitable. As such, as it is made, it can be 
unmade. To this end, a relationship-centered analysis, applied to the role of 
international actors in the quest to bring peace to the region becomes critical to the 
research endeavour. 
This thesis showed how processes of peace building and development, and 
the international aid given to promote it, interact with forces of exclusion, 
inequality, racism and oppression, and in turn re/create and sustain conditions for 
continued structured dominance, and state-sanctioned war and conflict. Indeed, 
the thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and conflict avoids 
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discussion and analysis of power relations: internal to the conflict dynamic and 
external. As in the Oslo case, donor-driven development is oft criticized for 
following its own priorities and logic, placing too much emphasis on technical 
assistance, existing outside and beyond local social and political dynamics. Mudar 
Kassis (2001) points out, "the state, the nation, the people, and their struggles are 
dismissed from die paradigm or rhetorically dismissed as misguided" (35). 
Indeed, development theory and practice is based in social science selectivity. In 
development theory, power is exercised through choosing which concepts, ideas, 
assumptions, and values are included into the canon. What is required is to adopt 
an inclusive approach to development that seeks to identify what is chosen and 
why and what other choices can be made. What is required is integrated research 
on the relationship between language and power and knowledge to the production 
of development thinking and practice on peace and conflict. 
General conclusions about the thinking, speaking, and writing about 
problems of development, conflict and peace are as follows. The thinking, 
speaking, and writing about development, peace and conflict is dominated by 
'one-size-fits-all' models and single-variable analysis. The failure of the Oslo 
Accords and the interim period to create sustained conditions for peace, and 
resulting outbreak of the second intifada, is just one case where the explicit 
imposition of democratic processes on a culture of conflict (Israel/Palestine) has 
failed to yield positive development effects and conditions of peace. 
'Understanding' in development, conflict and peace tends to be narrow in 
scope and thin in depth. Our ideas fail to properly explain problems of 
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development, peace, and conflict because they rely on highly contested fixed 
assumptions. Consequently, issues relating to justice, reconciliation, and 
accountability remain largely ignored or marginalized. This is illustrated through 
the case study of the Oslo Accords and the interim period; the renewed 'two state 
solution' model to reconfigure peaceful relations between Israelis and Palestinians 
through equal rights, democratic reform, and economic growth, only serves to 
further strengthen Israel's structured dominance over the territories. 
Donor preference for using globalizing policies and concepts in the practice 
of peacebuilding and conflict prevention have taken die goals of justice and 
reconciliation without adequately analyzing the concepts and how they are best 
achieved in different conflict circumstances and cultural contexts. Very few 
researchers have considered the roles of justice and reconciliation in the success 
or failures of peace agreements and peacebuilding processes in sustaining a long-
term peace. Unfortunately, the universal determinism of globalization stands in 
for this 'common language', just as economic growth stands in for social justice. 
In sum, development discourse often rearticulates a local, historical, and 
institutionally embedded dependency, and deep social cleavages. Further research 
is required that will enable development agencies to provoke new entry points for 
development activity and endorsement; illicit new areas for research and 
development; improve training and operations in the field and yield greater 
positive development effects 'on the ground'. In order to do so, issues of power 
must be brought centrally to the research endeavour. 
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The thinking, writing, and speaking about development peace and conflict 
avoids their normative, qualitative dimensions. Silences contribute to the 
reproduction of conflict, but also offer an entry point into resolving conflicts. 
Silences are the loci of lost narratives and experiences, histories and solutions, 
which can be harnessed for resolving deep tensions and conflicts. Indeed, 
development must seek to "rebuild social infrastructures, and rehabilitate the state, 
but also support reforms that will resolve political, ethnic and socioeconomic 
tensions" (Gervais 1999, 445). Indeed, a peace-centered approach offers an 
approach to development which places social justice on the international agenda. 
The productive agency of the poor and disenfranchised, their values, attitudes, and 
ingenuity, would take center stage, as opposed to their negative liberty. 
This research concludes that development theory and practice must assume 
that all development thinking and practice is political in nature. Additional, 
development is a regime of knowledge, constituting utterances and silences. 
Silences are a form of power; the task then becomes unmasking mat power, 
asking what is not spoken and why. Thinking, writing, and speaking development, 
peace and conflict must assume that guiding logic and assumptions are highly 
contested and privileged. Left unchecked, they reproduce deformed relationships 
as they are grafted onto various systems of ideas. The task becomes unmasking, 
mapping out, and integrating logics into a cohesive way of thinking that is also 
fluid, malleable: our concepts must 'work for' us, not 'work' us. As illustrated 
through the case study, concepts of development, peace, and conflict, when 
translated, manifest deformed variations of their meaning. 
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This research illustrated how discourse functions as a domain and 
mechanism for the reproduction of conflict. It places the role of discourse - how 
conflict, peace, and development are spoken, written, and thought about - at the 
centre of the dynamics and processes that reproduce conflict. As such 'meaning' 
and 'understanding' are treated as highly contested bodies of knowledge and 
shows that there is no such thing as neutral truth: truth is political and 
problematic. Truth is not fixed nor can it be contained (as violence shows us); 
multiple realities and therefore multiple meanings exist simultaneously. Truth 
ceases to be a privileged aim; rather, as discourse tells us, there are many truths 
and our task is to figure out as many as possible (unmasking discourses and 
knowledges). 
The study of discourse enables for the unmasking of discourses and 
knowledges from various institutions "that claim to speak on behalf of everyone: 
we are all the same, we speak the same language and share the same knowledge" 
(Blackwell, 7). It is diis key feature of discourse makes it and its considerations of 
power so useful to the thinking about issues and problems of development, 
conflict, and peace. This research offers the following conclusions about discourse 
that make its inclusion in the development canon imperative. 
First, discourse is social; all speech and writing is social and is sustained by 
social custom. Second, commands a particular kind of organization of audience 
which means that for any given audience, there is a corresponding discourse. 
Third, discourse and its study enables for the exploration of the social and 
historical dimension to discourse; how discourse is set up, organized, and 
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deployed. This is critical because it raises the key issue of accounting for positions 
and viewpoints from "[...] which people speak and the institutions that prompt 
them to speak and store and distribute that which is spoken" (Foucault 1978, 11). 
Fourth, analyzing problems from the point of view of discourse redefines our 
understanding of institutions and policies. Indeed, institutions are understood in 
terms of the distribution and hierarchy of discourses. In sum, analysis is guided by 
the idea that words carry weight. 
Discourse as a method and object of study has radical implications for all 
forms of knowledge. It is useful as an entry point to analysis to development 
thinking and practice because it enables for the capturing and study of 
simultaneous realities that coexist. Discourse manifests the underlying logic of 
our choices and how meaning is constructed; discourse has no fixed boundary; 
discourses bleed into each other; multiple discourses can interact simultaneously 
at different levels in different dimensions; discourses do not solely collide with 
other discourses (although the effect of their interaction can certainly be felt as a 
collision), they can pass through, collect, appropriate, abandon, edit, morph, 
change. Some discourses are abandoned outright, others wholly accepted; 
discourses can change but can also coexist. The discursive dimension to 
development is useful in exploring the continuity/discontinuity between the aims 
and outcomes of development strategy. 
Development thinkers and practitionners must embrace the political, and 
reject the ideas of neutrality and objectivity. We need to become comfortable with 
discomfort, and uncomfortably embrace the unsettling. The tendency in 
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development thinking is to contain 'development problems' - in concepts, 
categories, paradigms, models - but what is required is a shaking loose - freeing 
'problems' from calcified ideas that confine and constrict a deeper understanding 
of the issues facing the international development agenda. In this view, 
development becomes an ideology of opposition or dissent, becoming a 
mechanism for 'justice delivery' instead of 'aid delivery'. Indeed, the most 
important contribution donor development can make to the international peace 
agenda is to speak truth to power: that there is no one truth. 
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